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
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*American  
Military Government  
in Germany*

*By*

HAROLD ZINK

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*To*  
COLONEL CHARLES RYAN  
MAJOR FRANK JEBENS

*Brother Officers*  
*on the Board of Editors*  
*German Country Unit*  
*S.H.A.E.F.*

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## CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I The Importance of Military Government and Its Significance in Germany	1
II Preliminary Preparations	6
III Top Brass, Officers, and GIs	22
IV Military Government Staff and Planning Organization	41
V Military Government Organization in the Field	57
VI The Problem of Coordination	66
VII Military Government During Combat	79
VIII Building a New System of German Government	88
IX The Intermediate Phase of Military Government	104
X Military Government Settles Down in Germany	117
XI Denazification	130
XII The Problem of Educating the Germans	147
XIII The Goal of Democratization	165
XIV The Economic Program	187
XV American Military Government Policy in Germany	197
XVI The Role of the State Department in Germany	209
XVII The Role of the Navy	223
XVIII Public Relations and Intelligence	230
XIX Relations with the German People	237
XX The Berlin District	251
XXI Conclusion	260
Index	267



**AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT  
IN GERMANY**





## *Chapter 1* The Importance of Military Government and Its Significance in Germany

Military government is not a new thing under the sun, though such an impression is fairly widespread as a result of the wide publicity which it received during the campaigns in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, western Europe, Germany, and Japan. An examination of the detailed accounts of any of the past military engagements in which the United States has been involved will usually reveal the existence of some sort of military government activities however informal in character they may have been. As a matter of fact, it is virtually impossible to carry on a land war without making some provision for handling the civilian population who inhabit the territory used as a scene of battle. Even in desert warfare it is likely that there will be certain oases or other settled places to be taken.

In the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish American War, and World War I the military forces of the United States found it necessary to handle military government problems of various kinds. Civilians in the paths of the military forces had to be kept out of the way as far as that could be accomplished; various supplies, either of a routine or an emergency character, had to be obtained from the immediate vicinity of battle. As the combat forces moved on, supply lines and communications with the rear had to be maintained and safeguarded, often for a considerable period. And finally, at least a minimum provision had to be made for administering occupied territory until such time as Congress and the President saw fit to decide what should be done with it. In the Spanish American War this involved the administering of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine Islands for a time. In World War I it led to the occupation

of a part of the Rhineland in Germany and the establishment of a sort of American capital at Coblenz.

But military government organization in the past is a far cry from the military government which people read about in their local newspapers and heard discussed by their favorite radio commentators in 1945 and 1946. Military establishments in general have been on a more elaborate scale in World War II than ever before; military government has even surpassed most other military units in its rate of growth. One of the most important differences between World War II and earlier wars is that of specialization. In previous conflicts there was, of course, a measure of specialization, with infantry, cavalry, and artillery. But it is doubtful whether the soldier who fought in the Civil War or even the Spanish American War would be able to identify his type of fighting with the bombing, the paratroops, the tanks of diverse sorts, the flame throwers, and the almost incredible variety of techniques employed in World War II. Obviously the use of planes, parachutes, and the long list of highly complicated mechanical weapons calls for a considerable degree of skill and hence leads to soldiers who concentrate on piloting planes, driving tanks, and operating radar sets. It is not strange therefore that military government should have been modified by this emphasis on specialization.

In previous wars military government functions have been mainly performed by the officers and men who fired rifles and drove supply wagons. A certain military government job had to be done; so the commanding officer of combat forces on the spot detailed whatever officers and men were available at the moment to handle this work. Sometimes officers found themselves given more or less permanent assignments to this sort of duty, but even in such cases little or no provision was made for their training nor was much attention paid to their previous civilian background which might fit them for such tasks. Military government problems were comparatively simple in most cases and this arrangement worked out reasonably well.

In the early planning for World War II it was decided that a specialized military government program would be set up. G-5 or Civil Affairs staffs were provided at Theatre, Army Group, Army, and even corps and division levels—a most significant step. Officers were commissioned from civilian life on the basis of their professional skills to handle military government functions or they were

secured from other military units on the same basis. A training program shortly began to function both in the Army and Navy to provide general military indoctrination as well as specialized instruction in military government machinery and responsibilities. It was hoped that something of a similar character might be done for enlisted personnel through the Army Specialized Training Program organized on numerous university campuses, though the ASTP was not limited to military government.

Several thousand military government specialist officers were turned out by the Army and the Navy for staff and field work. The Army organized an elaborate system of country units, missions, G-5 staffs, and field detachments to be used throughout the world in handling military government problems. The Navy program was more limited by the nature of its operations, but it sent out military government officers to various bases, especially in the Pacific and also lent specialist officers to the Army for military government work at high headquarters in both the ETO and the Pacific.

During the operations in North Africa General Eisenhower discovered that the military government specialists relieved the combat forces of a heavy burden and that they actually were able to handle various problems more effectively than tactical officers detailed for that purpose. Consequently he requested the War Department to send out additional military government personnel so that he would be adequately supplied.

Military government officers accompanied the fighting troops to Sicily and on to Italy. As the combat forces pushed on North, many of the military government officers and men remained behind to take care of the local governments in the conquered areas.

On the basis of the experience in North Africa and the Mediterranean, it was decided to expand the military government program and to organize for similar work in France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, Austria, and Germany in Europe and for various places in the Pacific. Modifications were made as a result of the experience in Italy, but the general plans looking toward Europe and the Far East followed the lines already drawn.

The record of military government in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy is a most interesting one which justifies careful examination by those who seek a detailed knowledge of modern military government. Military government in the Far East has been less extensive than

was anticipated for various reasons; as a matter of fact large numbers of officers who devoted months to training for such undertakings and then endured the trying experience of waiting many more months to be called forward never received such orders and left military service without action. However, the military government program in Japan has aroused very great public interest, not only because of its aggressive character, but perhaps even more because of the decided skill of General MacArthur in the public relations field. Military government in Japan has had the advantage of profiting from the extensive experience in the North African-Mediterranean and European theatres. Moreover, it more or less skipped over the tactical phase which played such a role in the other theatres. Instead of having to start from scratch and construct a new system of government, military government in Japan took over the Japanese political structure which continued to operate. No serious student of military government can afford to overlook Japan.

But if a single area is to be selected for observation of military government it must clearly be Germany. The German record may be less spectacular than that in Japan, but the problems encountered have been more varied and have involved more extensive operations. The experience gained in North Africa and Italy made possible a maturity in Germany which the initial military government activities could not be expected to have. The military government organization in Germany surpassed any other in size, elaborateness, and scope of program. Here one may observe a training program, planning activities, the tactical phase, the intermediate phase, and the final period before the transition to a civil administration. Military government in Germany involved liaison with our Allies, as well as the collaboration with three of them in the occupation of Germany.

Military government in Germany was not the comparatively simple matter of American officers deciding what to do and then requiring Japanese officials to carry out the orders. Plans had to be coordinated with the English, Russians, and French. A new system of German regional and local government had to be organized from the ground up. An Allied Control Council for Germany and the Berlin District Military Government brought the American military government personnel into direct contact with military government officers of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and France and necessitated joint action. One may of course find the organization and the

program in Germany so complex and so confronted with difficulties of one kind and another that it is less easy to comprehend than the Japanese counterpart, but if military government in full strength and in full dress is to be examined, it must be in the Reich.

Military government in Germany is also significant because the future stakes involved are so high. Of course, it is important that Japan be dealt with in such a manner that she will cease to be a threat to world security and that the Far Eastern economy be made as stable as possible. But the German future seems to impinge even more seriously on the rest of the world. To begin with, it is probably fair to say that the Germans have been responsible for more international troubles than the Japanese. The location of Germany in Central Europe is even more commanding than that of Japan in the Far East. It is hardly an exaggeration to state that the return of anything like normalcy in Europe depends in large measure on developments in Germany. The German economy has long been closely geared into that of Europe; more than half of the steel of Europe and a considerable portion of the coal have come from Germany. The reestablishment of stable economic conditions in England, the low countries, France, the Scandinavian countries, and eastern Europe can only with difficulty if at all be achieved without the contribution of Germany. It is obvious that the security and economic prosperity of the world as a whole is closely tied up with Europe, much as many Americans would like to decree otherwise. We cannot be oblivious to what transpires in the Orient, but we are even more dependent on Europe. The success or failure of Allied military government in Germany will in the long run determine in large measure whether the world can look forward to peace and reasonably stable economic conditions or whether it will have to face again the horribly forbidding prospect of war on a world-wide scale and economic chaos.

## *Chapter 2 Preliminary Preparations*

Unlike the situation in earlier wars, when military government received little if any attention until an immediate problem had to be met, a great deal of planning was done and advance preparations made for military government operations in World War II.

Early in the war a military government section of the Office of the Provost Marshal General and a Civil Affairs Division were set up in the War Department in Washington to prepare for the establishment of a military government organization in the field and to work out plans which would govern the use of such an instrument. Progress was not always easy, however. Some of the more conservative officers in the War Department suspected any new organization on general principles. Existing agencies feared lest they might lose some of their authority. There was a strong feeling in some quarters that all emphasis should be placed on purely tactical operations, at least until the war had been won. Then, too, it was difficult to secure personnel at a time when there was a mad scramble for additional manpower on the part of virtually all military agencies.

It became apparent almost immediately that any military government organization in the field would have to be staffed at least to a considerable extent by personnel not at the time in the Army. To meet this problem a School of Military Government was established at Charlottesville, Virginia, on the campus of the University of Virginia, in 1942. Officers detailed from existing Army units and, to an increasing extent as time went on, officers commissioned direct from civil life on the basis of their professional qualifications attended this school for periods approximating two or three months.<sup>1</sup>

As the war progressed and military government officers proved their worth in North Africa, it was decided to enlarge the program

since the Charlottesville school could not possibly train sufficient officers. Arrangements were made to send several hundred officers recruited both from surpluses in various Army units and from civil life to Fort Custer, Michigan for a month's training in military government. At the conclusion of the month at Fort Custer these officers were distributed among CATS (Civil Affairs Training Schools) on various campuses including Harvard, Yale, Pittsburgh, Boston, Michigan, Northwestern, Western Reserve, Wisconsin, and Stanford Universities. Here they normally remained for two months. At the conclusion of that time they were sent abroad, stationed temporarily at replacement centers to await shipment overseas, or in the case of those newly commissioned from civil life sometimes returned to inactive status to await possible needs in the future. This program reached its height in the latter part of 1943, when as many as seven hundred officers received training at Fort Custer in a single month. The program of commissioning direct from civil life came to an end in September, 1943 and the CATS wound up their training for Germany in early 1944, though some of them continued programs for the Pacific after that time.

With almost no previous experience to serve as a guide, the instruction of the civil affairs officers had to be set up on an experimental basis. As experience was gained, changes were made to some extent. The School of Military Government at Charlottesville always varied somewhat from the Fort Custer-CATS setup.

The School of Military Government at Charlottesville was usually considered the center for training the top military government officers. The average rank of the officers included in the student body was somewhat higher, though the other schools could boast of numerous lieutenant colonels and full colonels too. Somewhat more "pull" was alleged to be required to get assigned to Charlottesville and the widespread feeling both among Charlottesville officers and CATS officers seemed to be that the former would get the staff jobs while the latter would constitute the organization in the field. Actually, this did not turn out to be the case, at least entirely, since many of the staff positions fell to other than Charlottesville products. There was comparatively little military drill at Charlottesville and the physical exercise required was slight. Range work with the .45, carbine, Garand, and submachine gun naturally came in for little attention. The officers lived in hotels or private homes, did not have to report for



duty until a gentleman's hour, and in general had little of the military regimentation which characterized a large Army post such as Fort Custer.

The officers who received their training at Fort Custer plunged at once into a distinctly military environment. They were housed in ordinary GI barracks, with some thirty officers quartered in a single dormitory room. A cot, a straight chair, and a plain deal table together with forty or fifty square feet of floor space constituted their quarters. Plumbing facilities were far more primitive than those furnished by hotels or modern housing. The hour for arising was six or earlier; every officer had to stand reveille at 6:20; and breakfast as well as other meals were served in a regular GI mess hall crowded with long wooden tables and benches and heated by huge stoves.

On every day except Sunday, even in the wintry weather and snow of January, all officers at Fort Custer marched for an hour over a course covering three miles or so. In addition, they were drilled by regular Army men in military tactics and given physical training in the post gym. They sat in classes for approximately nine hours six days per week. Though GIs were transported through the snow to the firing range two or more miles away, the officers in the Military Government School marched both ways and frequently became so cold that they could hardly pull the trigger of their .45s or carbines. The physical training program largely ignored the fact that the officers averaged something like forty-five years in age and undoubtedly contributed to the heart condition which later sent some officers home from Germany. But the mess was excellent, perhaps the best encountered anywhere by the officers involved. The cheerfulness with which the officers, especially those directly commissioned from civil life, took the regimentation was remarkable, though there was plenty of good humored complaining.

The CATS naturally varied from university to university, especially in physical setup. Housing depended upon local supply, but the individual officer was given considerable theoretical leeway. There was some drill and physical training, but in both instances less regimented than at Fort Custer. The schedule of classes was heavy by ordinary academic standards, yet lighter than at Custer. Officers had more free time—some lived with their families who had come to join them. Most of the instruction was given by civilians in contrast to the almost universal military at Custer.

The curriculum at both Charlottesville and Custer-CATS combined general military indoctrination with courses intended to prepare officers for military government assignments. In the general military courses officers learned something of military law, military policing, military security, aircraft identification, the problem of supply, Army correspondence, the Army postal system, military courtesy, and almost everything else military in character. Much of the information was given in a single lecture or a series of two or three lectures and naturally did not cover details. Obviously this part of the training proved very boring to those officers who had been through other training schools and in numerous cases had had considerable practical experience. The military government side of the curriculum consisted of instruction in the history of military government, the mission of military government, public administration, and the people, geography, and institutions of the people of a certain area: Germany, Italy, France, and so forth. Though Charlottesville did little with language instruction during its early classes and perhaps never emphasized language a great deal, the CATS placed heavy stress on the study of the language of the area in which an officer expected to be assigned.

Considering the lack of past experience, the training at both Charlottesville and Custer-CATS was effective, at least for the immediate job to be done. Extensive use was made of visual aids, including training films, slides, charts, and models, and this served a most useful purpose. Some of the older films left a good deal to be desired, it is true, and some of them were less applicable to military government than others; but in general they proved to be reasonably instructive and interesting. Instructors, both military and civil, took their jobs seriously and by and large did a competent job under rather difficult circumstances. Many had little or no practical experience in the fields in which they were assigned; yet they tried hard to do an effective job. There were a few instructors who could only read mimeographed material provided them. There were also a few impresarios who had to show off their own brilliance.

Doubtless the most serious handicap of those handling the military government courses, especially as they related to military government operations in the current war, was their lack of current information. Even after a considerable amount of material was available as a result of actual operations in the Mediterranean Theatre and the

ETO, it was difficult for the military government instructors in the United States to get it. There is good reason to argue that these officers should have been detailed for military government work in the field for brief periods and that officers with experience in the ETO should have been assigned to the schools in the United States as instructors. But there was very little of this done. Officers with foreign experience not infrequently visited military government schools as time went on and spoke once or twice, but this sporadic type of lecture did not always fit into the course of instruction; it certainly did not suffice to bring to the trainees a firsthand picture of what was going on in the field.

The language instruction was widely acclaimed as revolutionary in character. The most extravagant promises were made to the effect that after two months officers with no previous knowledge of a language would be fluent speakers. Instructors, who were usually civilians, included numerous natives of the countries whose language was being studied. An attempt was made to divide up the officers into small enough groups so that individual participation would be encouraged. Conversational skill was especially emphasized.

No doubt many officers made a good start in acquiring a knowledge of certain languages; some, with special aptitude or the advantage of a previous foundation, finished the courses with real ability to use the language as a tool. But the great majority of the officers never acquired enough of any foreign language to be able to use it with any degree of facility. Had the same sort of instruction been continued overseas during the long months that many officers waited for action, the story might have been different. As it turned out, what language instruction there was overseas was conducted for the most part by officers in the group who knew something about a language and had little else to do. Most of these had apparently had little experience in teaching language. All too often, they were filled with enthusiasm for some special method or emphasis and organized their courses on that basis. The net result was that the great majority of military government officers lost all interest, remained away from class as often as they could, and not only failed to progress but actually forgot most of what they had learned of the language in the United States.

Considerable emphasis was placed on the problem method, especially toward the end of a course of instruction. Small groups of

officers, simulating a detachment, were formed to study, analyze, and prepare recommendations for action on a problem relating to military government. This was intended to encourage initiative and to obviate a theoretical approach. Some very elaborate reports were prepared, especially at Charlottesville. There is some reason to conclude that this method produced less valuable results than the time and energy spent would justify, especially in view of the limited period available for training purposes, but it may have worked effectively in some instances. At least it stirred up interest on the part of many trainees. If the time spent had been devoted to areal study, it would perhaps have contributed more in the long run, since the rank and file of officers were woefully lacking in their knowledge of German institutions, culture, and psychology upon arrival in Germany.

As the military government training program in the United States developed, increasing emphasis was placed upon areal instruction. But with officers being prepared for the entire European Theatre of Operations, this involved the difficult problem of assignment to a specific country at an early stage or a program of instruction covering not only Germany but France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and even Norway and Denmark. It was not regarded as feasible at this stage to earmark officers in every case for service in a specific country, though in the CATS at least some classification was made. The likelihood that officers might be employed in more than a single country added to the difficulties. However, an areal program which attempted to cover most of Western Europe in the limited time available necessarily had to be so general in character that it had serious limitations.

Inasmuch as the German occupation turned out to be the principal assignment in most cases and the one which perhaps most of all needed a detailed areal knowledge, it might have been wise to have concentrated on Germany, but this was not so clearly apparent at the time the training was being carried on. The net result was that much of the areal program resembled basic university courses dealing with the history and civilization of Western Europe. Such instruction was certainly not without value, but it was general in character and did not give the detailed knowledge that was so widely needed to handle concrete German problems.

While most of the areal instructors were distinctly interested in doing an effective job, a good many lacked any very extensive first-

hand knowledge of Germany themselves. The result was that they tended to pass on to students what they had read in various books. Unfortunately there had been sweeping changes in Germany since the books were written and the result was that much of the information supposedly having to do with the current situation was badly out-of-date. Even in the case of instructors who could claim top standing as experts in various aspects of German affairs, this difficulty of obtaining accurate information loomed, since comparatively little detailed material from Germany reached the United States after 1941 despite significant changes that took place.

With military government officers in Germany having to cope with concrete problems of a highly complicated character in such fields as German political structure, legal system and courts, religious affairs, education, transportation, communications, trade and industry, and food and agriculture, what was especially needed was areal instruction in these specialized realms rather than general knowledge of the history of the country. But the limited time available for training purposes, the difficulty of making assignments to special fields at this early stage, and the small supply of persons qualified to carry on such instruction apparently had the effect of making this more or less out of the question.

By the early spring of 1944 most of the military government officers who had been trained for service in Germany had arrived in England. The British Government placed the extensive barracks, built in 1937-38 at Shrivenham on the border of Berkshire and Wiltshire for use as a national military academy, at the disposal of the military government program and here more than two thousand American officers were collected for further training and to await developments.

Shrivenham is located in a very pretty rural section of western England on the borders of the area made famous by Thomas Hardy in his novels. The historic White Horse, the reputed spot where King George met the dragon, some very old and picturesque villages, several lovely ancient stone churches, together with the rolling hills and attractive vegetation, contributed to the interest of the place. However, its location nine miles from the nearest city—and that the railroad junction of Swindon with few attractions—palled on many officers after the novelty of the countryside had worn off, and that did not require long.

Four huge brick barracks, with unusual facilities in the way of plumbing, heating, and mess halls in comparison with the average military post overseas, housed the officers, in rooms accommodating from half a dozen to fifteen each. Large refectory-style mess halls provided more than the ordinary space for meals. Buildings for headquarters offices, storage of supplies, class rooms, and recreational purposes may not have been as adequate as the housing facilities, but they were better than the average.

The training program at Shrivenham sought to continue what had been started in the United States, but with less in the way of staff provisions or equipment. Much of the instructional work was performed by members of the group who knew something of a foreign language or had been teachers at Fort Custer or Charlottesville; officers who had seen service in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy supplemented their efforts. Various training films were collected and exhibited. But the program did not fare well. Many officers, especially those who had recently seen active service in military government detachments in North Africa and Italy, felt that additional training served no useful purpose because it was theoretical in character and merely repeated what they had already heard many times. After seeing a single training film three or four times, it was not strange that officers were not eager to attend another showing. Addresses by officers from the Mediterranean stirred up some interest. Speakers brought in from OSS and various British military agencies sometimes aroused the officers and again left them cold. A project to simulate conditions to be encountered in the field, with officers assigned to various detachments as German officials or as tactical officers, probably created the most interest.

Most of the officers had been accustomed to more than usually active lives as civilians. After several months of training they often grew apathetic and indifferent. The lack of outside stimulation due to the isolated location of the training center, the inadequate special service program, the mingling of officers of all degrees of training and practical experience, all combined to make a difficult situation. Even with the most expert and adequate staff to head up the training, it would have been unlikely that great enthusiasm would have been forthcoming. With a comparatively small and amateurish staff which instead of being sympathetic blamed the officers and accused them of incurable laziness, the situation became increasingly unsatis-

#### 14 AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY

factory. Despite the roll calls, threats, and divers pressures exerted to compel attendance, the absence rate became appalling.

The status of civil affairs officers at Shrivenham was not very clear. They held commissions and drew the full pay and allowance of Army officers; yet in many respects they were not treated as officers. With no definite assignments other than to a pool, a training program of sorts still in progress, and perhaps most significant of all so large a group that even those holding field grade were very numerous, it was probably inevitable that this situation should have existed in some measure. But having gone through at least three months of training in the United States in most instances and frequently having served for months or even years with some other military organization before entering military government, the military government personnel after arriving in England felt that it was time to throw off childish status. If those fresh from the United States had such a reaction, it may be imagined what those who had had additional training in North Africa and often active service in Sicily and Italy felt. Wise commanding officers would have appreciated this psychological problem and done everything possible to minimize it. The commanding officers at Shrivenham did not always appear to realize the situation and indeed at times even seemed to go out of their way to aggravate it.

The group of more than two thousand military government specialist officers at Shrivenham had to be organized into some sort of system for administrative purposes. Obviously they could not be permitted to wander over England at a time when the military situation remained highly critical; practical considerations made it necessary to house them in quarters intended for young cadets, with as many as fifteen in a single room. Of course the situation was far from ideal, considering the backgrounds of the military government officers, but it might have been helped if reasonable care had been given to the details of organization. However, instead of selecting the leaders among the officers to serve as company and regimental commanders, the commanding officers at Shrivenham often designated officers who had few professional or personal qualifications for these positions. For example, the manager of a small five and ten cent store years younger than the specialist officers whom he commanded was placed over a company of highly trained specialists, many of whom had enjoyed notable recognition at home. To make matters

worse, he was assisted by a major who had failed to show up at the Port of Embarkation in the United States on sailing day because he could not part from his "sweetie"—obviously a most serious offense punishable by years of imprisonment. Instead of being court martialled for his dereliction of duty, this former pugilist with little or no educational or professional background was shipped over at a later date and made deputy commander of a company of military government officers.

With the commanding officer during the critical period committed to the idea that the most suitable training for military government officers would be eight hours per day on the drill field or doing field marches, it was to be expected that the basic purpose of military government personnel would be more or less ignored. No training program of significance could have been carried on under such a setup, even if other factors had permitted. Instead of continuing areal study and language instruction in a serious fashion which might have made a considerable difference in the performance of the military government officers at a later date in Germany, many hours were devoted to tramping through the countryside with full packs on back and to close-order drill, though few if any military government personnel had any occasion to hike or drill in connection with their jobs. Perhaps the most nonsensical emphasis of the commanding officer at Shrivenham took the form of parades. Whether because he loved to see masses of soldiers pass by in review or whether he derived a fiendish satisfaction from compelling middle-aged officers to go through the motions of young GIs, this colonel staged fairly frequent formal parades which top brass passing through were invited to witness. Hours were naturally consumed in practicing for such affairs, but the effect on the morale was even more serious.

Though military government always had the problem of a shifting personnel and it was not uncommon for those trained for one country to be assigned to another, the work done at Shrivenham in making assignments was fairly significant. Three boards were set up to interview the numerous officers in person and to give tentative assignments to various detachments and staffs. One was responsible for making assignments to military government teams or detachments which were to be placed under various American forces. A second made assignments to detachments that were to work with the British



Army. The third had the job of selecting officers for various staff positions. The task of classifying more than two thousand officers was not an easy one, especially with the plans for operation still somewhat vague. Naturally some of the officers were critical of the achievements of these assignment boards. However, on the whole the boards gave a good account of themselves. Their personnel might have been improved in certain instances, but in general it was reasonably well qualified. The attitude of the boards toward individual officers being interviewed varied somewhat, but in general it was courteous and there seemed to be a serious effort to handle a difficult job well. A considerable number of the military government officers after several interviews with one or more boards could not be given definite assignments even of a tentative character, because the paper organization did not seem to provide places for certain highly qualified specialists. These officers were finally assigned to a specialist pool, from which as time passed they were drained off in most cases for various jobs. Unfortunately quite a number of those assigned to the specialist pool lost their hope as the months passed and conditions seemed to deteriorate and hence some very valuable officers were not available at a later time when they were badly needed because they had managed to get out of military government into Psychological Warfare, the Surgeon General's Office, or some other organization.

As the spring of 1944 wore on and the date of invasion drew nearer, tentative assignments of officers to various military government regiments and detachments were completed and many officers moved to Eastbourne to join British military government detachments or were sent to Manchester along with British officers to be organized into detachments, receive their equipment, and add their enlisted personnel. Subsequently these detachments were ordered to various places in England to join the tactical units they were to assist. But a considerable number of specialists remained at Shrivenham until late June, when they were finally moved to Manchester for additional specialized training.

Despite the shortcomings of the training program very few who observed the records in action of those officers who had had such background in comparison with those who were brought in without training from other units because of shortages questioned the value of organized instruction in military government. The trained officers certainly did not meet every situation in a perfect manner; some of

them proved distinctly incompetent. But their general record of performance was so far above that of the tactical officers who were brought in later to assist in military government operations that even those who had sometimes doubted the value of the training program could not remain critics. The experience of American military government in Germany demonstrated about as conclusively as possible the wisdom of the decision to set up independent military government units *instead of relying on general military personnel for military government functions*, as had been done in the past.

Given a decision to establish a military government organization with its own personnel, it must follow that a considerable amount of preparation must be made in the way of materials for its training and use. Various manuals, handbooks, instructions, forms, reports, and reference books must be provided and few of these are already in existence in other military organizations.

The staff of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department did some work of this character, though its hands were not free to give anything like the amount of time required. The Office of Strategic Services came into the picture by undertaking the writing of numerous manuals dealing with Germany, France, Belgium, Holland, Italy, and other countries in general and with various aspects of these countries. Thus manuals appeared which dealt with German Civil Service, Political Parties, Legal System and Courts, Health and Welfare, Public Safety, Trade and Industry, Natural Resources, and many other topics. The State Department had its own staff studying various problems of special interest to it in the military government sphere. Corresponding agencies in England, notably CID, carried on similar activities and published various handbooks and manuals. Not to be forgotten are certain institutions somewhat outside the official channels, for example the University of Michigan which prepared approximately a dozen illuminating studies of various German states and provinces.

Much of this material could have been used to very great advantage in training military government officers, but unfortunately it was not available at the height of the training program. For one reason or another some of the material never became readily accessible. The studies made by the State Department doubtless contained much pertinent information that could have been distinctly valuable to planning staffs such as the German Country Unit of SHAEF, the US

Group CC for Germany, and G-5, USFET. But for some strange reason they could not be made available even to the Political Division of the US Group CC for Germany which was made up largely of State Department personnel and represented State Department interests. The studies of the University of Michigan must have been misplaced somewhere in transit, for most of them had not reached the offices which needed them in Europe late in 1945.

The quality of the material prepared in the United States and England for use by Allied military government in Germany varied considerably. The general War Department manuals may have lacked dramatic presentation—certainly few readers would have been intrigued by the monotonous format and lack of illustrative material—but they showed evidence of careful preparation and usually stated the regulations clearly.

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) studies naturally were not uniform in quality, since they came from various groups of research and analysis people. However, on the whole they proved disappointing to the higher headquarters staffs which probably used them most, because they so frequently lacked details, contented themselves with glittering generalities, did not make use of the most up-to-date sources available, and at times even included more errors than could have been reasonably expected.

The most useful source of material for planning purposes was put out by the British Combined Intelligence Department (CID), which incidentally used certain American officers in the work. The *Basic German Handbook*, which it issued, became widely used and undoubtedly contributed substantially to the efforts of military government planners in the ETO. Its bulk and size made it inconvenient to move about easily, but it proved to be a mine of useful information. While not always dependable factually, it was generally well thought of in that respect and presented quite up-to-date information. Its loose-leaf binder and frequent additions and revisions enhanced its value.

If there should be an occasion in the future to establish a military government organization, it may be hoped that more attention will be given to the preparation, distribution, and integration of materials which are essential to its effective operation. The delay in getting out materials is unfortunate, since much of the use comes at an early period. But that may not be possible to avoid unless continuing work

should be undertaken which is not always feasible. Instead of having several agencies engaged on these projects, often with no co-ordination apparent, it would be a decided advantage if a unified research program could be set up. This would not only obviate duplication, but in all probability ensure more detailed and accurate studies, since the trained personnel available could be used to greater effectiveness. Such a unified research agency might also tie in the efforts of the universities and serve as a channel through which all available material would be passed to the places where needed.

In addition to the various publications put out in the United States and Great Britain, military government contributed its own products, the most elaborate of which were doubtless the various *Handbooks for Military Government*, intended to serve as a constant companion and guide to the military government officers in the field. Early in 1944 a German Country Unit was set up as a special staff of the Supreme Headquarters along with a French Mission, a Belgian Mission, a Dutch Mission, a Norwegian Mission, and a Danish Mission. These units which varied in strength from approximately twenty-five to one hundred and fifty British and American officers, together with corresponding enlisted personnel, had various purposes. But as it turned out, their primary purpose, at least during the initial stage, was to prepare *Handbooks for Military Government* for the use of the military government officers who would make up the detachments to operate in Germany or to act as liaison officers with the governmental agencies in France, Belgium, and the other occupied countries.

The editorial board of the German Country Unit spent many hours every day for weeks in conference with representatives of functional divisions seeking modification of plans, attempting to iron out conflicts between two or more divisions, and urging either a condensation or expansion of material for use in the *Handbook for Military Government in Germany*. In many cases this required the greatest skill and patience, since the divisions resented any questioning of their contributions. Again and again after several unsatisfactory drafts had been submitted, the members of the board had to undertake rewriting themselves in order to provide plans that could be understood. The fact that this work was done during the height of the V-bomb period in London, with the frequent necessity of running to take shelter under alerts that sometimes lasted all day, added

of course to the pressure, especially after the buildings occupied by the German Country Unit had been badly damaged by a buzz bomb.

After three editions of the *Handbook for Military Government in Germany* had been issued in loose-leaf covers, it was expected that an authorized edition would be printed, inasmuch as a number of military government detachments were operating and it seemed probable that many more would be active shortly. But the printing required the approval of the Chief of Staff of SHAEF and the influence of the Morgenthau group was sufficient to hold the necessary authorization up. It was not until some months after the German Country Unit was dissolved that pressure as a result of current military government operations finally led to the long-delayed printing. Subsequently revisions were made by G-5, SHAEF and other editions prepared to embody changes.

It may be stated that the *Handbook for Military Government in Germany* represented an advance over the corresponding *Handbook* for Italy despite the shortcomings of the former. It was more carefully prepared, more adequate in organization, and more convenient in form. The bulk of the early Italian *Handbook* was such that the military government officers were said to have left it behind very early in the operations. The size and weight of the *German Handbook* in its printed editions did not unduly encumber the officers who had to carry it about. However, the hope that was often expressed during the early stages of preparing the *German Handbook* that this single volume would be all that military government officers in the field would have to carry with them faded as time passed. New organizations came into being and prepared manuals of one kind and another which they wanted used. The number of forms for the use of military officers became so large that it was not possible to include them in the *Handbook*, with the result that a separate publication of forms appeared. Various functional manuals, dealing with such matters as public safety, finance, local government and civil service, made their bow and asked for a place among the supplies to be furnished officers in the field.

By way of summary it may be pointed out that certain of the preliminary steps in the field of military government were of great significance. The establishment of a Civil Affairs Division in the War Department and the provision for G-5 staffs at theatre, Army Group, Army, and corps and division levels during the early months

of the war deserve the highest commendation. The decision to recruit specialists at a time when manpower was critically short required much courage but revealed unusual wisdom. The areal training at the various military government schools, despite the comparatively brief time available, served a useful purpose. Perhaps the greatest weakness took the form of a confusion as to the objectives. Great emphasis was placed on the combat functions of military government, with the result that few trainees had any doubt as to what was expected in keeping civilian populations from under the feet of our own forces or in "getting things going" in enemy territory. But relatively little attention was paid to the job of military government after hostilities had ceased. Indeed this was so skipped over that many military government officers considered their work completed within a few weeks or at least a few months after arriving in Germany. The result was that the tremendous task of getting Germany back on her feet after V-E Day was not foreseen with any degree of clarity. Military government planners in the ETO increasingly recognized the necessity of making provision for this phase of military government, but the rank and file of detachment personnel in the field probably never fully realized the importance of activating political parties, labor unions, and various cultural groups, reconstructing the German governmental system, reeducating the Germans, and other long-range problems because their training had not dealt more than passingly with such matters.

### *Chapter 3 Top Brass, Officers, and GIs*

In most phases of military activity much depends upon the personal element, even in this day of bombs, tanks, and mechanical equipment of many sorts. Military government may not be more dependent upon superior personnel than certain other military organizations, but it undoubtedly is one of those activities in which little mechanical equipment beyond the basic transport and supply items plays an important role and the men who are assigned determine in large measure the success or failure.

The ideal military government officer or enlisted man should have qualifications which would make the paragon blush. Physical vigor, courage, endurance, honesty, leadership and such basic qualities are taken for granted. Maturity of judgment, the ability to wait indefinitely without losing morale, specific professional attainments of a high order, the willingness to take a back seat during tactical operations without losing pride, all of these play an important role in military government.

Inasmuch as so much of the work of military government comes only after the fighting has ended, it is essential that officers and men have a sense of responsibility when it comes to remaining in military service a reasonable period. They should have a fluent knowledge of both the spoken and written language of the people with whom they are to deal and should be well acquainted with the history, culture, psychology, and political, social, and economic institutions of the country to which they are assigned. Unfortunately very few people can boast of such an array of qualifications in the United States or indeed in any other country. Moreover, by no means all of those few are available for military government.

The result is that military government personnel must be recruited from material available. Newsmen and others who may live

in glass houses themselves have not always appreciated this situation and their criticisms consequently have at times seemed to strike below the belt. On the other hand, it is not defensible to follow the course which some high officials have advocated: that it is necessary to take almost anyone who wants a job or is otherwise available irrespective of qualifications because it is futile trying to find those with superior qualifications. While the number of those with all of the qualifications listed above may be far too small to staff even a small military government organization, it is possible with the assistance of able personnel officers to find a large number of people who have the desirable attributes in considerable measure.

The record of American military government in Germany in World War II is reasonably good in matters of personnel on an overall basis. However, some bad mistakes were made and far too much indifference was exhibited by some very high ranking officers, especially as regards enlisted personnel.

### *Top Brass*

Perhaps no more prevalent and biting criticism is to be encountered among military government officers and men who served in Germany than that involving the leaders. Few of the top brass who had very much to do with military government escaped criticism and in all too many cases general officers and colonels were regarded as incompetent and in certain cases even psychologically abnormal.

Doubtless some and perhaps a large proportion of these complaints were unfair. Too much was expected of individual generals; too little attention was paid to the military system which in many instances was so complicated and involved that even an aggressive general had little influence. The long waiting, often in an anything but stimulating environment, on the part of men well established in their ways of life and accustomed to wide leeway and distinct activity, naturally promoted a most difficult morale problem. The junior status of military government as a military activity and the comparatively low prestige frequently enjoyed by military government units probably did not receive proper consideration as factors hampering the generals. And yet when all of the extenuating circumstances have been listed and duly weighed, there remains some basis for regarding certain of the military government leaders in



the ETO as unqualified for their assignments. And it is not too surprising that this should have been the case, for the ablest top brass were ordinarily assigned to combat duties or staff jobs in Washington. Even if the greatest emphasis had not been placed on combat units, military government might not have fared too well since it was one of the last major war activities to get organized.

The most respected and widely liked general officer was undoubtedly the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower. While he doubtless had some responsibility for many of the conditions military government officers complained of, he was infrequently held personally responsible. The general popularity of General Eisenhower in the ETO undoubtedly contributed to his enviable reputation among military government personnel. The fact that he was known to appreciate the role of military government in modern warfare also entered in. Being very human, large numbers of military government officers had an emotional affection for the Supreme Commander aroused by a personal appearance he made in their midst in England.

At a period when morale was at about its lowest level on account of lack of confidence in the commanding officer, dissatisfaction with mess and quarters, disappointments over lack of promotions, weariness engendered by waiting for action, and general homesickness, General Eisenhower, despite his many responsibilities shortly before D-Day, took occasion to drop in on the military government establishment at Shrivenham. The first thing he did, when he appeared before the officers who had been assembled in military formation to parade before him, was to ask them to break ranks and crowd up around him where they could hear his informal remarks. This may have been a small matter, but it made a big hit. He then proceeded in a most informal manner and without flourish to tell the more than two thousand officers that he regarded military government as highly important and that he had great confidence in them as vital instruments in the defeat of the Germans. Most of the officers were deeply impressed by his evident sincerity and his appreciation of the difficulty which they found in waiting about until it was time for them to become active.

The most serious criticism that could be directed at the Supreme Commander involves the great leeway permitted the commanding generals of the Army Groups and especially the Armies. Few would question the wisdom of permitting such freedom in tactical matters

or even as long as fighting continued. However, the exercise of such independence in matters relating to military government especially after V-E Day is another matter. There is little basis for denying that many of the difficulties of military government must be attributed to this freedom on the part of the Army commanding generals. General Eisenhower certainly had the theoretical authority to enforce an order compelling uniformity in military government policies throughout the ETO; he gave evidence of personally favoring such a course. Yet he failed to carry through this coordination. The demands made on the Supreme Commander by the vast Anglo-American military force in Europe were heavy. It was probably too much to expect that he could give detailed attention to every problem.

Though the Army commanders could not properly be included directly among military government personnel, their influence had so great an effect on military government operations that in many respects they might be considered the military government heads. Two generals stood out particularly in the American Zone: Lt. General A. M. Patch, the commanding general of the Seventh Army during a considerable period, and General George Patton, Jr. who commanded the Third Army at approximately the same critical time. Both generals, now unfortunately dead, established great records as tactical officers. They also left far-reaching impress on military government in the ETO, though this aspect of their careers is less known to the American public.

General Patch deserves a lot of credit for any success which military government may have achieved during the early period. Less colorful than certain other high ranking military leaders, General Patch combined the best qualities of a soldier in himself in an unusual manner. Living almost austere and working incessantly General Patch had little time for the small amenities of life. He did not seek publicity; yet he let his ideas be known with a frankness that sometimes startled observers. Few men in any walk of life have been as indifferent to currying favor with those in a position to exercise influence. Indeed he sometimes seemed to go out of his way to show his lack of respect—for example when a visiting party of Senator firemen visited his headquarters on what seemed to him a junket at a time when military operations were such as to make junkets undesirable, General Patch served them spam sandwiches for dinner.

But as far as military government was concerned, General Patch stood as a source of great strength. He believed that military government could perform a vital role in modern warfare and having arrived at that conclusion he gave the military government officers and detachments assigned to his headquarters and operating within his area great responsibilities. Moreover, he instructed his combat subordinates to give full support and to refrain from interference. The result was that military government established perhaps its best record in the Seventh Army under General Patch.

General Patton, in contrast to General Patch, never understood the function of military government in modern warfare. He doubtless honestly considered it an innovation which served no useful purpose and cluttered up the scene. He did of course recognize the necessity of performing the functions assigned to military government, but he apparently did not rate these very highly. Instead of having trained military government personnel, he preferred to use tactical officers for this purpose when they could be spared. The result was that at one period military government detachments, awaiting General Patton's orders, sat idly by while military government functions were being performed by surplus tactical officers. When the latter's record proved so unsatisfactory that pressure was brought from above, General Patton did permit the detachments to come in and take their places. However, very slight support was forthcoming and the tactical units, taking their cue from the commanding general, devoted much of their energy after fighting was over to interfering with the military government detachments. Orders of the latter were countermanded; German officials whom they had appointed were removed and others appointed. It was not surprising that many detachments found themselves so checked that they threw up their hands in despair. Surveys of military government operations in the American Zone revealed a striking contrast between the Third and Seventh Army territories, with the latter far in the lead.

As the defeat of Germany became imminent, Lt. General Lucius D. Clay appeared to take over the post as active head of the United States Group of the Control Council.<sup>1</sup> A regular Army officer from

<sup>1</sup> Lt. General Clay also held the position of deputy military governor in Germany and head of OMGUS. In 1947 he was made the American military governor and commanding general of the ETO.

the Engineering Corps, General Clay had had extensive experience both in engineering and in war mobilization. He it was who was dispatched in a hurry to get a badly needed harbor in France open for Allied shipping. On another occasion he had done effective work in connection with the construction of air fields in Brazil. As an associate of Director Byrnes of the War Mobilization Board, he had played an active role in the production of supplies at home, though he was finally forced out by those who felt that it was time to curtail military production in favor of a certain amount of civilian goods.

General Clay was branded a "stormy petrel" by the *New York Times* as he left the War Mobilization Board, but his record in Germany indicated that he is capable in his field. A clean-cut, slender built officer General Clay has little of the front sometimes associated with top brass. His conferences stress informality; he has no love for red tape. His secretaries and aides who combine personal agreeableness with competence reflect credit on their boss. Very few officers anywhere work as hard as General Clay who usually reaches his office long before the opening hour and not uncommonly remains after the closing hour far into the evening. The defects he displayed in Germany were probably primarily the result of his past background.

As an engineering officer General Clay had had little opportunity to make use of large staffs of experts or to deal with complicated political problems that require the most careful analysis before action. Thrown into an organization with a staff which at one time approximated two thousand highly trained officers and four thousand enlisted men, many of whom had professional skills, General Clay, to begin with at any rate, failed to get anything like full work out of these officers and men. Indeed at times large numbers of the officers or civilians with officer status had little or nothing to do.

Again with his engineering habit of rushing things through, General Clay took action which sometimes proved to be unsound, perhaps without consulting his specialist staff at all. Thus he impetuously decided after a ride through the countryside that he didn't like the names of German streets and parks and directed that not only Nazi names but the names of Bismarck, Frederick the Great, and other historical figures antedating the present century be obliterated. Again General Clay decided for some strange reason that German officials should not be permitted to carry titles such as president, trustee, com-

missioner, and director despite the fact that these titles have long been used in Germany and are also commonplace in the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.

The top brass who served on the G-5 staffs of SHAEF, USFET, the Army Groups, and Armies came from diverse backgrounds and possessed almost every imaginable characteristic. Some came from the regular Army; others had long interested themselves in the National Guard; still others were drawn from various civilian fields, notably the legal profession. The result was that some of the officers who served in key positions were thoroughly familiar with military practices, while others had had little or no contact with the professional military techniques before being commissioned in the Army of the United States. Very few of the leaders in the military government organizations had had any experience of a practical character in military government operations prior to World War II. Moreover, a comparatively small number could claim any considerable familiarity with any aspect of German government or socioeconomic institutions, language, psychology, or culture. Some of them had undergone brief training at Charlottesville and consequently had at least some knowledge of military government practices, but not a few lacked even this very elementary background.

Under the circumstances it is perhaps remarkable that the top brass assigned to military government performed as effectively as the record indicates. Many of them displayed an intense interest in the mission of military government and worked very faithfully to acquaint themselves with the general problem as well as the special problem represented by Germany. The turnover in key personnel was rapid in certain organizations and this of course had the effect of nullifying some of the efforts of otherwise untrained officers in the direction of acquiring reasonable familiarity with German military government. On the other hand, the tenure of certain top brass was remarkably stable and not a few of them could fairly claim to possess distinct competence after serving with the German Country Unit or G-5 of SHAEF or USFET for a year or more.

In addition to the inexperience of certain highly placed officers in the military government field, certain other valid criticisms may be made of some of the top brass. Military government in Germany drew at least a full share and probably more than a fair share of the senior colonels of the regular Army. Here were officers who had had

many years of professional experience in the Cavalry and other tactical branches of the Army and who knew every jot and tittle of traditional military procedure. But they lacked breadth of vision or sound judgment or adaptability, with the result that they were left as colonels while their juniors, the Eisenhowers, the Bradleys, and many others, became brigadier generals, major generals, lieutenant generals, and even full generals. Many of the former were to be pitied, since promotion meant the difference between success and failure in the professional military career. In certain cases their passing over may not have been warranted; had they had more influence or had they not been Cavalry officers, promotion to the rank of general officer might have come their way. At any rate those who were shuffled off on military government presented many complications. Most of them had little or no innate respect for this new-fangled military activity: prestige to them meant assignment to a tactical unit. A number were confident that they knew everything to be known in the military line and saw no reason for bothering about German problems. To them the running of a military government headquarters in Germany was substantially the same as operating a truck drivers' school or an airfield in the United States. With little appreciation of the job to be done in Germany or respect for the military government phase of the war effort, they obviously constituted a fairly heavy liability, especially when they concentrated their attention on jockeying for personal power, knocking the efforts of specialist military government officers down, and making themselves generally "difficult."

The senior colonels sometimes became even more of a problem when their bitterness over lack of promotion and their other frustrations led to the turning of their blood to gall. In a few cases they developed a sadism that not only had a most unfortunate effect on morale but actually served to destroy the effectiveness of personnel under their command. Insistence by them on long marches, close-order drill, formal parades, and other related practices in the case of senior officers who were in the 45-59 age group and indifference to mess and billets of the same officers may be cited as examples. The rank-consciousness of most of the senior colonels as well as certain brigadier generals was almost childish: in their eyes rank was the sole criterion for evaluating the capacity of an officer or enlisted man. Any colonel was to be regarded as capable of almost any respon-

sibility; a lieutenant or enlisted man irrespective of civilian background and expert knowledge counted for little.

Space does not permit even the enumeration of the legion of generals and full colonels who descended on military government, especially on the US Group, Control Council for Germany after V-E Day. General officers became so numerous that one could not shake the proverbial stick without hitting one, while "chicken" colonels became almost as commonplace as privates. One keenly observant regular Army colonel who had no connection with military government remarked once: "I always figured that military government in Germany would become the retiring center for the excess brass of the Army after V-E Day." He may have missed the mark slightly, but there was a large element of truth in his statement. After V-E Day large numbers of generals and full colonels in the United States found their work more or less finished. After having served as lieutenants and captains for fifteen or twenty years in most cases, few were at all eager to revert to their permanent grades of captain, major, and lieutenant colonel. Apparently they figured that the military government field offered the best chances for holding their temporary ranks. So they pulled every string known in Army circles to get assigned to Germany, and many succeeded.

Inasmuch as these officers outranked the officers who for a year or more had been preparing for the big job in Germany, they automatically in most cases took over the chief positions, under the Army rule which bases such matters on rank. The senior officers who had ably headed the divisions and made careful preparations for the actual work to be done in Germany found that there was little or nothing left for them. The specialists on German problems farther down the line were so buried under the deluge of rank above that they found it increasingly difficult to cut across the red tape necessary to get anything accomplished and hence in many cases either gave up trying to do anything or if possible got out entirely.

Some of the influx of brass, though lacking familiarity with what had been done to prepare for military government in Germany and usually with no past training or experience in European affairs, at least tried hard to remedy their defects. They admitted that it was all new to them and asked for all the help they could be given. The task of training numerous general officers and full colonels was hardly an inspiring one at such a late date, especially as the rapid

turnover became evident, but the experts at least received some encouragement from the willingness on the part of their successors to learn.

Unfortunately in all too many instances the newly arrived leaders felt entirely capable of meeting any demands made on them. If they were conscious of any lack of professional knowledge or concerned by their ignorance of German institutions, they certainly did not show it. Their main concern was that they receive the most palatial quarters, that they live in a style fitting their positions.

### *Officers*

The several thousand officers who were assigned to various military government headquarters or detachments in Germany came from every part of the United States, though Texas, California and New York made outstanding contributions in numbers. They differed from the officers of the Army in general in that they were distinctly older in age and consequently not only held somewhat higher ranks but had established positions in civilian life. To begin with, the minimum age for direct commissions from civil life was fixed at thirty-eight years. Officers transferring from other units could be as young as twenty-eight and some assignments made overseas brought in some officers below the age of twenty-eight years. At one time the average age of the military government officers in England ran to forty-five years. This was lowered as time went on and younger officers filtered in from various sources. Nevertheless, military government officers always remained a fairly mature group and sometimes felt themselves to be an aged group when surrounded by the numerous Air Force officers in their early twenties. A sizable number of military government officers belonged to the 50-60 age group. Some of these found the strain too severe and later returned home to resume civilian status, but many of the men in their fifties displayed an amazing ability to work long hours under far from ideal circumstances. Indeed some of the most energetic officers had passed the fifty-five-year mark.

Men of the age groups from which the majority of American military government officers assigned to Germany were drawn naturally have acquired much experience in business or a profession. It would be difficult to name any reputable occupation which could not find itself represented among the officers who served in military



government. There were public health officers, social workers, forestry experts, agronomists, journalists, bankers, foreign service officers, public-office holders, engineers, public utility experts, policemen, firemen, postal authorities, transportation directors, teachers, lawyers, wholesalers, and retailers. The largest number had engaged in some business enterprise, with lawyers perhaps following next in order.

Though it is dangerous to attempt an evaluation of the achievements of these many officers in private business and professions, it seems probable that they had attained a rather high measure of success. Some of the lawyers had left behind practices running to \$100,000 per year, while business men had in many cases made substantial fortunes. Journalists included the publishers and editors of large newspapers; education was represented by several university presidents, as well as by superintendents of metropolitan school systems. In contrast to the rank and file of Army officers who were making more money in the military service than in civil life, it is probable that military service represented a decided reduction in income for the average military government officer.

Income is, of course, not always a fair measure of achievement, to say nothing of character. There were officers assigned to military government duties in Germany who belonged to the ranks of rascals and crooks. A few were so brazen that they openly proclaimed their intention to profit as much as they could from their positions through blackmarket operations, selling favors, and even looting. Others, though not admitting such aims, possessed such weak characters that they succumbed to the temptations, especially in the matter of loot. But these officers constituted a very small minority of the entire number. It is probable that most of those who had wide contact with military government officers destined for Germany were impressed by their idealism, which it is only fair to say may have later been contaminated with cynicism as they became active.

But to begin with and to a considerable degree at a later date, the officers who served in military government in Germany, especially those commissioned direct from civil life, displayed something akin to missionary zeal. They left the comforts of home, the companionship of their families and friends, the businesses and professions which they had established to undergo tedious training, to live under the strain and discomforts of military life in the field, to receive a

reduced financial income, and to bear all too frequently the brunt of veiled if not open lack of respect of combat officers.

Some of them went into the work without realizing what the price would be, it is true; others sought adventure and the freedom of being away from the conventions of home and family. Yet after all of those factors are accounted for, it remains true that a considerable number performed their duties with good spirit, hoping that they could make a significant contribution to the war effort and to the peace to come after the war.

Military government officers who served in Germany fall roughly into four categories: (1) those commissioned directly from civil life, supposedly at least on the basis of professional qualifications, and trained during a period of several months for military government duties; (2) those transferred from other Army units but possessing theoretically at least special professional qualifications and given the same training noted above; (3) tactical officers assigned to military government duties in the ETO because of shortages of officers in categories 1 and 2 and usually given a few weeks of basic military government instruction in Europe; and (4) other officers of various sorts together with administrative personnel assigned to military government higher headquarters in Germany as the need arose.

During a period of months prior to September, 1943, when the program was terminated, several hundred officers were commissioned from civil life to be especially trained for military government duties. The minimum age of thirty-eight was intended to ensure that those selected had attained a high degree of maturity as well as wide experience in some professional or business field. A committee set up by the War Department in Washington, including both military and civilian members, spent a great deal of time sifting the records of many thousands of persons who had volunteered or been induced by the officer recruiting representative to submit statements of their qualifications. Without knowing exactly what the needs would be, the committee sought to secure a balanced number of specialists in the various fields related to military government.

Considering the lack of previous experience in such an undertaking as military government, the pressure of time, and the efforts made by various influential persons to get themselves or their friends commissioned, the committee did a good job. A number of persons with rather indifferent professional qualifications received approval

on the basis of their American Legion or World War I activities. Holders of political offices may have had an advantage, though in certain cases former governors and other prominent public officials came in with low ranks. Comparatively little attention was apparently given to higher headquarters or to planning staffs, with the result that the officers experienced in drafting plans, governmental research, and other skills so essential to the preliminary phase of military government were few in number.

Because of inaccurate information some selections were made of specialists who were not later used in their professional fields: a good example of this involved a group of newspaper men intended for a public relations setup in military government which never materialized. Possibly the committee can be fairly criticized on the score of turning down some people who were highly qualified professionally and eager to serve. Yet when all of these items have been weighed, it still must be admitted that a creditable job of selection was accomplished. Most of those chosen received commissions ranging from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel, with captains and majors the most numerous, in the specialist reserve.

In commenting on the American military government setup in Germany, a regular Army colonel, who had no connection with military government but had long been assigned to the General Staff of the Army in Washington, remarked that in his opinion military government operated under the severe handicap of being organized comparatively late in the war. He went on to explain that it was his experience that the most efficient and able officers were snatched up by the Army units which functioned from the early stages and that as other units were organized they had to content themselves with decreasingly superior officer personnel because many of the officers available were those who had proved unsatisfactory in earlier assignments. The experience of American military government in Germany gives some weight to this observation, but it fortunately did not apply as fully as the categorical statement would imply. In so far as the officers commissioned directly from civil life were involved—and they constituted a sizable proportion though as time went on not a majority—this handicap entered in slightly if at all. In the case of the large number of officers assigned from other military units, it obviously did play some part, despite the specifications drawn up as minimum qualifications.

Some very able officers came to military government in Germany as a result of transfers from other military units. Some of them had completed work that needed to be done and hence were available for new assignments; others may not have given superior performance in early assignments because they had not found their niches or because they had personal difficulties with temperamental commanding officers. There were, it is true, a number of officers who came in under this system who not only failed to carry their weight but actually weakened the military government program. Many of the officers who refused to benefit from the training designed for military government officers, preferring to sit or recline on their bunks during the day, came from those who had been transferred from other units to military government, often against their own desires. The rascals and looters also crept in this way as a rule. But it would be most unfair to assume that the great majority of those officers transferred to military government from other units failed to make a substantial contribution. While as a group they undoubtedly could not equal the specialists on a professional basis, they had enjoyed military experience which often proved valuable and which the former frequently lacked.

The tactical officers assigned in the ETO to military government duties in Germany did not as a rule begin to compare with the specialists or the officers transferred from other units and trained in the United States. Nor could this be reasonably expected. Few of them had any substantial background in the type of work involved. The training they received relating to military government covered a brief period and sought to inculcate the bare essentials. Moreover, these officers came to military government at a late date, when it appeared that not enough trained personnel had been provided. The most important assignments had been made and they necessarily had to take the spots that remained. Some of them had little or no interest in military government and did no more than they had to in that capacity. A good many had gone through a long period of active fighting, were war weary, and felt that they had done their share and should be returned home.

As the US Group, Control Council for Germany expanded and G-5, SHAEF and later G-5, USFET required staffs, most of the officers trained in military government had already been assigned to various military government detachments in the field. Their com-

manding officers were reluctant to release them for reassignment and in many cases absolutely refused to let officers go. Before V-E Day and the deluge of officers from the United States and tactical units in the ETO who descended on higher headquarters, the personnel problem in these headquarters often reached a critical state. Qualified officers and some not too well qualified were snapped up wherever found in the ETO or the United States. Few if any of these received formal military government training, though they frequently became more or less familiar with military government problems as time went on through their contacts and work.

The failure of the early military government planning to provide an adequate supply of staff officers was a serious defect. The argument that the administrative officers assigned to jobs at higher military government headquarters needed no military government background proved itself fallacious. At least the experience of the US Group, Control Council for Germany with a succession of administrative officers who lacked such background, would seem to point in this direction. The unsatisfactory character of the system of general administration, the virtual breakdown of the transportation facilities for other than generals, the poor mess arrangements extending from early days in England over a period of many months to Berlin, all to a greater or less degree probably went back to the failure on the part of the officers responsible to realize what sort of organization they belonged to, what its problems were, and what its mission consisted of. Of course, there were individual officers in this fourth category who proved their worth and contributed very substantially to the program of military government.

In conclusion, it seems fair to state that the officers assigned to military government work in Germany as a whole did a very creditable job. When one takes into account the handicaps under which they worked—absence of any clear policy from Washington, frequent lack of support from tactical units, poor equipment at least until they settled down in Germany, discrimination in the matter of promotions—it is perhaps remarkable that they gave the performance they did. Representatives from higher headquarters who visited the operating detachments in the field usually developed a considerable feeling of pride as a result of the high degree of initiative and interest encountered.

Looking back—which is always much easier than looking forward

—it would seem that the most serious weakness in the officer personnel program was the failure to make provision for replacements as V-E Day slipped into the background. Apparently it was the expectation that the specialist officers would remain indefinitely in Germany until the work of military government had been wound up. With the emphasis placed on recruiting officers with broad and successful civilian professional experience, it was unrealistic to expect that the body of these would be available for any considerable period after the defeat of Germany, for various pressures from the United States would require their return irrespective of formal rules and regulations. Despite the classification of military government officers in the critical category as not coming within the point system, the majority of these officers managed to get out of the Army during the months following V-E Day. Thus at a very critical period American military government in Germany found itself without adequate personnel, forced to rely on any officers available for assignment whether trained in anything relating to military government or not. A training program of sizable proportions started before V-E Day or just as soon thereafter as possible aimed at supplying military government replacements in Germany might have served a most useful purpose.

### *Enlisted Personnel*

The role of enlisted personnel in military government is very important, though it apparently received comparatively little over-all attention from the top, during World War II. If there is any military unit where the adage that a soldier is supposed to let his officers do the thinking applies it is certainly not military government. Much of the work to be performed by enlisted personnel in military government calls for professional skill of a high order. Even where the duties to be handled may be routine, the environment in which the work is done frequently requires unusual personal qualities on the part of enlisted men.

While the ratio of enlisted men to officers varied a good deal from place to place in military government, the total number of the former was approximately twice that of the latter. In the US Group, Council for Germany at the highwater mark some four thousand enlisted men and women had assignments either at headquarters or in the various service units. G-5, SHAEF and G-5, USFET, the European Civil Affairs Division, and the many detachments in

Germany all used many enlisted men and some of them had enlisted women.

The Army Specialized Training Program set up on many university campuses in the United States was expected to provide large numbers of adequately trained persons for use in military government. But the ASTP never seemed to enjoy the full support of the highest authorities in the Army or in the War Department for that matter. Hence though many of the very ablest young men in the student bodies of American universities volunteered for the ASTP in preference to the V programs of the Navy and the officer course of the Marine Corps, they discovered that they had been "sold down the river" in very large measure. Not only were the implied promises of commissions as officers almost completely ignored, but the young men found that they were given all too little opportunity to use their specialized knowledge as developed either in their universities or in the ASTP courses. On the plea of filling the gaps in infantry and engineer units, large numbers of the ASTP men were taken from their specialties and assigned to various other services.

The evidence has not been presented on which these decisions were made and hence it is impossible to judge the necessity of the step. However, the contrast to the policy of a much more hard-pressed Great Britain who, despite the demands and pressures, directed its trained university men and even public school men to Army positions where they could use their special training to best advantage places a serious question as to the justification of what was done. Certainly the subsequent need on the part of military government in Germany for men of unusual personal ability, coupled with training in the language, customs, and institutions of the Reich, led to serious doubts as to the wisdom of the large-scale scuttling of the ASTP.

It would be interesting to know how many of the ASTP men were ever used for specialized work. Some two thousand were collected for shipment to the ETO and earmarked for the use of military government. When they arrived in Manchester, England, they were publicized as the highest ranking I.Q. group in the entire Army. Reports as to their language ability indicated that such a skill did not determine their selection in any large measure from the rank and file of ASTP men in the United States. But the level of ability of the men reached a high point. Indeed a good many of them were

probably equal if not superior to the officers under whom they served. One major who commanded a military government detachment, upon being asked how he liked the enlisted men whom he had received from the Manchester pool, replied that he did not care for them much. Asked to explain why, he remarked, "They know too much."

When the time came to assemble staffs of enlisted men for the US Group, Control Council for Germany, G-5, SHAEF, and G-5, USFET, ASTP men had disappeared, been exhausted, lost track of, or otherwise been dispersed. No amount of search ever produced more than a very few of them, though thousands had been trained at home. The combination of the apathy of those responsible in the Army and the pressing need for enlisted personnel at higher headquarters led to the most fantastic situation. The tactical and service units were willing to give up only battle casualties. Hence despite the need for enlisted personnel with the very best training and personal qualifications, the US Group, Control Council for Germany had to depend in large measure during its most critical period of growth on psycho-neurotics who had broken down under Army life or those so severely wounded that they could not be sent back to fighting units.

It may be noted that the psycho-neurotics caused relatively little difficulty, despite the warnings sent out to administrative personnel to be prepared for all sorts of emotional crises. Except for the fact that they usually had very little specialized knowledge that fitted them for full use by the various offices, they proved reasonably satisfactory. In comparison with some of the State Department clerks who were brought over to serve as stenographers and secretaries, the "psychos," as they were called, turned out to be quite normal in emotional stability. Some of them curiously enough delighted in proclaiming to the world that they had been classified as "psychos" by the Army.

It is a credit to the enlisted men, who not infrequently had achieved more than average success in civil life, that they adapted themselves to the far from easy life of military government personnel. Particularly if they were in their thirties and had become well established in their habits, it required great self-discipline to live in the quarters provided enlisted personnel and satisfy themselves with the mess facilities usually available. And when holders of Ph.Ds and LL.Bs, with established professional records behind them, had to



serve under officers with far less in the way of educational training or professional success, the situation became very difficult indeed.

It may be questioned whether a military establishment can be efficiently operated on a truly democratic basis during wartime, at least when it comes to the everyday fundamental relations between officers and men. At any rate service as an enlisted man in American military government in Germany was not an easy experience for the more mature or professionally established. Some officers concluded that they would prefer not to have enlisted men with professional degrees on their staff unless they could be given some chance of reasonable promotion. And it may be added that, although a few enlisted men were eventually commissioned in military government in Germany, the chances were far from good.

The military arrangement of having two systems for supervising enlisted personnel working in higher headquarters complicated the problem. During the day the men were under the command of the officers in the various divisions in which they worked. At night and when off duty, they were controlled by other officers who had no professional assignment at headquarters and usually had little in the way of outstanding civilian accomplishments. The officers under whom they worked during the day in general had a genuine interest in and respect for their enlisted men and not only felt deep sympathy for their difficult positions but were anxious to help them improve their conditions. The officers who commanded outside of office hours and controlled such things as passes and KP not uncommonly had the idea that their mission was to grind the men down as far as possible. Passes were held up; frequent KP passed around, even to noncoms; and an ugly personal attitude all too frequently displayed. Highly valuable enlisted men who performed services often considered of an officer type were hauled off their jobs for a day of KP or guard service, despite the indignation of the headquarters officers who depended upon their services.

## *Chapter 4 Military Government Staff and Planning Organization*

In dealing with the organization set up for purposes of military government in Germany it is possible to start at the top and move down or to consider the field detachments first and then work up to the higher levels. Considering the great importance of the detachments there is good argument for beginning at the bottom, but the military chain of command operates in the reverse direction and for that reason it is simpler to follow its lines.

Inasmuch as this study deals only with military government in Germany, it is not appropriate to consider the Washington level in detail, though the chain of command obviously starts there. In passing, however, it may be noted that the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department serves as the central agency for military government affairs of the Army throughout the world and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff furnish the basic directives to theatre commanders. The Assistant Secretary of War has devoted considerable time to military government matters. Mention should be made of SWNCC, a coordinating committee made up of representatives of the State, War, and Navy Departments, and of an Assistant Secretary of State who gives his time to occupied areas. Finally, of course there is the President of the United States in his capacity as commander-in-chief. With military government so closely related to the highest political matters, the role of the President may be unusually important.

Perhaps the most serious weakness at the Washington end is the lack of any single center of responsibility. Even during the early months of occupation this became apparent, but as time has passed and an integrated administration becomes more and more essential,

the weakness has become intensified. The War Department has the general operating responsibility, but the State Department must formulate the basic policy in large measure. It is impossible to draw anything like a clear-cut line between the two spheres, with the result that adequate handling of the over-all problem is difficult. A much needed modification seems to be the establishment of a separate operating agency on Occupied Areas to handle American occupational responsibilities in Germany and elsewhere. Obviously such an administrative establishment would find it essential to maintain close contact with both the War and State Departments, at the same time relieving them of direct responsibilities which neither is well suited to exercise.

In the European Theatre the general responsibility for military government in Germany is entrusted to the commanding general of American forces. But this officer has so many duties to perform that he must delegate the active direction in large measure. To the extent that he desires to play a part himself he has the opportunity to wield great influence, despite the basic decisions which are made in Washington.

The specific responsibility for drafting plans and policies for military government in Germany has been divided between Washington and the European Theatre of Operations. Broad policies are supposedly laid down by the highest political authorities in Washington, though they have not always been forthcoming. Within the policy decisions made in Washington, often on the basis of international agreements, various less important military government policies have been drafted in the ETO and most of the detailed planning has been carried on there rather than in the United States.

Early in 1944 the German Country Unit was set up in England to deal with these matters. With approximately 150 British and American officers assigned as a staff, this unit proceeded on the assumption that policy determination and military government planning would be handled on an Anglo-American rather than on a purely national basis. The German Country Unit variously occupied a position as a special staff of the Supreme Headquarters and as a military government unit under ECAD (European Civil Affairs Division). It was organized to parallel the German governmental organization and drafted plans for the control of the various Reich ministries. With almost no policies at the time available from Washington or

London, it had the very difficult task of making plans without any substantial guidance. Nevertheless, it made a very serious effort to perform its work and actually succeeded in drafting a series of plans which some consider superior to the later plans which grew out of the various JCS 1067 papers. At any rate its plans emphasized constructive action to a greater extent than was possible under the largely negative policies which were incorporated in the JCS 1067 papers after the meetings of the heads of states in Quebec, Yalta, and Potsdam. Three editions of the *Handbook for Military Government in Germany* were prepared by the German Country Unit during the spring and summer of 1944, together with several functional manuals containing detailed plans for public safety, local and regional government, and various other fields.

Some time during the summer of 1944 it was decided by the top authorities that military government planning should be handled on a national rather than on an Allied basis. The German Country Unit consequently came to an end in the late summer and the US Group, Control Council for Germany was organized to take its place in so far as the United States was concerned. The US Group CC for Germany, whose full name was long carefully guarded from the public, began to function in August, 1944, though it was not activated formally until October. It took over many of the American officers and enlisted men who had been assigned to the German Country Unit and for a time occupied the quarters in London which had been used by the latter. In the fall of 1944 it moved to Bushey Park on the outskirts of London where it remained until the spring of 1945.

Starting out in a modest fashion with approximately 150 officers and 250 enlisted personnel, the US Group CC proceeded to a considerable extent on the basis of what had already been started by the German Country Unit. Later when it appeared that there would be no functioning German governmental system to take over, a basic modification had to be made in the system of control, though much of the program remained fairly constant.

Though recommendations had been made by the ETO to Washington in regard to the organization of the US Group CC for Germany, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not see fit to follow them. Consequently the organization plan for the US Group CC did not follow the structure of German government and this led to serious difficulties which interfered with effective operations for many months and

indeed plagued the US Group CC throughout its existence. No provision at all was made for dealing with regional and local government and civil service in Germany, though few fields required as much attention. Even after a small section charged with planning for German local government was authorized in the winter of 1944, the general organization of the US Group CC remained unsatisfactory.

Space does not permit consideration of the many changes that were made in the organization chart of the US Group CC for Germany, but it is probably fair to state that the greatest weakness throughout was the failure to base the setup on the German system for which it had to plan. In general, organization was determined more by personal factors—the jockeying of the various brass hats for power—than by the job to be done. Thus at one time public safety, public health, public welfare, education, religious affairs, local government and civil service, and communications were all jumbled together into a single division, though manpower and transportation, both of which probably had less complicated fields to plan than either education or public safety, enjoyed the status of separate divisions. Education and religious affairs, despite their responsibilities, never received anything like fair recognition in the organization setup of the US Group CC for Germany. It was difficult to know where they might be located at any given moment, for at times they belonged to communications; again they were made a tail of public health. Army Ground, Air, and Navy Divisions always retained a considerable degree of autonomy and incidentally had large staffs running to a score or more of officers each at a time when local government and civil service, religious affairs, and education could together claim a grand total of some eight officers.

For many months the US Group CC for Germany remained a comparatively small agency, though it made vigorous requests for additional specialist officers. When it moved from near London to Versailles in the spring of 1945, it had some two hundred and fifty officers, more than four hundred GIs, and a fairly sizable number of foreign service officers and civilians. Though the refusal of the American chief of staff of SHAEF to authorize additional strength handicapped planning activities, it had at least one advantage. During the first six months of the existence of the US Group CC for Germany it was possible for every officer to know more or less all of the other officers in the entire group. Business was transacted quite informally

as a rule and it was consequently possible to get things done with little of the delay and red tape that were later characteristic.

After V-E Day the growth of the US Group CC for Germany was rapid. Even before the move was made to Höchst, near Frankfurt in Germany, in May and June of 1945, numerous high ranking surplus officers from the United States were coming to join the staff. Soon many surplus officers in the ETO were being added. The size of the staff grew from the small number of some 150 officers and 250 enlisted men to almost 2000 officers and more than 4000 enlisted men. The rank of officers which had long consisted mainly of captain, major, and lieutenant colonel blossomed out into large numbers of full colonels and various general officers. Large numbers of well paid civilians from the United States came to join such divisions as the trade and industry, food and agriculture, and legal. The old informality had become hardly more than a memory when the final move to Berlin was undertaken in the mid-summer of 1945. Not only was it impossible for any officer to know any large proportion of the entire staff, but the great influx of high rank with little background in German institutions or language made it difficult to plan with adequate effectiveness. The colonels and generals fresh from the United States tended to ignore the many months of careful work done by the German Country Unit and the US Group CC for Germany and all too often regarded the work of the US Group CC for Germany as similar to that of any military headquarters.

During the early days of the US Group CC it was assumed that this agency would not only do the planning for military government in Germany but also serve as the top American military government headquarters after Germany had been occupied. But with the formation of G-5 of USFET (United States Forces, European Theatre) it appeared that that staff considered itself as the top agency for military government control. Indeed by the midsummer of 1945 G-5 of USFET began to doubt whether the US Group CC for Germany had any authority for planning or drafting directives as far as the American Zone was concerned. It went so far as to maintain that the US Group CC for Germany could only deal with the few general matters which came under the Allied Control Council for Germany. A great deal of energy was lost in connection with this struggle which was largely personal in character, and for several months it was uncertain which agency could be considered the highest Amer-


ican military government headquarters. Despite the impressive beginning made by G-5 of USFET, later renamed the Office of Military Government, U.S. Zone, it was eventually decided to concentrate general responsibility for both planning and control in the older unit. However, this was not done until the US Group CC for Germany had become OMGUS. It was not until early 1946 that Berlin was made the military government headquarters of the United States in Germany and most of the staff of the Office of Military Government, U.S. Zone moved from Frankfurt to Berlin.

In the fall of 1945 the US Group CC for Germany ceased to exist and the Office of Military Government for Germany of the United States came into being. In reality this involved little more than a change in name. The commanding officer of the US Group CC for Germany became the commanding officer of OMGUS and the military and civilian personnel of the former went over to the latter. By this time the preliminary planning had been more or less completed and emphasis changed to the control angle. The OMGUS served as the staff of the American military governor who was also the United States representative on the Allied Control Council for Germany. It was immediately under the American deputy military governor who occupied the seat of the United States on the Coordinating Committee. Officers assigned to OMGUS served on the working committees and secretariat of the Allied Control Council and performed staff duties for military government in the American Zone.

In order to obtain anything like a clear picture of military government in Germany it is necessary, beyond the US Group CC for Germany-OMGUS, to differentiate the period prior to July, 1945 from the later period. A further subdivision of the period following the midsummer of 1945 into two phases will also be helpful.

### *The SHAEF Period*

During the period of the combined Anglo-American headquarters known as SHAEF, which covered all of the combat phase and some two months of transition following V-E Day, G-5 of SHAEF had the general responsibility for military government operations as delegated by the Supreme Commander. G-5 of SHAEF had both planning and operations staffs, but G-5 OPS (Operations) took



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precedence. The difficulty of securing specialist personnel and the failure of those in authority to perfect a well rounded organization led to serious weaknesses in G-5, SHAEF, especially in the planning area. Incredible as it may seem, no provision was made, at least until the final weeks, for any agency to deal with such a major problem as German regional and local government and civil service. Comparatively little provision was made for such fields as education, public welfare, and public safety. The influence and size of the legal and financial divisions was out of all proportion to the role of these functions. Even more serious in limiting the effectiveness of G-5, SHAEF must be placed the old problem of military jealousy. Though obviously closely related in purpose to the German Country Unit and the US Group CC for Germany, G-5 of SHAEF was not anxious to maintain effective working relations with these agencies. Even more serious was the gap which separated G-5 of SHAEF from the military government organizations in the field which it theoretically supervised and which should have looked to it for basic policies.

Immediately below G-5, SHAEF in the military government setup were the G-5 staffs of the Army Groups—the Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups holding the center of the scene in American military government operations. Under the strict rule that military government must follow the command channel, the relations between G-5, SHAEF and the G-5 staffs of the Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups,<sup>1</sup> instead of being direct, followed a devious route through the chief of staff of SHAEF to the commanding generals of the two Army Groups and thence through their chiefs of staff to the G-5 staffs of the Army Groups. All G-5, SHAEF supervision of the military government organization in the field had to be done through the Army Groups under the rigorous Army insistence on strictly following the lines of Army organization. Yet the basic military government operations were not in the hands of the Army Groups but in the control of the Armies. Consequently G-5, SHAEF, having to proceed by command channels to G-5, Army Groups, was still not in

<sup>1</sup> In the case of the Sixth Army Group the command-channel rule was enforced less than in the Twelfth Army Group. Despite the formal decision to use command channels in military government rather than permit the technical channels specified in the earlier handbooks, the Sixth Army managed to maintain close relations with G-5 of SHAEF, though it was forced to follow command channels with the Seventh Army.

a position to exercise anything like effective control over military government operations.

An order was early issued that G-5, SHAEF officers desiring to visit military government detachments in the field must be accompanied by Army Group representatives. Such representatives were not always available or at least were refused by the Army Group headquarters on the ground that information desired by G-5, SHAEF was already available at Army Group headquarters or would be obtained by Army Group and supplied to G-5, SHAEF. In those instances in which permission was granted to G-5 of SHAEF, Army Group representatives had the final say in arranging the itinerary and deciding what would be done in the visitation. Top brass from SHAEF could virtually always get out into the field because the fraternity to which they belonged ordained that generals be permitted to go pretty much where they pleased. However, officers below the rank of general officer often encountered barriers very hard to cross. The net result was that G-5, SHAEF not only found it difficult to exercise adequate supervision over military government operations in the field but frequently lacked detailed knowledge of what was taking place.

G-5 staffs of Army Groups varied somewhat from Army Group to Army Group, depending upon the desire of the commanding generals, but by and large they followed the pattern of G-5, SHAEF. They were headed by an assistant chief of staff, usually a colonel, and in addition to an executive officer and various administrative officers consisted of functional officers designated to deal respectively with legal, financial, economic, food and agriculture, public safety, public health and welfare, manpower and other areas.

The officers who served on the G-5 staffs of the Army Groups sometimes came from the ranks of those trained in military government and again had little or no background in the specialized areas with which they were supposed to deal. A great deal depended upon the commanding general of the Army Group and his assistant chief of staff in charge of G-5. If they had an understanding of the problem of military government, they usually saw to it that trained officers received assignments to the functional positions on the G-5 staffs; if they regarded the G-5 staff as merely an opportunity to place friends and relatives of friends the results were not too satisfactory.

Below the G-5 staffs of the Army Groups came the G-5 staffs of the Armies. Again under the command channel requirement the relationship between the two was indirect rather than direct, though informal contacts of a direct character often existed. G-5 staffs of the Armies followed the same general lines as G-5, SHAEF and G-5, Army Groups, with an assistant chief of staff at the head and various functional officers in addition to executive and administrative officers. Inasmuch as the actual military government operations headed up in the Army, the G-5 staffs of the latter might be as large or even larger in certain cases than those of the G-5, Army Groups. The Armies usually displayed more feeling of independence and consequently greater unwillingness to be interfered with from above than any other unit. Their generals often received great publicity and not infrequently displayed the temperament of a movie star. Hence the difficulties of G-5 of the Army Groups with G-5 of the Armies probably exceeded those already noted in the case of the US Group CC for Germany and G-5 of SHAEF or G-5 of SHAEF and G-5 of Army Groups. Representatives from the Army Groups often had to proceed as if they were from some foreign country when they wanted to go themselves or take representatives of G-5, SHAEF into the field. Special permission had to be sought for named officers to visit designated places for listed purposes and for strictly limited periods of time. Army representatives must accompany these outsiders to see that they got into no mischief, to prevent them from visiting any spots where it was not desired that observations be made, and to safeguard the Army authority and the Army pride.

The next echelon below the Army is the corps. The military government staff provided at corps headquarters ordinarily had a small number of officers assigned, but it performed rather important functions in locating the military government detachments in the field. Down the line further came the division which occupied a most significant position in military government. Though regiments and even companies constituting a division might be vitally interested in military government operations and frequently interfered so regularly with the detachments in their areas that for all practical purposes they handled military government matters themselves, the division usually served as the final command unit for purposes of military government administration.

The Army divisions maintained contact with the military govern-

ment detachments in their territories through field telephone installations and courier service. More than that, they not infrequently called conferences of the senior military government officers of the detachments within their territories to consider the over-all situation. Senior military government officers from the detachments frequently visited division headquarters to confer, while officers of divisional headquarters inspected the military government detachments and observed their operations. Even at this level military government orders had to follow the chain of command and go through the division commander, but the contact in comparison with those existing at higher levels was quite direct.

Finally, one must not lose sight of the European Civil Affairs Division, and its three regiments if one desires a complete picture of military government organization. During the training period prior to D-Day most of the military government officers in the ETO were directly under the ECAD. However, as detachments came into a state of preparedness and were assigned to the Armies, they pulled away from ECAD and from that time on had their most direct contacts with the Armies or their divisions. As has been pointed out above, the operational orders of the military government detachments in the field came from the Armies to which they belonged and not from ECAD. A specialist pool remained directly under ECAD for a considerable time after active operations commenced, though its members increasingly received other assignments. The chief functions of ECAD after 1944 were to provide administrative facilities for military government detachments through its regiments, to train tactical officers for military government duties, and to compile a periodic general military government report.

Despite the fact that military government officers in general became integral parts of Armies and received their orders from such a source, they looked to ECAD and its regiments for their pay and allowances, their promotions, and their supplies. This was responsible for much confusion and numerous bitter complaints. Supplies did not always come in regularly from the Civil Affairs Regiments and had to be borrowed from the Army supply depots. ECAD for various reasons never fared well in promotion quotas and the small number received seemed to go primarily to officers and men working in ECAD headquarters. The far from generous recognition given to military government personnel, at a time when the combat personnel

received promotions right and left, naturally led to the very deepest bitterness on the part of the former. The arguments advanced for a separate administrative setup for military government officers apart from the military units in which they serve may sound plausible, but the system certainly left much to be desired in operation.

### *The Early Posthostility Period*

With the dissolution of SHAEF and the agreement that the United States should undertake responsibility for a zone made up of *Land* Bavaria, parts of *Länder* Baden, Württemberg, and Hessen, and two Prussian provinces, the military government setup underwent certain changes, G-5, SHAEF gave way to G-5, USFET, later designated the Office of Military Government, U.S. Zone. The Army Groups folded up and ceased to exercise military government functions. Incidentally this served to reduce somewhat the distance which had formerly separated military government higher headquarters from the detachments which carried on field operations. The American Zone was placed under a military governor who also served as the commanding general of the American Forces in the ETO as well as the American representative on the Allied Control Council for Germany.

The American Zone was divided into an eastern and a western district, with the Third Army in charge of the former and the Seventh Army responsible for the latter. Under this arrangement G-5 of the Third Army became the agency through which military government was administered in the State of Bavaria and G-5 of the Seventh Army filled a similar role in the case of the remainder of the zone. The headquarters of the eastern district was located in or near Munich and for the western district in Heidelberg. The commanding generals of these Armies served as district military governors.

Even before the dissolution of SHAEF a paper went out to the commanding generals of the Armies stating that military government experience had indicated the necessity of some measure of direct communication between military government units. With the tactical phase over, generals were directed to go as far as circumstances justified in setting up direct technical channels in military government. Moreover, under this same directive the Army was

specified as the lowest unit for the direct military control of military government detachments.

Had these provisions been carried into effect promptly, many of the headaches of military government arising out of the roundabout and time-consuming command-channel system of control and the almost paralyzing interference from lower tactical units would have been ended. However, this directive gave the commanding generals of the Armies discretion as to when and to what extent they would put its provisions into effect. The result was that no great headway in substituting direct or technical channels for the indirect command channels was actually made for some months. Nor did the directive succeed to any considerable extent in eliminating the serious interference of corps, divisions, regiments, and even companies of combat troops with the operations of military government in the field.

But the significance of the recognition of the desirability of establishing direct channels of communication in military government and the fixing of the Armies as the basic tactical unit for control of military government operations cannot be lightly dismissed. Despite the reluctance of the generals of the Armies to go ahead with the reforms, some immediate advantage was forthcoming and as time passed more and more actual change could be observed.


During this period important improvements were made in the organization of G-5, USFET. It has been pointed out that G-5, SHAEF gave undue prominence to legal and financial divisions and lacked adequate facilities for handling the vital problems of regional and local governmental organization, civil service, and public safety. These weaknesses were recognized to some extent at least shortly after USFET came into existence and officers were brought in to give attention to these matters.

### *The Later Period*

By the end of 1945 and the early months of 1946 distinct progress had been made in drawing military government planning and staff sections into a cohesive organization. G-5 of USFET which had become the Office of Military Government in the American Zone was for the most part moved to Berlin and combined with the Office of Military Government for Germany of the United States. Hence the old jealousy which had existed from the early days at a top

# MILITARY GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIPS

EFFECTIVE 1 APRIL 1946



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level and which had seriously interfered with effective efforts came to an end in so far as it proceeded out of rival organizations. Of course there remained the problem of coordinating the various functional subdivisions within OMGUS and the integration of the headquarters subdivisions of OMGUS with the functional subdivisions. The consolidation of the top level planning and staff organizations also left more or less untouched the personal jockeying for position and power among the top brass in OMGUS. But nevertheless, it marked a most important step forward.

The last days of 1945 saw the abandonment of command channels in military government and the establishment of definite technical channels of a direct character between the various levels of military government. This also represented a major step forward in the development of a well integrated military government organization. The deactivation of the Seventh Army and the subsequent moving of the Third Army out of Germany had the effect of diminishing the tactical control over military government and concentrating authority in the military government setup as such.

As the months passed after V-E Day, the G-5 staffs increasingly gave way to Offices of Military Government at the various levels. The *Land* military government detachments, which to start out had been more field units than staff organizations, limited as they were to the supervision of a single German government, became basic military government headquarters for the control of the entire system of German government from the *Land* down through the districts and including the *Kreise* and *Gemeinde*.

The later-period also saw two significant developments within the general fabric of military government organization. First of all, certain modifications were made which had the effect of revaluing the role of the various functional subdivisions. Thus the Education Section, though remaining a section rather than a major subdivision, received a greater recognition in relative status as a result of the assignment of staff. In contrast to the mere handful of officers which it had during the period prior to V-E Day and during the months immediately following, it could point to approximately sixty-five persons of officer equivalent by mid-1946. This was still far from adequate, considering the job to be done in reeducating the Germans and actually meant something like one American officer to every 270,000 Germans, but it at any rate represented an advance. In the



second place, the civilianization of the military government staff continued at a somewhat accelerated rate, despite the failure to set up an American civil administration in Germany. Civil Administration which had heretofore been headed by military officers now had a civilian appointed as director and Education transformed its military head into civilian status. In August, 1946, Lt. General Clay could report that two-thirds of the military government staff in Germany was civilian.

By 1946 military government higher headquarters in Germany had reached a stage where it was in a position to keep informed as to what was going on within the entire military government organization in Germany, and what was more important, could exercise a fair measure of supervision over the program. By creating a Council of States in the American Zone and assigning American military and civilian personnel to its headquarters in Stuttgart, it was possible to handle economic, food and agriculture, and certain other functions on a zone-wide basis. As far as organization was concerned, the main problem then probably involved the provisions in Washington and the integration of machinery in Washington with that in Germany rather than the setup in Germany.

## Chapter 5 Military Government Organization in the Field

As in the case of military government higher headquarters, the field organization created to carry out the actual military government program underwent rapid and important change. The original planning was based on the assumption that there would be a functioning system of German government to take over. Moreover, it was anticipated at that time that control would be primarily exercised from a very high level through the Reich ministries. The complete disintegration of German government and the difficulties encountered by the Allies in achieving close collaboration among themselves made it necessary to modify the early plans in a drastic fashion. If one attempts to present a single diagram of the military government field detachments in Germany, he will perforce be compelled to draw a most involved and confused picture. But by dividing the operations into three periods: a SHAEF stage, an early post-hostility period, and a later stage, it is possible to avoid much of this difficulty though even so it may not always be easy for a reader to envision the setup.

### *The SHAEF Period*

During the SHAEF period military government organization below the division depended to a considerable extent upon the particular division and especially upon the territory which it occupied. During the period before V-E Day divisions engaged in active combat had military government officers whose functions were mainly related to the tactical operations of the division. These military government officers accompanied the division and its constituent regiments and

originally had approximately a dozen officers and corresponding enlisted personnel and jumped to thirty or more officers during the summer of 1945. Intended to be used for medium sized *Stadtkreise* (cities), smaller *Regierungsbezirke* (districts) and a few of the largest *Landkreise* (rural counties), they had the same type of general organization as the larger detachments but fewer specialist officers, especially in such fields as education, monuments and fine arts, and mining. Their size did suffice to permit functional specialists in public safety, finance, legal matters, public health, and economics.

The D (later II and I) detachments far exceeded the above detachments in number, but they were distinctly smaller in size and much more general in character. To begin with they were assigned four and six officers respectively together with complements of enlisted personnel, but the rapid expansion in size which has been noted in the case of the larger detachments also took place at these levels, though usually on a somewhat smaller scale. By the peak of their operations in the late summer of 1945 they had doubled in size and in certain cases had even larger staffs.

Obviously detachments of the D (H and I) strengths could not be based on any considerable degree of specialization, since a single officer had to give attention to three or four or even more functions. One officer served as commanding officer, while a second acted as his assistant and also performed administrative duties, with general responsibility for German government organization added. The remaining two or more officers had to take care of the administrative agencies of the German government supervised. In most cases one concentrated pretty largely on public safety together with denazification. In rural areas another officer sometimes gave more or less his entire time to food and agriculture. As the detachments increased in size, it was not uncommon to find one or more officers devoting themselves entirely to displaced persons. But any high degree of specialization did not enter in. These detachments were assigned to the many *Landkreise* (rural counties) and at times to small *Stadtkreise* (cities).

### *The Early Posthostility Period*

The early plans did not provide military government detachments to control every German political unit. It was believed that a single

detachment could give adequate direction to two or three rural *Landkreise* and that a detachment located in a city where there might be German *Stadtkreis*, *Regierungsbezirk*, and *Landkreis* offices could supervise all of them. In the case of the latter it was argued that one detachment would be able to coordinate the efforts of several German governments, while the presence of two or more detachments in one city would lead to rivalry and duplication. The experience in the SHAEF period convinced the higher authorities that one military government detachment should be given responsibility for only a single German political unit. If two or more were assigned to a single military government detachment, there seemed to be a distinct tendency to concentrate on one government and to more or less ignore the others. Hence additional detachments were organized or transferred from France, Belgium, and Holland and by August of 1945 all or virtually all of the approximately three hundred American military government detachments in Germany had responsibility for only one German governmental unit. This of course meant that in large cities there might be three or even more detachments.

The increase in the size of the military government detachments which took place during the summer of 1945 also had significance. Almost all detachments, as pointed out earlier, at least doubled in size during this period. To the extent that the officers who were added had adequate background this increase permitted more specialization, particularly in the three smaller-size detachments. Actually many of those who were added lacked substantial professional background. Hence they could be used for general purposes and to assist the overworked specialists in routine duties, but they could not be given direct responsibilities for functional work.

It is unfortunate that the additional personnel could not have been furnished earlier, when the detachments were engaged in the initial problem of taking over German political units. At that time they were seriously undermanned and much handicapped by the lack of officers and men. By the time the great increase came, the job had been pretty well organized and the pressure had been reduced. That is not to say that the new personnel did not serve a useful purpose, for in many detachments there remained a definite need for additional personnel who knew how to cope with denazification, the food problem, displaced persons, and various other matters. At the same time, it must be admitted that many of the detachments found it difficult

to absorb the new officers and men who arrived, often without much attention to the needs of that particular detachment. One senior military government officer remarked that he had received four agriculture officers in two weeks, though his area had no unusual problem in that respect and a single officer could handle the job. This happened not infrequently, with the result that officers who knew something about one field had to be used for an entirely different function.

### *The Later Period*

By the fall of 1945 and increasingly as the winter wore on, military government had arrived at the point where it could begin to prepare to turn responsibility back to the Germans. The demobilization program involved many military government officers, despite the attempt to exclude them by classifying them as critical personnel not subject to the point system. The military government specialist officers often had a hundred or more points to their credit. Most of these middle-aged officers had left their businesses and professions as well as their families at a considerable personal sacrifice to enter the armed forces and, now that the reconversion process had begun at home, they found themselves under constant pressure to return to give attention to important domestic problems. The distinctly niggardly promotion policy, the influx of regular Army officers to positions where they could counteract much of what was done by the military government specialists, the indecisive and wavering policy which seemed to be coming from Washington, all combined to lead large numbers of military government officers to decide that their efforts would be more valuable at home than in Germany. Consequently critical classification or no critical classification, the majority of military government officers bent every effort toward getting back to the United States.

Coupled with the conclusion on the part of military government officers and men that they would serve a more useful purpose in the United States than in Germany was the progress made in meeting the more immediate problems of German regional and local government. When the detachments arrived on the scene, virtually no German governments were functioning. The detachments worked day and night and on Sundays to get new governments organized. By late May of 1945 German governments had been set up in almost

every place and at every level below the central government. To begin with, many of these governments were organized on a skeletal basis and it required many weeks to get them to a point where they could be regarded as full-fledged and effective. By the end of 1945 the local German governments, including the *Landkreise* and *Stadtkreise*, had made a good deal of progress in taking responsibility for government functions in their respective areas.

From the beginning there had never been any intention of having American military government detachments operate German government directly, since that would have required personnel far beyond the numbers that could possibly be supplied by the United States, even had this course been regarded as desirable. Actually it would have been a most unsound policy for the United States to take over direct administrative responsibility for German problems. Endless expense and mistakes would have resulted and the psychological effect on the Germans themselves would have been the reverse of what was desired. It is true that American military government personnel did not always find it easy to follow the fundamental directive that their role was to supervise and control—not to be direct administrators. Sometimes the immediate pressure was such as to cause military government detachments to attempt some project—for example to get water supplies available and electric lines furnishing current. As time went on, it was more frequently the inability of some bureaucratically-inclined American officers to refrain from active and detailed participation in the everyday affairs of the government they were supposed to supervise.

As the German governments demonstrated their ability to manage their own affairs and military government personnel became drained off as a result of the demobilization program, detachments were reduced in size and finally withdrawn from the *Landkreise* and the *Stadtkreise*. To take their place small Liaison and Security teams were installed at the key places. This does not mean that the Germans were given complete responsibility; it simply indicates that supervision increasingly came to be exercised at a higher level. In other words, instead of having military government detachments in every *Landkreis* and *Stadtkreis* to give orders to the local German officials, this control was exercised from the regional level through German officials over the local governments. With one *Land* government in Bavaria and two in the western military district, control over Ger-

man officials in the American Zone was exercised more and more from the state level. In certain fields, such as food and industry, the creation of a Council of States for the American Zone permitted control at a single point.

Whether the process of contracting the American military government machinery in the field was unduly rushed through depends in large measure upon personal judgment. The British and French followed a more conservative course in this respect. Under an ideal set of circumstances it is possible that more time should have been allowed to accomplish the transition in the American Zone. Had large numbers of military government specialists been available in the regular Army there would have been less reason to hurry the process along. If the military government specialists recruited for the purpose from civilian life had had no important obligations at home in reconversion, a stronger case could be made against reducing military government personnel in Germany as rapidly as was done, *especially if the top authorities had been willing to give them due recognition and adequate responsibility.*

Considering the situation as it actually existed, it is difficult to accept at face value many of the statements made by correspondents and others both in the ETO and in the United States. These statements frequently seem to be based on superficial knowledge and certainly display little understanding of the complex factors that had to be considered in deciding what should be done. Some of them have paid far too little attention to the control which remains and have even given the impression that the United States was pulling out and leaving the Germans to do as they please.

In reality the freedom given the Germans under the new setup may be no greater than that permitted under the system which provided an American military government detachment at each German political unit. The chief difference in the two systems lies in the employment of German officials. In the former system they were used by each American military government field detachment to carry on the work of government. Under this plan there was closer direct supervision of course, but there was always the problem of getting an integrated system of German government going because of the slight authority which the German state and district governments could exercise over the rank and file of rural and urban governments.

The advantage of the newer arrangement is that, working as it

does from the top or state level, it builds up a complete system of German government below the Reich level. Of course, the job of the *Land* detachments is more difficult because they have to see that not only the *Land* officials but the *Regierungsbezirk*, *Stadtkreis*, and *Landkreis* officials under the former perform their jobs in an adequate measure. This calls for a better intelligence system and necessitates more field work on the part of the *Land* military government staffs. But it may be repeated that this is a step which had to be taken sometime before anything like an adequate German system of government can be expected to function. The only question is whether the step was taken too soon and whether the personnel made available to the *Land* detachments and to the Liaison and Security teams was adequately trained and experienced in the various fields of German government and given proper rank and leeway to do the job.



## *Chapter 6* The Problem of Coordination

**T**here is no over-all problem in military government more important than that of coordination. A superior type of personnel in adequate numbers, an effective system of organization, good morale based on reasonable promotional opportunities, proper supplies including satisfactory transport, carefully devised plans of operations are all of major significance and should receive full attention. However, even granted these in generous measure—which is far from simple as a matter of reality—the record of military government will suffer and suffer seriously, especially as related to long-range objectives, unless substantial coordination can be achieved. Coordination is essential where the responsibility rests with a single nation; it is especially important where four Allied nations have jointly undertaken control as in Germany. It is hardly necessary to consider the waste, the conflicts, the virtual state of paralysis, and other evils that may result from lack of coordination.

If one were to depend upon many of the reports which have appeared in the newspapers it might be assumed that very little attention has been paid to the problem of coordination either at the four-power level or indeed within our own military government setup in Germany. No thoughtful student of public administration can maintain that the degree of coordination thus far achieved either among the four Allied military governments in Germany or on the part of the American military government itself has been impressive. On the other hand, it is only fair to point out that a great deal of attention has been given to the problem at both levels and that some results have been forthcoming.

It may be profitable to examine some of the attempts to bring about coordination in Germany. Beginning with the Quebec conference in 1944 it was sought at the very highest political level to


arrive at certain decisions which would result in some measure of unity in handling the German problem. Obviously it is somewhat difficult to ascertain exactly what took place at Quebec, Yalta, and Potsdam, but the main points in so far as military government is concerned seem reasonably clear. Germany was to be divided into four zones to be occupied by the four Allies for an indefinite period. An Allied Control Council participated in by the four powers was to be created in order to deal with over-all policies and to supervise a Reich government when and if established. It was provided that action by this body could be taken only by unanimous vote. Though not surprising under the circumstances, it can hardly be denied that this provision which gave any one power the authority to veto action on the part of the Allied Control Council did not point in the direction of coordination. The experience of the years 1945-47, with the French refusing to agree to proposals to set up certain central government agencies to deal with such problems as food distribution, transportation, communications, finance, and trade and industry until a decision had been reached as to the western boundary of Germany, indicates how serious a limitation this actually is in practice. Time does not permit a detailed consideration of the decisions made at the Big Three conferences. Certainly they have served a necessary purpose, but few would maintain that they have achieved as much as might be wished. Such conferences are not too satisfactory as coordinating devices themselves since they must give their attention to so many immediately pressing international problems. Moreover, they operate under such serious time limitations that they can not be expected to give detailed consideration to the numerous problems of military government. To date the general decisions which they have made have usually involved so much compromise that the policies set forth have been exceedingly difficult to implement. Finally, it would seem that each nation has reserved such leeway to itself to deal as it sees fit with military government problems within its zone in Germany that the announced decisions of the Big Three have sometimes had little actual influence.

The Conferences of Foreign Ministers have somewhat less limitations in the matter of time and perhaps can be expected to give more attention to details. They doubtless serve a useful purpose, but again it may be doubted how successful they have been as an instrument of coordination in the field of military government.

The European Advisory Commission devoted many months to a wide variety of problems involving the war and especially the post-war period. Originally representing the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union it later brought in France. In addition to its voting members who were high ranking diplomatic officers, it maintained a secretariat and a system of national working committees which included numerous military persons. The European Advisory Commission had an advantage over the Big Three and Foreign Ministers Conferences in that it could spend weeks and even months grappling with problems. It had the disadvantage of being too low in political level to decide important issues itself and found that referring matters to four capitals for decision led to serious difficulties. It perhaps unduly scattered its efforts, giving attention to drafting a surrender document, considering terms of peace treaties, and attempting to work out directives which might be used by the four powers in handling German problems. The list of its formal accomplishments is not long, but it is desirable to note that the draft directives which it worked out on various aspects of military government in Germany made a valuable contribution toward coordination. One of the chief weaknesses of the European Advisory Commission so far as military government in Germany is concerned was its lack of intimate contact with the main body of American military government personnel.

In passing one may note COSSAC, a Combined Civil Affairs Committee, and a German Country Unit which operated for various periods during 1943 and 1944 and succeeded in working out reasonably complete agreement in matters of detail between the British and American military governments in the European Theatre.

On the Allied level there remains the Allied Control Council for Germany and its supporting national elements to be considered. The Allied Control Council for Germany was set up in the summer of 1945, but for various reasons it was able to do little more than make preliminary arrangements for some weeks. When it finally did arrive at a point where it was organized to function in a reasonably adequate fashion, it unfortunately found itself blocked to a considerable extent by the veto imposed by the French. Inasmuch as most of the pressing problems confronting the Control Council related to the establishment of central German governmental agencies if not a central Reich government, it was more or less paralyzed by the French refusal to permit action in this direction until the Ruhr and Rhineland had been



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detached from Germany and organized as international units. Consequently it is difficult to judge what its potential role might be in coordinating Allied military government efforts in Germany. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Control Council has continued to hold formal meetings despite the French veto and that a good deal of progress in routine matters has been made.

The Allied Control Council for Germany is organized on three levels. At the top there is the Council proper which is made up of the ranking representatives of the four Allies. To start out, the Allies designated their top military commanders in Germany to these posts, but it is possible, indeed probable, that civilians may succeed to these seats as the occupation proceeds, especially if a working arrangement can be achieved among the four powers. Each member of the Council is flanked by a political adviser designated by his State Department or Foreign Office to assist in handling intricate matters of a political character.

Over-all policies are drafted by the four-member Council in so far as they are not laid down by Conferences of the Foreign Ministers and other higher political authorities. General supervision over the Allied occupation of Germany is supposed to be exercised by the Council, though with the French veto and the Russian reluctance to brook what it considers interference in the administration of the Russian Zone, this has not proved easy to carry out.

Immediately below the Council there is a Coordinating Committee, also with four members but in this case the deputy military governors rather than the ranking representatives of the Allied governments. This body gives its attention to the multifarious immediate problems arising out of the occupation which do not involve the laying down of basic policies or the making of far-reaching decisions. Its members devote a greater portion of their time to its work than in the case of the Council and sessions under ordinary circumstances would be more frequent and of longer duration than those of the Council. The day-to-day activities of the Allied occupation depend far more on the Coordinating Committee than on the higher body.

Below the Council and the Coordinating Committee there are the secretariat and various directorates or working committees. The secretariat, with representatives from the four Allied powers who rotate as secretaries-general, has the important job of house-keeping and maintaining records. It is its responsibility to maintain the headquar-

ters building, to recruit staffs of interpreters and assistants, and to prepare agenda for the Council and the Coordinating Committee. Its task of keeping records of actions taken by the various bodies of the Allied Control Council for Germany and of supplying statistical reports and other tools necessary for the effective work of the above is not an easy one. The compilation of reports as to the operations of the Allied Control Council for Germany also is assigned to it.

The twelve directorates perform the basic spadework upon which the Council and the Coordinating Committee depend in making their decisions. Here are agencies dealing with the various functional aspects of the occupation: military, naval, air, economic matters, finance, legal, manpower, internal affairs, communications, political affairs, prisoners of war and displaced persons, and reparations. Each of the Allied powers designates representatives from its military government headquarters in Germany to staff these directorates. These normally are drawn from the functional subdivisions of their headquarters and supposedly at least have an expert knowledge of the German fields covered. They carry on preliminary discussions, thrash out differences of a detailed character, prepare reports recommending action to the Coordinating Committee which in turn may send the recommendations to the Council, and after decisions have been made exercise certain responsibilities in carrying out the provisions. When and if the Potsdam Agreement is implemented by the setting up of central German administrative agencies to deal with food and agriculture, trade and industry, public finance, transportation, and communications, some of these Allied directorates will have important supervisory functions. The decision to proceed with a full-fledged central German government would of course add appreciably to the significance of the directorates and give most of them heavy control duties. Under the directorates there are approximately sixty working committees which deal with problems, such as health, education, religious affairs, housing, courts, and sports.

Though the Allied Control Council for Germany did not come into existence until mid-1945 and then was unable to function very effectively as a coordinating mechanism, its national supporting elements can claim a longer life. The British and American elements were as a matter of fact organized in the late summer of 1944, though not formally activated until several weeks later. The French got started in the first months of 1945 and the Russians apparently

sometime later. Even before the British and American elements of the Control Council came into being an Anglo-American German Country Unit referred to above had already made a substantial start in planning American and British military government programs. Perhaps the most encouraging example of coordination to be found in the whole tangled Allied military government record is that involving the British and American elements or groups of the Control Council for Germany. These staffs were obviously at too low a level to arrive at important policy decisions and were very seriously handicapped in their planning by inability to obtain policy decisions from Washington and London. Nevertheless, in so far as coordinating their work, their detailed plans, and their general approach was concerned, the British and American elements achieved a high degree of success. Despite personal differences and somewhat varying national attitudes on matters such as denazification and deindustrialization, the American and British elements of the Control Council for Germany found it possible to discuss their mutual problems in a friendly fashion and with very few exceptions to arrive at conclusions which were reasonably satisfactory to both. The result was that the military government plans of both were substantially the same when Germany was occupied. After V-E Day the US Group CC moved to Höchst and then to Berlin, while the British element went to various places in the British Zone near the headquarters of Field Marshal Montgomery and the contacts between the two were therefore somewhat broken, despite a liaison arrangement. If the early relations established between the U.S. and British national elements could have been carried forward as a working basis for all four powers in the Allied Control Council for Germany a substantially different report might be possible.

After waiting for months on the French and the Russians to cooperate in making the Allied Control Council for Germany an effective agency, with the results of separate zonal administration increasingly unsatisfactory especially in the economic field, the United States in mid-1946 appealed to her three Allies to join their zones with the American Zone in an economic unification. The Russians and French did not see fit to accept this bid, but the English agreed to the proposal. Hence in late 1946 a joint economic administration for the two zones was set up, with headquarters at Minden in the British Zone. Subdivisions of this agency, staffed by Americans and

British, were organized to deal with food supply and rationing, fuel, trade and industry, and other economic matters. Political unification, it should be emphasized, was not involved in this move toward centralized controls.

It would be a mistake to assume that the military government program in each of the four zones in Germany depends entirely on formal coordination machinery as a basis for uniformity. Each national military government organization has a reasonably good idea of what is going on in the other zones—at least with the exception of the Russian Zone. Naturally some effort is made to keep the program in one zone somewhat on a level with those of the other zones, since it is recognized by the authorities in each zone that there is an advantage in dealing with the Germans in keeping up with what is being provided in the other zones. The Russians have perhaps been the least desirous of following a uniform program in the absence of any formal coordination. Hence in education, entertainments, denazification, industrialization, and political activity they have followed a more daring plan which has probably been to the advantage of the German people for the time being. An informal system of coordination cannot be regarded as an adequate substitute for an effective Allied Control Council, though it has contributed certain results.

What has been said thus far relates to Allied coordination, but it must not be assumed that there is not a very serious problem of coordination within our own military government. Everyone is familiar with the divergencies between Germany and Japan. Carrying the problem a step further one encounters the problem of coordination within the American military government organization for Germany. At times it has actually seemed easier to coordinate efforts of British and American divisions charged with drafting plans for German regional and local government for example than to coordinate the plans of the American finance division with those of the American trade and industry division. Moreover, there has often been a gap between American planning headquarters and American operating detachments in the field almost if not quite as great as that between the Russians and the Americans. And that despite the fact that elaborate formal provisions have been made for internal American coordination.

Space does not permit more than a general consideration of the coordination machinery which the United States has created to deal



with military government. The Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Coordinating Committee of the State, War, and Navy Departments, the Assistant Secretary of State for occupied areas, all are charged with American military government coordination in Washington. In the European theatre there are or have been the US Group, Control Council for Germany, the Office of Military Government for Germany of the United States, the Office of Political Affairs, G-5 of SHAEF, G-5 of USFET, G-5 of the Army Groups, the Office of Military Government of the U.S. Zone, the Offices of the District Military Governors, and G-5 of the Armies. At lower levels one may note the civil affairs staffs of divisions and military government detachments of the *Länder* and *Regierungsbezirke*. Certainly few would stipulate a more extensive formal provision for coordination and yet it is common knowledge that there has frequently been comparatively little actual coordination. Thus the denazification program has varied considerably within the American Zone in Germany and military government responsibilities under the Seventh Army were a far cry from those under the Third Army not only during the combat phase but well after V-E Day.

In the fall of 1945 the United States gave formal recognition to the need for coordination within the American Zone by setting up a *Länderrat* (Council of States), staffed by Germans under American supervision. A monthly meeting of the three minister presidents or heads of states was scheduled for the purpose of going over common problems and working out uniform policies as far as seemed desirable. A *Länderrat* Directorate was organized at Stuttgart, to be composed of one special delegate from each of the three states, a plenipotentiary from each of the three states, and a secretary general. Weekly meetings of this directorate are held to canvass and decide matters not involving basic principles. As the *Länderrat* got under way, various administrative and advisory bodies came into being to give attention to specific problems. A Commission for Food and Agriculture was created to provide a uniform system of food rationing throughout the American Zone. Senior directorates were authorized to handle transport and posts and communications. During the first year some fourteen committees and forty-six subcommittees were set up to give attention to such matters as housing, labor supply, welfare, and education. The results of the Council of States became

increasingly apparent as the months passed. Certain problems were of such a character that they could only be dealt with in anything like an adequate manner on a Reich basis; in the economic field this was especially the case. However, there can be little doubt that the Council of States served a very useful purpose in coordinating the military government program within the American Zone. By late 1946 a great deal of the confusion which sometimes seemed almost to reach chaos which characterized the early months of American military government in Germany had been cleared away and much of the credit for this accomplishment must be given to the *Länderrat* and its American supervisors.

Perhaps the very complexity of the coordinating machinery has contributed somewhat to defeat its primary purpose. But more important may be mentioned the large measure of independence which a theatre commander enjoys and the consequent probability of lack of intimate relations between theatre agencies and the Washington end. In combat operations experience has demonstrated the necessity of a considerable degree of such independence, but in military government where so much depends upon political considerations in the United States the situation is very different. A decision taken by G-5 of USFET in the ETO to civilianize military government at a very early date, with the end of June, 1946 as a date set for the final transfer to a civilian status, without full consultation with the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department and the State Department may sound incredible and yet such was the case. Indeed officers in Washington first learned of the vitally important decision from the press.

Internal coordination is again made difficult by the gap which separates higher headquarters in a theatre from the operating detachments in the field. Army organization is theoretically a hierarchy, with every echelon more or less completely subordinate to the next higher echelon. But military experience has indicated that it is desirable to permit considerable leeway on the part of the Army Group commanders and Army commanders in combat, since it is difficult if not impossible to centralize operations completely. But here again the combat pattern is not always suitable for the military government program, at least after the combat phase has passed and military government has settled down to grapple with the numerous complex civil problems of an area. Yet under the American system directives

carefully framed by higher headquarters in the theatre on the basis of Joint Chiefs of Staff papers from Washington could be redrafted by Army Group and again by Army headquarters. Of course no important change is supposed to be made, but slight changes in wording may at times lead to far-reaching changes in application. At one time American military government in Germany operated under four different directives relating to denazification and the policy in the Seventh Army territory which was guided by a Seventh Army directive was quite different from that of the Third Army which followed a Twelfth Army Group directive.

Other factors which tend to prevent coordination are perhaps less important, though far from negligible. Certain high-ranking officers in higher headquarters G-5 were imbued with the much publicized American distrust of centralization. With long experience in city or state administration they had deep-seated antipathy for central control and consequently stressed the importance of leaving the responsibility largely in the hands of the local military government detachments. Doubtless there was good argument for such a policy during the combat phase, and of course it is desirable at any time to permit a reasonable degree of local initiative and discretion. But the very complexity of many German problems, especially those of long-range character, requires a common approach and the lack of uniformity promoted by the officers referred to above became a serious problem. Some military government detachments conceived of themselves as perfectly free agents and a few even boasted that they had thrown away their *Handbooks* and read almost nothing which came to them from higher levels. In conversation some officers expressed surprise that Washington was interested in German problems or that there was any place in field operations for policy decisions made in Washington. But in general detachments attempted to carry out directions and were only disappointed that more clear-cut instructions and policy-decisions were not forthcoming.

As time passed after V-E Day distinct progress was made in bringing about coordination within an area as large as a military district. Coordination within the entire American Zone was somewhat slower in coming and coordination between Washington and the American Military Government in Germany was even more complicated. Perhaps the most serious problem in this field at present relates to top control. The War Department has vital interests in

Germany and will continue to have as long as there is an American occupation, but it is not too well equipped to deal with over-all German problems of a long-range character. The State Department has a sound claim to a weighty influence in determining many of the political and economic problems of Germany. Yet it is not organized to take over the responsibility for a civil administration. At present there is the Coordinating Committee of the State, War, and Navy Departments, but a coordinating committee is not well adapted for administrative control.

The British have provided a member of the Cabinet without portfolio, with the title of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, to assume basic administrative responsibility for the British zones in Germany and Austria. Obviously this official works in close conjunction with both the Foreign Office and the War Office. In the United States an attempt has been made to divide responsibilities between the War Department and the State Department, with disappointing results. The Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas Problems has reconstructed the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee into a fairly elaborate setup, with a secretariat and an executive agency. But the War Department continues to shoulder the general responsibility for carrying on American military government in Germany and orders to the American military governor in Germany go out from the Pentagon Building. The State Department wants to fix the policies to be followed, but the American military governor in Germany takes his instructions from the War Department. As long as the operating responsibility is in the hands of the latter department, it is altogether probable that it will expect to have a voice in policies and that in the last analysis it is likely to see that its desires are carried out rather than those of the State Department.

If any genuine and far-reaching coordination is to be achieved at the Washington end—and that is of the very highest importance—an independent operating office for occupied areas will probably have to be created. If placed under the Executive Office of the President and hence directly responsible to the President, it should be able to provide instructions to American military government in Germany which are based on the general policies laid down by the State Department and the interests of the War Department. An alternative would be to give the full operating responsibility to the State Department. But on the basis of its past difficulties in dealing with its compara-

tively simple administrative problems in Washington, there is little reason to question Secretary Byrnes' statement that his department is not prepared to assume the basic administrative responsibility in Germany.

## *Chapter 7 Military Government During Combat*

In looking at the operations of military government in Germany it is essential that a clear-cut distinction be made between the period during which actual fighting went on and the post-hostility phase which came later. Many of those who have written newspaper dispatches about military government have failed to do this, if indeed they have understood the general purposes of military government at all. Perhaps the fault lies with the military authorities primarily. The Army public relations officers have not always given evidence of having adequate knowledge of this sort themselves. The Army manuals and other publications dealing with military government have not been widely circulated and in some instances have been classified as "Confidential" or "Secret." The natural result is that military government has sometimes been criticized for failure to achieve goals or to give attention to problems for which it has actually had no responsibility.

During the period when active fighting goes on, military government has one great official mission to perform and that is to assist the tactical forces in every possible way to achieve military success. Of course, secondary attention may be given to longer-range objectives, such as the denazification program in Germany and the setting up of a civil government structure that may be expected to form the basis for a lasting peace. But these latter matters, it must be stressed, are purely incidental to the active furtherance of immediate military success. There may be doubt in the minds of some as to whether military government should be so intensely concentrated on tactical operations during this period, but by and large, it is logical that the mission at this time should be centered on assisting the fighting

forces. Tactical operations usually involve great risks in human life and national strength. Military government personnel is not only in uniform but an integral part of the armed forces. It is to be expected therefore that the chief aim of military government while the fighting continues should be to promote the success of those operations in every possible way.

Military government officers went right along with the front-line fighting forces into Germany and subjected themselves to the danger and hardship necessarily attending such a position. They were on hand in order to deal with the civilian populace in such a manner that the military operations of our own forces were hindered as little as possible. In any warfare civilians are likely to get in the way of fighting forces as a result of their attempts to move with their possessions out of the danger zone. Armies require many of the available roads to move their men and equipment; if these roads are filled with fleeing civilians and their belongings a very critical situation may develop. Other civilians get in the way of fighting forces by trying to remain at the scene of battle in order to protect their property. Military police had a responsibility in dealing with these problems in Germany, but the role of military government was also highly important.

The situation in Germany was enormously complicated by the presence of millions of displaced persons from Poland, Russia, France, Italy, Yugoslavia, and virtually every other European country. Many of these had been brought and held in Germany against their wills and greeted American forces as deliverers and saviors. With the best possible intentions, they lost sight of the fact that they might seriously hamper their deliverers by their presence and especially by their anxiety to move about. A great amount of the energy of military government officers was directed toward the considerate and at the same time effective handling of these unfortunates who in many cases had endured a virtual state of slavery in Germany.

But it is not enough to keep civilians from under the feet of the military, though that in itself requires very great effort. Our tactical forces find it necessary to make use of enemy civilians for various purposes. They may be needed to clear roads of barriers or to fill holes made by explosives. Or they may be required for making repairs so that a water supply will be available for our troops. Some of them may be desired for various purposes in putting billets in

shape for use. There are numerous things that an advancing army requires which it can handle in cases of emergency but for which it prefers to use civilian labor. One of the functions of military government is to see that such labor is provided. In order to do this, it is necessary to set up some sort of machinery under which the civilians can be registered, notified of when and where they are to report, paid, and so forth. With communication and transportation systems frequently destroyed, civilians cowering in cellars and odd corners, more or less dazed by the fearful explosions of bombs and artillery fire, this was by no means a routine responsibility in Germany.

Despite the elaborate preparations made by our own Army for various supplies, it is always necessary for fighting troops in the midst of hostilities in an enemy country to procure emergency items. Military government has the task of securing these supplies from the civilian population as far as they are obtainable. The Army of the United States does not live off enemy countries, as certain other armies find it necessary to do, and hence there was not the great problem of forcing the Germans to furnish large quantities of food. However, it required unusual ingenuity as well as effort to locate and deliver to the proper places various items needed to prepare billets, repair electric systems, get water pumps operating, and a hundred and one other purposes.

If the fighting forces remain in a locality any length of time, many other problems may arise which military government has to handle. Provision had to be made in Germany for maintaining law and order among the civil populace; public health had to be watched for indications of typhus, typhoid, and other virulent diseases; a minimum amount of food for civilian consumption had to be provided if local supplies were insufficient.

Of course, these actions benefit the civilian population, but they are performed only incidentally for their assistance. Outbreaks and lawlessness on the part of the enemy civilians or displaced persons not only frequently led to friction with American military personnel but sometimes interfered with the effective operations of our forces. Though our own military personnel had been carefully inoculated and vaccinated against various diseases, there was always the danger that a serious epidemic of typhus might threaten their welfare. Moreover, if there is widespread disease and death among the civilian



population various problems may arise as to their care and the disposal of bodies which may in the last analysis require the attention of an invading army. If the food supply available to the civilian population goes below a certain point it not only creates a most unpleasant atmosphere for the American Army, but might well lead to riots which would interfere with our military operations. Certainly the civilian labor supply available for our use depends in no small measure on the food supply.

In order to guard against civil disturbances, safeguard health, and see that a minimum food supply is provided the civilian population, military government officers prefer to make use of an existing local government, but if none is found, they are forced to organize one. In the invasion of Germany virtually every vestige of government even of a local character had disappeared before our troops arrived. To begin with, the German authorities systematically withdrew the public officials and employees from the territories in the paths of the Allied Armies. Later the collapse became so disordered that this course could not be followed, but even so functioning governments rarely if ever were found. And the officials who had been active Nazis had frequently taken to their heels in order to save themselves if possible from the coming judgment. Hence military government in Germany had the very difficult problem, which did not have to be faced in Japan and elsewhere, of starting from the ground so to speak in the establishment of a simple sort of government. With little information at hand as to local inhabitants and as to whether they had been active Nazis or what their professional skills were and with the immediate necessity of taking action, military government officers had to proceed as best they could.

Though military government officers and men had come in for their share of waiting around with little of any significance to demand their attention during the days before D-Day, those who served with combat forces often labored to the very limit of their strength. At times they spent their nights in foxholes for several weeks, often without a bath or a change of clothing for days at a run. During daylight hours and frequently until long after darkness they were hard at work, trying to deal with the many demands made on them. The combat commanders insisted on all sorts of service for their forces, though some of their desires were almost impossible of realization. There were the difficult traffic regulations and routings

to be worked out so that the thousands of vehicles of the combat troops pushing ahead against the Wehrmacht would not be bottlenecked when passing through the towns and cities. There was the ever-present displaced persons problem, with the almost hysterical craving of those who had long been separated from their families to get back to their native lands and if that were not possible at least to be on the go. There were the curfew regulations to be enforced and the arrests to be made of those civilians who circulated about contrary to orders.

There were the crowds of Germans besieging the hurriedly established offices of military government, asking for information, for permission to do various things, for assistance of one kind or another, seeking jobs, offering their aid, complaining at the treatment received from American troops, revealing the hiding places of Nazi leaders, laying bare the past sins of their neighbors, and sometimes putting in an appearance for no reason at all. There were the many corpses of those who had been victims of artillery or bombing, the wounded who managed to survive despite the lack of medical care, and permeating everything the musty stench from the remains of the thousands buried under the debris.

During the fall and winter and spring of 1944-45, while most of the combat operations were going on, there was the dank cold of unheated offices and billets and the penetrating chill of the gloomy northern winters out-of-doors. And this went on day after day and week after week, with little or no opportunity for military government personnel to get away from the frustrations resulting from the realization of how little could be done to repair the devastation or to reduce the human misery. Even the insensitive among the American military government personnel found it difficult to remain oblivious to the sorrow, the terror, the suffering, the destruction, and the general dreariness of the environment in which they worked. Yet they kept at their job continuously during long hours with little sleep and few comforts. Some of them saw their friends killed and were themselves decorated for their wounds. The heroism among the young combat forces is well known throughout the length and breadth of the land and justly so, for their valor was notable. Military government officers in their middle years were less glamorous than their sons and young comrades who served in infantry units and on bombing missions; yet there was heroism among them.

As the fighting units moved on, military government detachments were left behind or came up from the rear to take over the job of administering the civilian population. At times these teams were the ones originally on the spot and hence merely proceeded to a later phase of military government operations, having the advantage of the early experience in the situation. But not infrequently the initial work was performed by military government officers who accompanied a tactical unit and after a few days the more permanent detachment, which had been active in a liberated country or simply waiting in the rear, came in to take over.

The emphasis continued to center on the promoting of successful military operations especially in those areas taken over before V-E Day. True, the combat units may have moved on, but it was vitally important to protect their supply lines and to safeguard their rear. Disturbances on the part of the civilian population could have jeopardized our military operations; it was essential that certain roads be kept free from civilian traffic because for a considerable period virtually all munitions and other supplies had to be brought into Germany by motor transport. Labor forces of German civilians became more and more needed in order to clear streets through towns and cities, start work on repairing railroad right of ways, assist engineering units in building emergency bridges, and for many other purposes.

Though the fighting divisions had moved on, other military installations were established to handle communications, transportation, and the many services which must be carried on behind the front lines. These forces had to be billeted and required many items, such as lumber, building supplies, machinery, wire, and repair parts. There was not quite as much emergency pressure perhaps in getting things done during this phase, but more and more had to be undertaken as the first days of the occupation gave way to the weeks that followed.

As time passed, increasing attention could be properly given to the welfare of the civilian population, especially to the displaced persons. Nevertheless, with military aims always the determining factor, any programs directed at ameliorating the conditions of the populace had to be limited in character. The military government personnel available was rarely adequate to do more than the top priority things; the dearth of equipment and supplies which could

be used for other than strictly military purposes prevented many undertakings.

To begin with, military government detachments sought the best available quarters for their own offices and billets. With destruction as complete as it was in many places, it was far from easy to find any adequate quarters, especially in those places where other military units were located—and there were few places of any size where this was not the case. If these other Army units had arrived on the scene first and gotten themselves ensconced, it was not a simple matter to dislodge them. Those arriving later often displayed a most independent attitude as to what they wanted for their use and thus gave military government officers many headaches.

Headquarters for military government purposes was usually located in a public building if any suitable one still stood and could be repaired enough to be used. The city hall might be taken over or the *Landkreis* building or a district or state office building used. Finance offices and court buildings sometimes served as headquarters. If no public buildings were found, hotels and business structures were usually sought for headquarters. Some of the German public buildings, especially the newer ones built by the Nazis, provided very adequate quarters if they hadn't been too seriously damaged. Few, it may be added, had escaped some bomb or artillery damage, but many could be used for emergency purposes after basic repairs had been made. In some places the furniture and equipment still remained and the detachments fared quite well. However, in general, offices were far from luxurious or commodious and adequate equipment was difficult to obtain.

Considerable publicity has been given by certain correspondents to the fine billets occupied by military government detachments in Germany. An attempt was always made to find quarters which would lend proper prestige to the detachment, since it was stressed that German psychology placed great emphasis on the manner in which its own officials lived. It was logical that the Germans would be easier to deal with if American military government personnel occupied suitable quarters. In contrast to the distinctly below-standard billets usually provided military government officers prior to their going into Germany, it must be admitted that the billets occupied by most detachments in Germany rated high. They perhaps exceeded in comfort the billets of other military personnel of equal rank—cer-

tainly they surpassed the quarters furnished the military government officers of similar grade in higher headquarters such as the US Group, Control Council for Germany. On the other hand, it is easy to exaggerate their magnificence, as some correspondents have done.

German governments frequently furnished living quarters for their *Bürgermeister*, *Landräte*, and district and state administrative officials. If these were standing and at all adequate they were usually taken over for billets by military government officers. But obviously a detachment of ten or more officers and men could not find spaciousness in a house intended for a single German official and his family. Hence many of the military government officers lived under crowded conditions. Private homes were used by other detachments and in certain cases provided more adequate living quarters than the official residences. Except in rare instances, military government officers enjoyed comparatively little privacy, eating their meals together and depending upon one or two common living rooms. Plumbing facilities were anything but adequate in most cases.

The detachments employed German cooks and housekeepers and sometimes set very good tables. Often they supplemented their army rations with local milk, butter, cheese, and green vegetables through barter and thus were among the few to eat fresh food in Germany. All too frequently however their cooks had little imagination and served food that was far from appetizing. In many cases the housekeeping was done in such a manner as to belie the traditional reputation that Germans have for cleanliness. The furniture and decorations were usually limited either to the dark, heavy stuff so commonplace in the pre-Nazi period or the hideous modern creations so dear to the National Socialists. Thus while some detachments may have lived in distinct comfort, the general level was below that of middle-class families in the United States. Considering the fact that few of the detachments were located where they had much in the way of entertainment facilities and consequently had to depend upon their own resources for amusement after long and strenuous days of work, one could hardly consider their life idyllic.

In general, the accomplishments of military government during the combat phase were of a high order. Particularly as time has passed and it has been possible to look at the over-all picture and take into account the attending difficulties, there has been a pretty widespread verdict that military government performed very well.

Civilians were kept off the roads to a remarkable degree in light of the hordes of displaced persons who during the early period delighted in roaming aimlessly about if they could not move toward their homelands. Adequate civilian labor was provided and much ingenuity displayed in finding various supplies desired by our combat forces.

## *Chapter 8* Building a New German Governmental Structure

The preliminary plans made by Allied military government called for the taking over of an existing system of German government. Of course, it was realized that there might be instances where local governments had been destroyed, but on the basis of past experience there was reason to believe that the central government and indeed the main governmental structure would be more or less intact and would consequently be surrendered to the Allies. But the planners reckoned without the fanaticism of the Nazis, though they made a serious effort to understand the working of the Nazi mind.

During the very first invasion of German soil by the Allies a rigorous scorched earth policy was adhered to by the retreating Germans. Not satisfied with destroying everything that might be of assistance to the victors, they ordered all public officials, indeed virtually all able-bodied persons, to move back into Germany so that the invading armies would find an area devoid of physical property and people. Later, as the German armies were forced to retreat more rapidly, this policy was more or less abandoned, since it was hardly feasible to clear large areas of their inhabitants in the time available and it was decided that the laying waste of all of western Germany would in the last analysis injure the Germans more than it would the Allies.

But the Nazis, as defeat became inevitable, were determined to hold out to the last bitter moment. Just before the end they sought to scatter the personnel and records of the Reich ministries over more or less the entire area of Germany, in every case dividing a single agency into two sections, with one headed toward the North

and the other toward the South. Even if these officials and records had reached their intended destinations, it is doubtful whether there would have been anything like a going central government to take over. As it was, the trains and motor vehicles used for transport ordinarily were stalled before they arrived at their destinations and Allied representatives found the remains of the central government here and there throughout the country.

In the case of the regional and local governments the disintegration was almost as complete as in the case of the Reich ministries. The more important regional governments had been headed by Nazi leaders who took to their heels, hoping to save their own skins, when the Allied forces appeared. The bombing of the cities had contributed to the dispersing of local populations. The operations of the land forces also added to the confusion. The net result was that German government from top to the bottom had almost if not absolutely ceased to exist by the time the Allies completed occupation. The public officials remaining behind were frequently lost in the chaotic masses of people and had no desire to make their identities known. Public buildings had been destroyed in many instances; even where they remained standing, their offices were seldom manned by German officials and civil servants.

As this complete disintegration of German government became apparent to the Allies, drastic modifications of plans had to be made at the last minute. Emphasis, which had already shifted to some extent to the Allied zones as a result of the decision of the Big Three to divide Germany up into national zones, was soon transferred from the control of German government at the top level to control at the lower levels. But before any control could be exercised it was necessary to build a new governmental structure in Germany from the ground up.

Perhaps never before in modern history have victorious invaders been faced with such a problem as confronted the Allies in Germany. War always must be expected to produce confusion and some breakdown, but a complete disintegration of government in a major nation seems to be something new under the sun.

The enormous job to be done in building a new German governmental structure can hardly be fully appreciated unless one is aware of the details of what was involved. Those who have compared military government in Japan with that in Germany have usually failed



to recognize the basic difference in the two at this point and consequently have gone far afield in their statements. An established Japanese government surrendered to the Allies and that government was then made use of to control Japan. The Doenitz government which performed the final surrender to the Allies in Germany was no more than a paper affair which had no utility as far as the Allies were concerned after the surrender had been accomplished.

The problems facing military government in Germany were not only difficult but they took on emergency character. Some things could of course be handled directly by the military government detachments, but these were hardly more than a drop in the bucket so to speak. There was no possibility of dealing with such problems as finance, trade and industry, food rationing and production, and education, until a system of German government could be organized. It was entirely logical therefore that the first thing to be done by military government aside from combat duties was a vigorous attempt to get German governments started.

Had Germany been occupied by a single power or had the Allies been completely unified in their own organizations and ideals, it might have been feasible to start at the top. After setting up a central German government much of the responsibility for reconstituting the regional and local governmental structure might have been left to the Germans. But these conditions, whether one liked it or not, were not existing and it was therefore necessary to begin at the bottom and work up.

The United States had provided military government detachments to take over and control the state, district, and *Kreis* governments in the American Zone in Germany, though single detachments often had instructions to assume responsibility for several governments: perhaps two or three *Kreise*; possibly a district, a city, and a *Kreis*; or some other combination. As these detachments arrived at their locations in Germany, they gave their attention to getting one or more governments organized at the earliest possible moment. Later the United States modified its arrangements in such a manner as to provide a military government detachment for every German political unit in its territory down to and including the *Kreis*. Had this been in effect at the beginning it would probably have permitted an American group to concentrate attention on a single government. As it was, a single military government detachment often had to divide its

attention among two or three or even more German political units and this added substantially to the complications.

Inasmuch as the chaos was so complete and the needs so pressing, it was wisely decided to bend every effort to begin with on the establishment of local governments, leaving the regional governments to receive attention later. Within a day or two or at least a very few days of their arrival the military government detachments usually had started the framework of new *Kreis* governments, both of the rural and urban variety. Their first job was to find some German with the experience and in so far as possible the anti-Nazi political record suitable for designation as *Landrat* or *Bürgermeister*. With his assistance they then proceeded to select a few heads of major administrative departments. As time went on, they recruited Germans to work in these key offices and departments and added other less important departments. Within a matter of a week or two they usually had a skeletal sort of German government functioning in a more or less feeble way. It required weeks and even months to nourish that government which started out with the merest spark of life to a point where it could be regarded as anything like a full-fledged government.

Under any circumstances it would have been difficult to get these local governments in Germany going. The environment of physical destruction, human shock, paralyzed transportation and communications systems, financial insolvency, and abject military defeat made the task more troublesome. But even so, the military government detachments would have found the undertaking reasonably simple had it not been for the Nazi contamination. It was not only necessary to find some German with the know-how, the physical and mental vigor, the willingness to risk his future reputation by co-operating with Americans, and the ability to lead his fellows—hardly an easy task in the midst of the widespread confusion—but that person had to be or at least was supposed to be free from Nazi taint.

Though the OSS and Counterintelligence were supposed to have records which would guide the military government officers in finding acceptable Germans with all of these qualifications or at least in steering clear of dangerous Nazis, it turned out that they were not actually able to perform this service in large measure. In their defense it may be stated that they were interested in other basic jobs and that their responsibility to military government noted above was

secondary. At any rate military government detachments after being told that they would have "black," "grey," and "white" lists containing the names of Germans who could not under any circumstances be used, might be used under pressure, or could safely be selected, actually found that the lists if they existed at all in the smaller places were very incomplete and even in the larger places anything but inclusive.

Few of the American military government officers knew very much about Germany, German psychology, German political institutions, or German language. Most of them had received some basic instruction in these fields, but it was so general in character and so limited in time that they were far from expert. They found that despite the OSS and Counterintelligence promises little aid was forthcoming from these sources. Yet they were under intense pressure to proceed so that they could report to the division headquarters that certain problems had been met. The result was that they stumbled ahead as best they could, sometimes making very bad mistakes, again achieving fair results, and in some instances succeeding remarkably well.

Having been told that the German clergy had remained fairly independent of the Nazis and that it would be desirable to treat them with consideration and discovering that the German clergy frequently went out of their way to greet American forces as liberators and to offer them active assistance, it was not strange that many military government detachments depended in no small measure on the advice of the clergy. The clergy realizing the need, and perhaps in some cases hoping to profit personally, often made it a practice to call or send their assistants to call on the local military government detachments every day. Some of the assistance received from the German clergy was invaluable and should receive high credit. Unfortunately, some of the advice proved very unsound and led military government officers into extremely embarrassing situations. German clergy naturally saw matters from the German point of view and also were disposed to forgive the Nazi wanderings of some of their influential members. Hence some of the Germans they recommended turned out to be "black list" Nazis, weak in their leadership, unable to achieve results, or otherwise unsatisfactory. But it was often late in the day when military government officers discovered this after valuable time had been lost.

A cardinal tenet of American military government stipulates the selection of a single top official at each political level and the giving of responsibility for choosing secondary officials and civil service holders to that person. This policy was actually followed in certain cases, but it frequently received comparatively little observance in practice. To begin with, there was the tremendous pressure to get a government organized and in operation. Rightly or wrongly, many military government detachments apparently believed that they could make more rapid progress by picking out a number of Germans to hold the key positions rather than by leaving this responsibility to the German chosen as *Londrat* or *Bürgermeister*.

In defense of this procedure it may be noted that it was difficult to find Germans with anything like the American zest for rapid action. Those Germans with experience in government had been so thoroughly regimented in the tradition of following detailed instructions from above and avoiding any local initiative that it was exceedingly difficult for them to take decisive action of the kind desired by American military government. Again and again, they fell back on military government officers for instructions even in routine matters. When faced with a problem of some complexity, the German official often reported to American military government officers that it could not be handled by his particular government because that function belonged to a *Regierungsbezirk* or *Land*. During the early stage there were no *Regierungsbezirk* and *Land* governments in operation and the need to get a certain job done was often very great. Obviously the American military government officers expected an emergency to be met despite the old pattern. In order to get such action they frequently had to make decisions which according to military government manuals should have been made by the Germans.

A second military government dogma stressed the importance of *control* rather than *direct performance*. American military government was given the responsibility of controlling German governments, not of handling administrative problems. The principle underlying this was very sound. American military government forces did not and in all probability could not justify the assumption of any direct responsibility for getting jobs done. Not only would the contrary course result in an intolerable burden on American military government, but it was psychologically unsound. Especially in Germany where the tradition was against assuming responsibility at

lower levels, it was important that as much initiative as possible be built up on the part of the German officials.

Nevertheless, it proved difficult if not impossible to follow this policy during the early weeks of the occupation. There were numerous things that simply had to be done. The German government which had been set up was so weak that it found it difficult to maintain its existence at all in many cases. If accomplishments were to be reported, it seemed to the local military government officials that they would have to jump in and undertake direct action themselves. Having established this pattern it was easy to continue it, with the result that less progress was made in establishing effective German governments in some localities than was desirable. German governments could only be given real vigor by being charged with substantial responsibility, however much patience that might require on the part of American military government.

Though it had been planned at higher headquarters to permit some time to elapse between the setting up of German governments at the *Gemeinde*, *Landkreis*, and *Stadtkreis* level and the establishment of district and state governments, a combination of circumstances led to a somewhat different course. Military government detachments earmarked to take over *Regierungsbezirke* and *Länder* had been organized months before V-E Day. Some of these had been given other tasks to do, pending their use in Germany, but in most cases these regional detachments were ready to start work immediately after the surrender of Germany. Their officers had frequently cooled their heels over such periods of time that they were most eager to start their primary assignments. Hence the very availability of the "E" and "F" detachments, with their sizable staffs, set up substantial pressure to organize German regional governments at an early date, irrespective of the plans of higher headquarters.

In addition, it was very soon apparent that many problems arising out of the occupation were too complicated to be dealt with at the local level. The rationing of food, for example, demanded far more in the way of facilities than the German local governments could possibly offer. Certain financial problems had to be met from the beginning; yet these depended on the existence of governments above the *Kreis*. Finally, the general rate of development in military government proved to be more rapid than had been anticipated. Despite all of the difficulties, military government detachments, car-

ried on by intense zeal and enthusiasm, progressed to a point within a few weeks of their arrival in a German *Kreis* distinctly beyond what had been expected. That is not to say that they had always given the detailed attention to certain problems that might have been desirable, but they had, whether one liked it or not, reached a stage where the next step seemed to be necessary.

The result was that reports were received of the organization of German regional governments even before military government higher headquarters had moved into Germany. Indeed the first developments in this direction took place even before the final surrender of Germany. A conference was hastily called at SHAEF Forward, then located in Rheims, with representatives of the US Group, Control Council for Germany, G-5 of SHAEF, and G-5 of the Army Groups and Armies present, to canvass the situation. After considering the evidence it was decided that regional governments would have to be set up in Germany at once, despite the earlier policy. By late May of 1945 military government detachments had been authorized to start the task of organizing *Regierungsbezirk* governments and a state government in Bavaria. With the decision yet to be made as to what should be done about state governments in the western part of the American Zone, where remnants of the states of Baden, Württemberg, and Hesse and provinces Hessen-Nassau and Kurhessen remained after amputation of a French Zone, progress was slower in that area.

The end of May saw a minister president installed in Bavaria and either *Regierungspräsidenten* or deputies named in most of the Bavarian *Regierungsbezirke*. These first regional governments were of course distinctly skeletal affairs, and it required additional weeks to fill the various administrative posts and to recruit the necessary civil service staffs. Though there was more information available at this level in regard to the Nazi records of possible candidates, the task of selecting the major officials was by no means a light one. If local governments had been badly contaminated with Nazi viciousness, the regional governments were even worse. It had been the custom under the Nazis for the party *Gauleiter* to hold the top position in a state and for his henchmen to ensconce themselves in the *Regierungsbezirke*. Therefore there was nothing to be gained as a rule by even considering those with recent experience in the positions at this level.

The positions of *Bürgermeister* and *Landrat* called for persons with personal leadership, vigor, honesty, and experience, but the qualifications desired in the cases of the heads of the states and the districts were naturally even higher. Many of the tasks at the lower level were routine and could be performed with reasonable effectiveness by almost any person of medium ability. But the job to be done at the state level and to a lesser extent at the *Regierungsbezirk* level was far more complex, especially under the American policy to reconstruct the German states in such a fashion that they would be units in a federal government rather than mere administrative districts in a completely centralized system. Here it was essential that Germans whose attachment to democratic principles was unquestioned be found. In addition, the minister presidents and the *Regierungspräsidenten* needed to have high qualities of leadership, initiative, imagination, resourcefulness, courage, and reliability. Most of these qualities had not been encouraged by the Nazis and the supply, never generous in any country, seemed especially short in Germany.

The process of developing state and district governments from the paper stage, through the infancy period, and on to a point where they displayed sizable staffs and functioned with some degree of vigor over the entire governmental field was naturally slower than in the case of the local German governments. Military government detachments charged with organizing and controlling the state and district governments were much larger than the *Kreis* detachments, starting out with twenty-five or more officers and eventually reaching a point where some of them had more than one hundred officers assigned or attached. Moreover, these detachments had various specialists whose civilian backgrounds fitted them for effective work in dealing with the complexities of German administration. But the task of building German state and district governments from the ground up to a position where they were adequately staffed with numerous officials and civil servants and operating in such a fashion as to handle the highly difficult posthostility problems was one of the first order. Had a central German government or central administrative agencies been set up, the job would have been an enormous one. But with the state governments forced to deal with all matters, it was even more arduous.

The construction of German governments beyond the local level in the western district of the American Zone was as surrounded by

pitfalls and difficulties as the most vivid imagination could portray. In Bavaria military government at least had somewhat of a pattern to follow, though many alterations had to be made. But in the western district even the pattern was lacking. The highest political authorities had decided to carve up this portion of Germany in such a manner that there were only miscellaneous legs, arms, and other bits of anatomy to work with. How to tie these remaining parts into a living organism which would grapple with the many problems to be faced seemed one of those fantastic puzzles more appropriate for nightmares than for reality. The state of Württemberg had been severed into two parts, with the western portion going to France. The capital city, Stuttgart, remained to the United States, after the French military forces reluctantly moved out, but it had been cut away from much of the area which served to nourish it. The state of Baden suffered the same fate, with the south assigned to France and the north placed in the American Zone. The south had depended in large measure on Karlsruhe and Mannheim, which the Americans insisted on having.

The state of Hesse, never too impressive in population and area, had been deprived of much of its most productive territory to be given to France, leaving the old Free City of Frankfurt cut off from much of its support. The Prussian province of Hessen-Nassau had not only been detached from the body of Prussia, but it had further suffered from losing a substantial part of its most prosperous lands. Finally, there was the relatively weak province of Kurhessen only recently set up by the Nazis which had been cut off from Prussia.

All of this carving up had broken ruthlessly through political lines and administrative organization, largely ignored economic factors, and treated cultural patterns as irrelevant and unimportant. The result was not only the shock of a series of major operations, but the amputation of virtually all members. Certainly military government has never been called on to perform a more grotesque and complicated task than to organize effective governments out of the remnants.

As if these incredible difficulties were not enough, American military authorities added some more. The American commandant of SHAEF at Frankfurt decided that it would be very nice if he could have a little feudal state to play with. His rival in the Twelfth Army Group, then with headquarters at Wiesbaden, threatened to over-



shadow him; by creating a Frankfort Enclave with himself as feudal lord he might not only ward off the danger but place himself in a position of greater influence. Just how this commandant managed to persuade the chief of staff of SHAEF to issue orders setting up such an Enclave is one of those enigmas which will probably never be quite clear. At any rate such an order was issued and a paper Frankfort Enclave came into being. A portion of terribly mutilated *Land Hesse*, a piece of almost equally cut-up Province *Hessen-Nassau*, a section of Province *Kurhessen*, and the old Free City of Frankfort were joined together to constitute this new feudal barony for the commandant. It had no political unity; it tore up economic patterns. Moreover, it literally paralyzed the local American military government detachments while it lasted. The scheme was carried through without reference to military government plans and seriously hampered the setting up of a new system of German government in the western district of the American Zone. After considerable delay and much wasted energy the strange order was superseded, but it had to be done with utmost finesse so as to save the faces of those immediately involved.

With the Frankfort Enclave episode and the general feeling of hopelessness engendered by the sewing of the remnants of Hesse, Baden, Württemberg, and Hessen-Nassau together, even the top level made slow progress in dealing with the western part of the American Zone. Some favored trying to make a single state out of the odd assortment; others strongly supported the retention of the old identities despite the mutilations; still others believed that a compromise between the two first positions offered most promise. The latter doubted whether what remained of Baden, Württemberg, Hesse, and Hessen-Nassau could possibly support any life. The populations, the economic resources, and the areas hardly were appropriate to states which could be expected to show any vitality.

At one time the proponents of a single state seemed to have the ascendance. Then an appeal taken to Washington resulted in a directive that three states should be created out of the remnants: a combination of Württemberg-Baden, Hesse, and a combination of Hessen-Nassau and Kurhessen. An examination of the latter two proposed states revealed such serious weaknesses in the way of economic resources and population that the matter was shortly reopened and it was finally decided to set up two instead of three states in

the western district: Württemberg-Baden and Greater Hesse. In the meantime considerable time had elapsed and it was late summer before the state government of Greater Hesse could be started. Even then there was uncertainty of a sort because of the problem of a state capital.

Frankfort seemed the logical place for a capital of Greater Hesse because of its central location, its economic importance, and its cultural leadership, but the American tactical authorities were unwilling to have Frankfort the state capital. Its resources were already overtaxed, they asserted, and the location of the capital of Greater Hesse there would bring more people to be housed and fed. Buildings suitable for state government officers were at a premium in Frankfort and were needed for American military purposes, it was added. Finally, it seemed probable that it was not regarded as suitable psychologically by American tactical forces to have the headquarters of a German state government in the American "capital" in Germany. Wiesbaden had something to offer if Frankfort could not be used, since its location was fairly central and it was already the seat of numerous records and government offices going back to the Province of Hessen-Nassau. But here again there was American military objection. As long as Wiesbaden remained the headquarters of the Twelfth Army Group, there seemed no available space; after the deactivation of that Group other tactical headquarters had their eye on Wiesbaden. Kassel, the seat of government in Kurhessen, was located away to the north of the new state and besides it had suffered such devastation that it promised little in the way of accommodations. The tactical authorities could only offer little Marburg, a university town which had escaped serious damage and was not needed for American military uses. Few military government officers looked upon Marburg as suitable because of its relatively poor transportation facilities, its size, and its general prestige in the area. Yet Marburg was used as the capital until later developments made it possible to move to Wiesbaden.

Inasmuch as no Reich government was in immediate prospect and even the central German administrative agencies specified in the Potsdam Agreement could not be organized because of the French veto, an experiment was launched in the American Zone in the fall of 1945 which provided for a Council of States, with offices in Stuttgart. There were certain important matters which could not be

## Bayaria

## KASSEL

## THÜRINGEN

## HESSEN

CZECHO-  
SLOVAKIA

BADEN

WUERATTEMBERG

## SWITZERLAND

ITALY

Prepared by QMGUS

**Greater Hesse, Wuerttemberg-Baden**

**SACHSEN**

## THURINGEN

## OBER UND MITTELFRANKEN

W U E R T T E M B E R G

SCHWABEN

Prepared by OMGUS

handled on a state basis and required a national administration. But with no central German agencies operating, it seemed that a zone organization would at least give more effective facilities than the states.<sup>1</sup>

Most of the job of building a new German governmental structure had to be done in the field. Though assistance could of course be given by military government higher headquarters, the spade work of finding and selecting Germans to fill the key places and then laboriously nourishing the little beginning to a point where it could be considered a going concern could only be performed on the spot. Fortunately it had been decided at a fairly early date to provide a number of government and administration specialist officers to be assigned to the larger military government detachments. The number actually supplied was far from generous considering the great undertaking in building a new system of government from the ground up. However, in comparison with education and certain other functions, government and administration fared quite well. There was the problem of finding officers who had background for this sort of work and a number of officers had to be used whose experience and training were not too adequate for a task of such magnitude. But at least there were available at the *Land* level and often at the *Regierungsbezirk* and large *Stadtkreis* levels officers who devoted all of their time to the problems of German governmental and administrative structure. In the case of the smaller detachments the senior military government officer and his deputy usually gave their personal attention to this job, though they of course encountered much else to demand their services.

By the fall of 1945 a large measure of progress had been made in constructing German governments from the ground up and through the state level. Denazification was still incomplete and caused a considerable turnover in German personnel. Various changes in key personnel had to be made from time to time for various other reasons. Much remained to be done in filling in the details. The establishment of an adequate German civil service depended on training programs, the right kind of traditions and standards, and other factors which require years to bring to full fruition. Modifications in the administrative structure were necessary in order to meet new problems as they arose. The relationship between the state govern-

<sup>1</sup> For additional discussion of the Council of States, see Chap. VI.

ments and a central German government would require very careful attention when and if such a Reich government came into being. The elections held at the various levels during 1946 displaced some of the office-holders designated by military government. The elections of state legislative bodies in 1946 added another important element to the governmental structure. But it is remarkable, considering the circumstances, how much had been accomplished during the few months following V-E Day.

## Chapter 9 The Intermediate Phase of Military Government

With German regional and local governments started and beginning to function, military government had to determine what to do next. And it was far from easy to decide. There was such destruction, so much confusion, such dire necessity that it was difficult to know what to attempt first, especially in those localities which had military government detachments consisting of only four or six officers and a few GIs.

Although there were exceptions, the typical American military government detachment during the weeks immediately following the combat period found itself preoccupied with tangible problems, such as repairing water mains, starting street cars running, continuing the clearing of major streets, restoring certain public buildings to the point where they could be used, and finding sufficient food to maintain the ration system. There has been some criticism based on this tendency, but on the whole it was not to be expected that the situation would be otherwise. These jobs could be tackled and in certain instances completed in a comparatively short time. Besides such efforts could be easily seen and served to impress the tactical officers who still actually controlled military government operations in the field in large measure. Much of this sort of work was urgently requested if not demanded by various American tactical units which happened to be stationed for the time being in the *Kreise* controlled by military government detachments. Then, too, this sort of activity was similar to that which the majority of American military government officers had long been familiar with—it involved little in Germany that was not well known in the United States. Denazification, education, welfare, cultural matters, democratization, and so forth

seemed less pressing and more complex and hence they were left in abeyance to a considerable extent for the time being.

Anyone who circulated about in the American areas of Germany could hardly have failed to be impressed by the progress made in physical repairs in a very short time. Electric current was usually available within a matter of hours or certainly except in isolated instances within a few days. It required longer to get water systems operating, but, considering the damage, the time involved in the most necessary repairs was very short. No general physical reconstruction was attempted because of the completeness of the holocaust in most cities. To rebuild the public buildings to say nothing of the private buildings would be a problem lasting for many years and requiring enormous amounts of material, labor, and capital. Hence clearing the main streets of rubble and debris so that they could be used for passage and repairing military government headquarters and army billets so that they were habitable was about as much as could be undertaken.

It had been anticipated that the Germans might cause serious difficulty because of underground movements, youthful gangsters, and general hatred. Actually military government for many months encountered almost no signs of an underground movement; the youngsters generally proved apathetic and disillusioned; and the early attitude of the German public rarely transcended docility and frequently embarrassed American military personnel by its friendliness.

The displaced persons in Germany always received serious attention in planning, but no one apparently fully appreciated the magnitude of the problem. The number of displaced persons turned out to be less than estimates made by those working on the plans; but the psychological reactions, their capacity for getting into conflict with the Germans, and their consuming desire to be on the move irrespective of direction all were underestimated. From the very beginning it is probably fair to say that displaced persons gave military government more trouble than any other single problem.

It became apparent almost immediately that displaced persons would have to be rounded up and placed in camps where they could be supervised, organized for shipment home, and otherwise looked after. With the cooperation of various military units, something like eighty per cent of them were collected and housed in various German military barracks, prisoner-of-war camps, and other mass housing projects.




Military government started out with a very sympathetic attitude toward displaced persons and a distinctly stern attitude toward the Germans. As time went on, though it bent over backwards in giving displaced persons every consideration, it became increasingly difficult to maintain the ideal warm relations with them. On the other hand, considerable sympathy was aroused for the German populace by the widespread looting and violence on the part of the displaced persons. Military government personnel tried to remember the suffering of the displaced persons under the Nazis and the resulting hatred which the former naturally displayed after liberation toward the Germans. As long as the displaced persons made their desires for food, clothing, radios, and other facilities known through the channels provided, military government attempted to compel the German populace to provide these things. Hence the Germans were forced to furnish food for the displaced persons at the rate of 2000 calories per day when they themselves could have only 900-1100 calories.

But when the displaced persons broke out of their camps night after night and pillaged the country for miles around, driving off a hundred head of cattle or more in a single night and killing the German farmers who sought to protect their property, military government officials began to worry. Conferences were held with the leaders of the displaced persons and agreements made to curb such practices. But the leaders could not control the rank and file and a bad situation became worse. Attempts were made to patrol the countryside at night, but these failed to deter the raids made by the displaced persons, who continued to be a constant source of trouble.

Perhaps because of the difficulties which they occasioned, an unusual effort was made to get the displaced persons back to their homes at the very earliest time. Almost incredible progress was made in this direction during the period immediately following the occupation of Germany. By midsummer of 1945 most of the western Europeans had been moved from Germany to their homes in France, Belgium, and Holland. Italians were sent to Italy and Czechs and Bulgars to their respective countries. The transfer of the Russians who had caused perhaps the most trouble took longer, but by September of 1945 the process of turning them over to the Russian agents on the eastern border of the American Zone had been largely completed.

The Poles, who next to the Russians had been the most energetic



\* EX-ENEMY

Prepared by OMGUS

## REPATRIATION OF DISPLACED PERSONS

in raiding the countryside and defied all efforts to restrain them, did not prove so easy to dispose of. Many of them did not want to return to their homeland because of the new regime there. The result was that large numbers remained in the American Zone to cause military government officials major concern. Increasingly military government turned the displaced persons camps over to UNRRA and relieved itself of direct administration, but it could not rid itself of the widespread disturbances which they caused.

When military government detachments appeared on the scene, the German banks seldom were open for business. If they were not closed, it was the general practice to order them closed for a period during which a survey could be made of the local financial situation. Most bank accounts were frozen as a result of a general military government proclamation, but it was essential that a limited amount of banking be permitted as soon as possible. With their assets very largely tied up in German government bonds, the banks were certainly not solvent, but nevertheless they could serve a very necessary purpose for the time being in supplying currency for the carrying on of basic purchases of food. Some of the bankers appeared anxious to have their banks open while in other cases military government had to exert some pressure. Shortages of currency in some areas caused some concern until military government managed to get supplies from other places. In some instances it was necessary to authorize the local branch of the *Reichsbank* to print paper money. In industrial sections little could be done without banking facilities to provide payrolls; even in the rural areas it was necessary to have banks to furnish funds for the operations of the local German government.

The collapse of German government was accompanied by the breakdown of the complicated tax system as well as the elaborate machinery for handling public finance. Inasmuch as German public finance had been highly centralized, military government found it extremely difficult to deal with the problem on a local basis. The destruction of vast numbers of buildings cut off real property tax income in large measure, while the general economic paralysis dried up income tax productivity. Military government could do little to solve these problems at once, but it did seek to provide German machinery for collecting as much tax money as possible.

To begin with all German courts were closed by military government. Violators of military government rules and orders were hailed

before military government officers who served as judges in a hierarchy of military government tribunals. Ordinary cases came before local military government tribunals presided over by the legal officer or some other officer assigned by the local detachment. These included cases where Germans ignored the curfew regulations, used certain highways reserved for military traffic and committed petty theft, as well as various other routine offenses. More serious cases involving possession of fire arms, stealing of American military property, and assault might be given a preliminary hearing in the lowest military government tribunal, but they were then referred to a general military government tribunal which operated in the area and had as judge an officer trained in the law. A final military government tribunal heard appeals and had to concur in any sentence involving the death penalty. This tribunal which had three judges to hear or review cases was required to have at least one officer who was a professional lawyer.

There were always a certain number of curfew violators to be brought before the local military government tribunals. Possession of American military property frequently also gave rise to cases, though frequently Germans had come into the possession of rations as a result of more or less above-board transactions. Especially after periodic searches had been made of every German house in a large area by the military police assisted by tactical personnel, large numbers of cases involving possession of military property and arms had to be disposed of. Yet in general the Germans behaved themselves better than had been expected and were responsible for a smaller burden on the military government tribunals than had been anticipated. Nevertheless, a considerable amount of time had to be given by one of the officers belonging to even the smaller military government detachments to this work.

As soon as military government detachments had had an opportunity to settle down and find German personnel of suitable character, the reopening of the lowest German courts was authorized. By early summer of 1945 German courts were functioning in most places and were charged with handling the rank and file of cases. By midsummer sufficient progress had been made to reopen some of the intermediate German courts.

Though local food supplies were usually at least fairly adequate when occupation took place, a few weeks served to develop a critical

situation virtually everywhere except in the farm areas. Military government detachments sought to ascertain what the local warehouses contained immediately after taking over, but it did not prove easy to locate the various stores at once. The early planning for military government was based on the assumption that Germany produced something like 85% of the food consumed and the standards existing were known to be the highest in Europe. Though agricultural production centered in the eastern territories occupied by the Russians, the American Zone, especially *Land* Bavaria, was reported by the various statistical records to be largely self-sufficient. Consequently there seemed little reason why the Germans could not handle their own food problem without difficulty.

But the available reports did not prove reliable and the food situation soon became and remained one of the most serious problems of American military government. Insufficient account had been taken of the effects of several years of warfare on agricultural production in Germany. German land has been tilled so long that it depends in very large measure on fertilizers for its productivity and adequate fertilizers had not been manufactured in quantity as the war progressed. Moreover, the farm labor had been performed to a considerable extent by Poles and other foreigners and these people left their jobs as soon as the Allies came in. The necessary farm machinery was increasingly lacking as emphasis became more concentrated on the manufacture of munitions. Good seed could not be obtained in anything like sufficient quantity. The breakdown in the transportation system made it difficult to get farm products and farm supplies to the places where they were needed. Germans had depended increasingly on the food which the conquered territories: Rumania, Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, Denmark, and Hungary, had supplied.

By the time most military government detachments took over, the season was far advanced for detailed attention to the agricultural situation. Survey parties were rushed into the rural districts to ascertain to what extent land had been planted and brought back reports that 85 or 90% of the available farm land had been plowed and planted. But it became apparent that the labor supply on the farms was so short as a result of the walkout of the displaced persons and the absence of the German prisoners of war that it was questionable whether fields could be cultivated and crops harvested. Military government did what it could to prevail on the Allied military authorities

to release German prisoners of war as rapidly as possible for farm work and tried to improve transport facilities to the point where supplies could be delivered. Binder-twine plants were started working almost at once. But despite everything that could be done it became increasingly apparent that food, even after the harvest of 1945, would be far from adequate.

With the German governments not functioning, the rationing system had broken down. One of the first tasks to be undertaken by military government detachments at the various levels was the re-establishment of a rationing system. To begin with, this was done in the local areas, but as soon as district and state detachments got established they took over the responsibility as being one which required more than local provision. The Germans cooperated surprisingly well in meeting the crisis, perhaps because they appreciated its seriousness even more than the military government officers and because they realized that the brunt of an insufficient food supply would have to be borne by themselves.

It was the German officials rather than the Americans who fixed the early ration quotas and set them at a point far below the bare subsistence level. The ration varied somewhat from place to place within the American Zone to begin with, ranging usually from approximately 900 to 1100 calories per day. Considering the fact that a diet of 2000 calories has usually been considered the minimum for people not engaged in active physical labor, it is easy to appreciate the drastic character of the ration authorized. Of course displaced persons were given 2000 calories per day out of the German food stores. The amount available for German use hardly equalled the food supplied by the Nazis at such notorious concentration camps as Dachau where thousands died from starvation.

Some Germans fared reasonably well because they had accumulations of food in their possession. Everyone who could possibly find a bit of land and obtain seed put out gardens which served to supplement the ration during the summer months. The farmers of course usually ate fairly well because they produced the food. But, despite all of the reports of cellars full of food which appeared in American newspapers immediately after occupation, it did not require long to prove beyond a doubt that most of the urban German population suffered severely from lack of food. Even the most unsympathetic American tactical officers found themselves admitting that the situa-

tion was so serious that German labor could not perform the expected amount of work and food riots might threaten. Some 400,000 tons of Army supplies were brought in during the summer of 1945 to feed the displaced persons so that the local supplies could be used as far as they went in feeding the Germans.

As the food situation became more and more serious and it was not easy to find enough to provide the authorized 900-1100 calories, military government detachments became more and more active in tracking down stores. An intensive search was carried on for hidden stores in unknown warehouses and buildings. Trucks were sent to various places where report had it that surplus potatoes and grains were located. No effective system existed for collecting and sending out reliable information as to available supplies. Communication facilities except to local tactical units were usually most inadequate. Military government at the highest levels had not anticipated the food shortages and hence made no provision for a central clearing agency. Local detachments could do little more than send trucks to the places where rumor indicated supplies might be purchased. Obviously the rumors often turned out to be unfounded and trucks might have to return empty or go on to another place suggested by further rumor.

Considering the extreme shortage of trucks and the great difficulty experienced by military government detachments in getting any type of vehicle from the military police and tactical units which controlled both American and German cars and trucks, this situation can hardly be passed over lightly. Frequently military government officers could not get out into the various sections of their districts to carry on the work for which they were responsible because there were no vehicles available, especially during the first weeks of operation. Hence to be forced to use available equipment and the very limited gasoline on wildgoose searches for food was most unfortunate and only justified by the desperate local food shortages. Local detachments probably handled the situation as well as could have been expected, but higher military government headquarters, despite the lack of accurate information, scarcity of food and agriculture specialists, and other limitations, can with difficulty justify their small role.

German trade and industry, like the governmental structure, had virtually ceased operations when military government detachments took over. But while it was considered imperative to get the latter started as quickly as possible, a go-slow or stop sign was displayed

in reopening business and industrial establishments. A number of retail shops had to be opened as soon as possible to distribute the food ration. Certain food processing plants received authorization to resume operations in order to supply various food products. Provision was later made to reopen plants manufacturing binder twine and agricultural necessities as well as items desired for American Army use. But it was so unusual to see smoke rising from the chimneys of an industrial plant during the summer of 1945 that travelers remarked at the spectacle. Only a small per cent—two or three per cent perhaps—of the industrial establishments in the American Zone reopened during this period.

Various factors entered into the paralysis of the German trade and industrial system. The devastating destruction caused by heavy bombing and to a lesser extent by artillery fire either partially or completely wiped out large numbers of factories and shops. While certain plants located on the outskirts of urban centers escaped with comparatively minor damage, it was impossible for military government officers to accept the FEA estimates which set 80% as the proportion of German industrial resources remaining intact. True, certain machines probably were buried under the debris, but the task of digging out with facilities available had to be considered a major one. At any rate very many factories and shops could not have been reopened speedily, even if military government had desired.

German health received the constant attention of both military government and tactical public health officers, not so much because of any concern with what happened to the Germans as the effect that outbreaks of certain diseases might have on American troops. DDT powder was widely used to reduce the danger of typhus and considerable attention was given to providing uncontaminated water supplies and repairing sanitary systems. Yet the job was so big in some cities that little more than emergency steps could be taken.

Welfare received some consideration from military government as the pressure relaxed, though it did not arouse great concern as a rule. Some assistance was given to the problems of certain public institutions, especially those housing children. Relief activities of the German governments were authorized in so far as funds permitted and after reorganization to get rid of Nazi personnel and emphasis.

Under a policy which ordained that no German schools would



#### 114 AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY

be reopened until a reasonably adequate supply of uncontaminated teachers and texts could be assured, education did not come in for a great deal of attention in the rank and file of military government detachments at this time. In the case of the state detachments an attempt was made to assist the education sections of higher headquarters in compiling lists of those teachers who could safely be used. In the detachments in the field education officers rarely were to be found and educational functions were assigned to any officer who could be spared. The chief activity in most localities at this time had to do with ascertaining what school properties would be available for use when the time came to start the elementary schools.

Religious affairs might have received a great deal of attention, considering the American policy which permitted churches to hold services despite the general ban on German group meetings. But the powers that be never saw fit to authorize full-time religious affairs specialist officers even in the larger military government detachments. Despite the unusually able leadership in this field in higher headquarters, the general program as it related to religious affairs in the field was carried on quite casually by any officers who might be available. Few had any background for such duties and in the last analysis much depended upon the religious attitude of the senior military government officer. If he was favorably inclined toward the church and the local churchmen proved at all cooperative, the relations of military government with the religious organizations were cordial. On the other hand, if the detachment commander had little use for religious groups this attitude reflected itself in the relations existing between military government and the German churches. This rather personal approach to the problem naturally left something to be desired.

The jealousy of the tactical communications officers minimized the activities of military government detachments in this area, particularly during the period under consideration. The post offices remained closed for some time, but pressure became increasingly great to get them open to a limited extent in order to lighten the burden of military government in getting word to Germans who were required for labor services. Local deliveries were then authorized and service gradually expanded so that it covered the American Zone.

Though telephone systems suffered less in the way of damage than had been anticipated and were badly needed by the military

government detachments in carrying on their work, the signal corps which had taken them over was most reluctant to permit their use. Facilities in most localities exceeded those required for American military purposes, but even so the signal people argued that it would not be safe to permit any Germans to use the lines. Military government detachments at this time had telephone lines to the tactical headquarters which controlled them, but they had no way of communicating with the German officials in the outlying areas under their jurisdiction or even with the military government detachments operating in their states or districts. Courier services were set up to meet the critical emergency, but they were slow and depended upon the availability of vehicles, gasoline, drivers, and so forth. Pressure from above finally led the signal corps to provide certain facilities for military government use, but for weeks the efforts of the military government detachments received a serious setback as a result of the lack of anything like adequate communication facilities.

Under a clearly stated American policy German newspapers, periodicals, radios, movies, theatres, and other cultural centers were not permitted to operate during the early and intermediate periods of military government. Psychological Warfare which later switched to Public Information Services of USFET published several newspapers in German to circulate a limited amount of carefully controlled information among the Germans and provided radio programs aimed at the same end. But the military government detachments beyond serving as the media through which the newspapers were distributed had no responsibilities in these fields other than seeing that the ban on German publications and amusements was enforced.

The intermediate period of military government presented more in the way of difficulties than the tactical phase. The tactical phase had been so concentrated on purely military operations of an emergency character that specialized problems received slight attention. With the immediate situation receiving right of way, the more complicated problems of a long-range character naturally remained in the background. But after military government detachments had been established for a few weeks in their areas, these matters had to be faced. It is not surprising that the record of military government during the second phase is somewhat less impressive than that of the combat period. Military government training proved valuable in the earlier operations; in handling the work of the second phase spe-

cialized skills coupled with an understanding of military government responsibilities determined in large measure the success or failure of a detachment in so far as the military government detachments were given responsibility by the division or Army which controlled them. Of course no amount of expertness served any very useful purpose if the tactical units refused to permit the military government detachments to carry out their mission.

Officers who had infiltrated into military government as surplus officers from other units and who either lacked training in military government or proved unable to make use of it often displayed lack of competence. Certain officers and men gave their attention to looting or blackmarket operations; a small number of others seemed to feel that they were in Germany primarily to hunt game or to play with German women. But these were definitely the exception rather than the rule. The over-all military government record during this period was reasonably good in those areas where tactical units gave a fair amount of cooperation and support.

Morale which had been a serious problem among military government personnel before combat got under way again came to the fore during the intermediate period. A tour among the detachments in June of 1945 revealed a considerable amount of bad morale arising out of the refusal of the higher headquarters to recognize effective service by giving promotions. The fact that personnel had been shifted about arbitrarily and without consulting the detachment commanders also contributed to the bad feeling. Most of the detachments felt that adequate directives were not forthcoming and that the United States had let them down by failing to establish a policy in Germany. Contact between the detachments and headquarters was far from close at this time. If detachments requested higher headquarters to furnish advice in handling difficult matters or to furnish instructions covering fields in which they did not feel competent to act, they either did not receive a reply within a reasonable period or did not hear at all. Naturally the detachments were annoyed at this apparent lack of cooperation and often concluded that higher headquarters was falling down on the job, not realizing that as a result of the niggardly policy followed in some highly important fields the two or three officers assigned were terrifically harassed if under the roundabout tactical channel arrangement they ever received the communications from the detachments.

## Chapter 10 Military Government Settles Down in Germany

Inasmuch as conditions varied somewhat from place to place and one period tended to merge into another rather than to be sharply separated, it is difficult to fix a date when the settled phase began. But roughly speaking it may be fixed as the late summer of 1945.

By the beginning of this phase of military government the fighting had receded somewhat into the distance. Tactical units had been redeployed to the areas in Germany where they were to be stationed as occupation forces or to other theatres or earmarked for the United States. German governments beginning with the states and going down through the districts to the cities, counties, and rural towns and farming areas had been organized and were functioning on a fairly broad scale. The early emergencies had been confronted and either met or allowed to develop into a more settled type of situation. Certain responsibilities naturally carried over from the intermediate period to the later period, but the primary mission of military government in this phase were more long-range in character. A civil administration which is to prepare Germany to be turned back eventually to the Germans may have the chief responsibility for political reconstruction, but military government has to make ready the way for the civil administration and in so doing plays a vital part in establishing the foundation for any program which the civil administration will carry through.

Anyone who will read the *Hunt Report* dealing with military government in Germany during the first World War will be impressed by the significance of this aspect of military government in carrying out the final objectives. If military government ignores or

proves unsuccessful in carrying out its mission as it relates to long-range objectives the efforts of the civil administration will be severely handicapped and it is quite probable that the civil administration may never be able to perform its work in a successful manner. In the first World War this was not sufficiently appreciated and military government proceeded on the thesis that it could operate on a temporary basis which would have little or no bearing on what might be decided upon later. But according to the official report the errors made in the early military government operations could never be corrected and led to almost crippling weaknesses in the period before the Germans took over full control.

The United States has given lip service to the principle that it fights a war only when necessary to defend itself and that the main objective in fighting is not only to defeat an enemy immediately but to prevent any future trouble with that enemy. Military government could be withdrawn shortly after the fighting ends if its mission were limited to the immediate objective of defeating the enemy. But its final phase as well as the civil administration which succeeds it are intended to carry out the vital mission of preventing future war on the part of the country occupied. Those who do not believe that there is any possibility of preventing future wars rule out the necessity of continuing military government beyond the immediate period after fighting ceases as well as the establishment of a civil administration to carry on the occupation. And it may be added that American military government personnel in Germany included a goodly number of those who held this conception. To them the military government assignment ended with the emergency repairing of public works and utilities.

This final mission of military government is always more difficult than the earlier objectives, irrespective of the occupying authority or the country occupied. If there are differences of opinion as to how best to keep roads clear from civilian traffic or how to keep civil unrest to a minimum or what physical repairs to undertake, there will be much greater divergencies of opinion as to what steps should be taken to safeguard against future aggression. Many of the problems facing American military government in Germany during the first two phases were concrete and comparatively easy to view. The problems arising out of the long-range mission were usually not at all concrete or limited in scope and could be seen in anything like

their entirety only with the greatest difficulty. Certain of the problems of the earlier periods of military government called for little knowledge of the country under occupation, but the long-range objectives could hardly be approached at all without such background.

Germany presents more complexities than certain other countries. The experience of more than a century seems to many thoughtful people to throw grave doubt on the ability of the German people to govern themselves. If it is true that the Germans have no capacity in this respect and may be expected to deliver themselves into the clutches of whoever is strong enough to seize the reins or promise enough in the way of stimulants, the prospects of carrying out what some regard as the final objective of American military government are far from bright. Moreover, those who maintain that the Russians will never withdraw from Germany but rather intend to take it over eventually as a Russian satellite naturally see very little chance of accomplishing such an end. Those who consider European affairs so muddled and Europeans so decadent that there will always be trouble there also are not disposed to look upon Germany as offering a fertile field for the final phase of military government.

There are others who take a less pessimistic view. They point to the start which the Germans made toward local self-government at the time of the Stein reforms in the early nineteenth century as well as to the good administrative record which many German cities had as recently as the early years of the present century. They also believe that the German capacity for hard work, frugality, and appreciation of the arts can be directed toward responsible government. Not everyone has such deep-seated suspicions of the Russians or lack of respect for Europeans as those referred to above.

The third stage of military government in Germany was not only complicated by the character of the Germans but by the character of the Americans. It is probable that few people in the world live as much in the present as the people of the United States. The very word "planning" has a sinister connotation in the minds of many of our people. With so little inclination to give thought to the future and so great a concentration on the present and immediate future, it was certainly not easy for American military government officers in Germany to agree on a program, for the policy determiners in Washington to make decisions, or for the people at home to give the necessary backing through understanding. Indeed there long remained the

uncertainty as to whether the United States would remain in Germany to carry out her occupation responsibilities or whether she would withdraw after a few years, leaving her Allies to bear the brunt of the burden.

Being particularly interested in practical affairs and finding theoretical matters tedious Americans have a distinct tendency to emphasize public works, great factory resources and productivity, governmental structure, administrative organization, and other things that can be seen and touched. Such a national characteristic has its great advantages, for it makes for automobiles, telephones, radios, electric refrigerators, and mechanical facilities to the extent no other country begins to approach. Moreover, it enabled the United States during the course of World War II to convert to a munitions supplier of such magnitude that even the optimists were left behind.

This characteristic was by no means a complete liability during the third and presumably the final phase of military government in Germany, though it gave rise to certain problems. It meant that we found it difficult to refrain from undue emphasis on public works in Germany, from running military government on the basis of personal power and the "bigger and better" philosophy of public agencies and private businesses in the United States. It meant that we overrated the importance of laws, directives, constitutions, and governmental and administrative structure in reconstructing Germany. Because it provides a water supply route over which we wanted entire control this meant that we considered the military control of the Rhine from the Ruhr to middle Baden more important than the boundary separating the American Zone from the French Zone though the artificiality of the latter may in the last analysis seriously interfere with the realization of our final objective in Germany. It meant that we gave more attention to economic matters than to cultural, educational, and religious problems which in the long run may determine Germany's future willingness to take her place as a citizen rather than an outlaw among nations.

As a result of our physical isolation from Europe and other great nations and our predilection toward the present and material things, we probably have less political consciousness than the people of any other great nation. If any one wants proof of this he has only to look at the situation that characterized even our higher headquarters in Germany. From the top on down the officers frequently drafted

plans and directives which almost completely ignored the political implications either on the part of the Germans or our Allies. In order to safeguard against the most serious of these politically immature actions the US Group CC (Office of Military Government for Germany) maintained an Office of Political Affairs (Political Division) staffed by approximately one hundred persons. A similar agency in the British element of the Control Commission for Germany did its work with less effort on the basis of a staff of perhaps ten. We may consider political consciousness as something to criticize—as some of our people do, but it can hardly be denied that the handling of our relations with other nations and especially our military government operations in Germany in the last phase depend in no small measure on gauging the effect of any given action or policy on future events.

A continuing responsibility of military government during the third phase involved the organization and staffing of the German governments of the three states, the various districts, and the large number of cities, towns, and rural communes in the American Zone. The pressure was so great during the earlier periods that there was comparatively little opportunity to give any great amount of attention to the detailed problem of governmental organization. The big thing was to get the local governments going and as time passed to organize some sort of regional governments above the local level.

Though the greater part of the displaced persons had been returned to their homelands by the Autumn of 1945, military government found the Poles, Jews, Yugoslavs and others that did not wish to leave serious problems. They not only consumed large quantities of food, but they exhibited many of the psychoneurotic traits which must be expected from people who have undergone the tribulations that many of the displaced persons suffered. It was commonplace for them to allege that they were not receiving the consideration that they deserved from the Allied authorities. They often objected to the camps in which they were living, maintaining that it reflected on their position to be lodged in camps. Some urged that the best German houses be cleared of their occupants and placed at the disposal of the displaced persons, especially the Jews. They refused to assist in some instances in keeping their quarters reasonably habitable, taking the position that it was not their responsibility to make any effort to help themselves. During this period the actual care of the displaced persons was handled for some months by UNRRA, but final



responsibility remained with military government and it had to give attention to the charges made in the press as to inadequate treatment.

Moreover, the displaced persons continued their underground war with the German population, despite all their promises and the efforts exerted by UNRRA and the American Army personnel. Forages into the countryside never ceased; some displaced persons took advantage of every opportunity to pick a quarrel with the Germans. With German property looted, German lives lost, and German women raped almost every day by the displaced persons, widespread resentment developed among the populace, especially when they could not defend themselves against the fire-arms which the displaced persons managed to obtain. The situation became so tense by the winter of 1945 that General Eisenhower reported that serious unrest and disturbances might be expected on the part of the German people unless something was done. General McNarney reiterated this point when he took over as Commanding General. The public-safety angle continued of course to be a direct responsibility of military government after UNRRA assumed the task of administering the camps.

The worst aspect of the displaced persons problem was that there seemed little likelihood of solving it. As long as a difficulty can be tackled with some chance of success, there is an incentive to attack it, but most of the displaced persons who remained in the American Zone in the fall of 1945 did not desire to return to their native lands; indeed tens of thousands of them were literally people without a country. Instead of being reduced in numbers as the months passed, these homeless people increased as refugees from Poland and certain other eastern points managed to reach the American Zone. Some of these who were Jews might eventually move on to Palestine if the way opened, but the future remained most uncertain for many of them. More than three hundred thousand displaced persons remained in the American Zone a year after V-J Day.<sup>1</sup>

Another group of refugees became a major problem during the third phase of military government: the Germans who were forced to leave Sudetenland, Poland, Hungary, and other eastern European countries which no longer would tolerate their presence.<sup>2</sup> During the

<sup>1</sup> As of June 1, 1946 there were 368,210 displaced persons in various camps in the American Zone. Despite all efforts to reduce this number the total actually increased to approximately half a million.

<sup>2</sup> By June 1, 1946, 646,338 of these people had arrived in the U. S. Zone from Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

earlier periods considerable numbers of Germans had left the Russian Zone and entered either the American or British Zone, where they anticipated conditions more to their liking. With housing facilities already so critical and food supplies so inadequate in these western zones, the presence of hundreds of thousands of these migrants added to the complications. But these people were present for the most part when military government began to function and they had to be taken for granted. However, the forced emigration of large numbers of Germans from the East presented graver problems. To begin with, they were definitely coming in on a permanent basis. Moreover, many of them had lived so long in the East that they had become quite different from the Germans in Germany and consequently could be expected to add to the public-safety and cultural problems. Finally, the burden of their support on an already badly strained German economy added materially to the general grimness of the situation.

The food problem remained a most insistent one. The 900-1100 calories which prevailed in the American Zone before the first harvest after V-E Day was increased to a point where a ration of approximately 1500 calories of food per day was authorized. Though this was well below the 2000 calories regarded as a minimum for the subsistence of human beings, it came in for widespread criticism outside of Germany on the ground that it equalled or exceeded the diet in certain other European countries, such as Yugoslavia, and its maintenance required the importation of supplies from the United States. Military government, backed up by the American tactical military forces in Germany, decided that military security required such a food allowance, but nevertheless a drastic cut had to be made in the Spring of 1946.<sup>1</sup>

It is not easy to judge the validity of the criticism leveled at the German food standards set up with the approval of the American Army. It is doubtless true under our compartmentalized planning that comparatively little attention was paid to the food situations in other European countries in deciding what should be done in Germany. Obviously one cannot refuse sympathy to the people of the countries occupied by the Germans: under any just system of deserts they should have good living while the Germans go without.

<sup>1</sup> In May, 1946 the ration for normal consumers was cut to 1180 calories daily, but during the summer a restoration to the higher amount was achieved.

It is probably true that the decision of American military authorities in Germany was influenced by the emotions of officers and men who saw the widespread misery surrounding them. It may not be proper to base decisions on the impact made by the sight of undernourished German children begging the scraps from the mess tins of American GIs, though it is reassuring that our military personnel reacts so humanely. How great a danger of civil uprisings was created by the food situation, it is difficult to determine.

The general cultural program came in for considerably more attention during the third phase of military government than had been given in the first two periods. The ban against any kind of group meeting other than religious and later purely local political party was removed and movies and theatres were permitted to operate under license. Publishing also began to function in a modest way,<sup>1</sup> as a more liberal attitude was displayed by the American occupying authorities.

The third phase saw the railroad tracks restored in large measure and trains running in so far as rolling stock permitted. The destruction of cars and locomotives during the bombing had reached large proportions. Coupled with the terrific burden placed on the railroad equipment during the war and the removal of certain equipment by the Russians, it was not to be expected that train service, especially of the passenger variety, could return to more than a mere fraction of the prewar record. Even in the case of freight traffic the delivery of the limited amount of coal that could be mined in the Ruhr fields frequently was held up, despite all the pressure that could be brought to bear.<sup>2</sup>

After the emergency repairs in public works which received attention immediately after military government detachments took over, this particular program more or less settled into a routine. The work of repairing streets, roads, and bridges continued and additional streets were cleared of debris and opened to traffic. But the task of permanent reconstruction involved such incredible quantities of materials and labor that military government did not feel inclined to tackle it. In general, this decision was doubtless a wise one, since the problem belonged primarily to the Germans rather than to American

<sup>1</sup> Thirty-five German newspapers had been licensed by June, 1946.

<sup>2</sup> In May, 1946 less than 40% of the locomotives and passenger cars were in a serviceable condition. About half of the inadequate number of freight cars in use belonged to foreign countries.

military government. However, with the housing situation so critical there were 45 per cent more occupants per room in December, 1945 than in 1939<sup>1</sup>—and the need for the most elementary repairs involving the boarding up of windows and holes so prevalent, it was felt in some quarters that military government should take a hand, at least to the extent of assisting the German authorities in obtaining the necessary materials. As it was, the American Army had requisitioned the available building materials and any supplies for German repairs would either have to be taken from the Army stocks or at least arranged for at mills not operating and then transported to the places where needed. Especially with the lack of fuel and the frigid German winters coupled with the small food ration and the limited clothing supplies, it was sometimes argued that military security demanded steps in this direction. But in most instances American military government did comparatively little in the housing field, maintaining that it was a problem for the Germans to handle.

During this period military government had to maintain its own tribunals to deal with certain types of cases involving Germans, but more and more of the cases were placed under the jurisdiction of German courts as additional judges were "vetted"<sup>2</sup> and higher courts reopened. By March, 1946 all German courts in the U.S. Zone had been reopened. At the top level attention was given to the revision of German law so as to purge the legal system of Nazi contamination.

In the financial field increasing attention was devoted during this stage to the reconstruction of the German tax system. Old sources of revenues were exploited as far as possible<sup>3</sup> and new types of revenue vigorously sought. The tax system under the Nazis had not only been almost completely centralized under the Reich Ministry of Finance but it had been organized into administrative districts quite apart from the states, *Regierungsbezirke*, and *Kreise*. With a program of strengthening the state and local governments in Germany, one of the sizable tasks of American military government was that of assisting the Germans to integrate the machinery for public finance with the state and local governments. Much effort was also expended in the denazification of insurance companies, savings banks, and other

<sup>1</sup> There were 1.6 persons per room in the U. S. Zone in 1945.

<sup>2</sup> 80% of the judges had to be removed because of their Nazi records.

<sup>3</sup> Tax collections in 1945 amounted to 40% of those in 1944. Corporate income tax collections were only 14% as large as in 1944.

credit agencies<sup>1</sup> as well as to the discovery of carefully concealed Nazi assets.<sup>2</sup>

Labor unions had been singled out for special favor at an earlier date and some progress had been made in laying the foundations of a system of free labor unions that would be appropriate in a democratic Germany. However, many of the American tactical officers regarded labor unions in anything but a favorable light and refused to permit labor specialists in their military government detachments to recognize unions within their areas. The Potsdam Agreement quite definitely provided for the organizing of German labor and directives issued under its terms emphasized the American policy of not only permitting but encouraging labor unions in Germany. Considerable progress was gradually made and labor unions became more or less commonplace.<sup>3</sup> However, with the virtual paralysis of industry in the American Zone, the opportunities for a vital program on the part of the unions were somewhat limited.

A manpower registration was undertaken during this period which revealed a total labor force of 5,703,325 in the American Zone as of the end of May, 1946. Of these 485,946 were classified as unemployed. Inasmuch as the Nazis had scuttled the German system of unemployment insurance, boasting that they could maintain an economy in which there would never again be unemployment, there was no direct program available for dealing with these cases. A relief case load of approximately 960,000 at this time indicates that a large proportion of the unemployed had to be taken care of on an outright relief basis. Something was done to ameliorate the situation in certain cases by authorizing the insurance companies to make full payments up to RM 1,000 on life insurance policies which were payable.<sup>4</sup>

With the tax sources sadly shrunk, the public debt reaching enormous figures, and the financial institutions so loaded down with public securities that few if any were solvent, the social insurance system for which Germany once had a world-wide reputation was naturally severely shaken. As has been noted above, unemployment

<sup>1</sup> By March, 1946 bank accounts amounting to 46.3 billion marks had been unblocked; 18.2 billion marks remained blocked.

<sup>2</sup> By June, 1946 57,453 properties valued at RM 8,587,000,000 had been taken over, of which 40,985 represented former Nazi party, Nazi leaders, and German government properties.

<sup>3</sup> There were approximately 500 unions with 750,000 members a year after V-E Day.

<sup>4</sup> The remaining amounts of the policies due were deferred.

insurance had been abandoned under the National Socialist regime and hence could not be immediately reactivated. Old-age insurance was maintained in so far as the funds of the various public treasuries permitted. Within a year after V-E Day approximately 80 per cent of the population in the American Zone had been covered by a re-activated system of health insurance. A payroll tax of 18 per cent was levied to finance the social insurance program. The fact that 23.2 per cent of the German medical personnel had been found unacceptable after "vetting" complicated the maintenance of health standards. Indeed so serious was the shortage of German doctors that the medical school at Heidelberg was one of the first educational facilities to be reopened.

The handling of German prisoners of war was given vigorous attention as military government settled down. The first emphasis was placed on returning agricultural workers and miners so that food and coal supplies might be increased. By June 30, 1946 all but 140,000 of the prisoners of war in the American Zone had been demobilized and all were scheduled to be released by November 30, 1946.

The job of organizing a new German police force was continued and distinct progress made during this period. "Vetting" revealed that a sizable number of the active Nazis had managed to creep back into the police departments and these of course had to be thrown out. Police-training courses were set up to train new recruits. Despite the acute shortage of clothing some progress was made in securing uniforms for the police personnel, though few of them presented a very good appearance. During the fall of 1945 the rule forbidding German police to be armed was dropped and it became more feasible for these public security agents to cope with dangerous criminals.

Though the responsibility for maintaining law and order was placed primarily on the German governments, the mobilized force organized by the American Army to take over from the Third and Seventh Armies contributed considerably toward this end. More than thirty thousand American soldiers were assigned to this force which was adequately armed and given full facilities for moving about. This force was intended to deal especially with offenses against the United States, to keep a careful watch on any revival of the Nazi organization, to seize weapons illegally held by the Germans, and to prevent unauthorized entry into the American Zone from other parts of Germany or from foreign countries. It was handicapped by the

same problem of rapid turnover that weakened military government: its commanding officer complained bitterly in 1946 that he could not keep officers or men long enough to break them into their jobs before they were returned to the United States. Nevertheless, the mobilized force despite its untrained personnel was better fitted than the ordinary tactical forces of the Armies for security duties. Its organization made it feasible to cut the number of American troops in Germany drastically.

A central archival depot was established in March, 1946 at Offenbach, near Frankfurt. More than 1,850,000 items were collected at this depot from the several assembly points which had been set up earlier. Almost at once a start was made in returning various objects which the Germans had looted from various occupied countries: by the summer of 1946 some 250,000 items had been restored to France, the Netherlands, and other countries.

The start which had been made in reestablishing the German *communications system in the intermediate phase* was gradually broadened into some semblance of the older setup.<sup>1</sup> Local mail service was expanded to district service and then to service throughout the American Zone,<sup>2</sup> though certain special postal activities were not revived. Plans looking toward the carrying of mail throughout Germany and to other countries received attention. Had the French not vetoed the establishment of a central German agency for communications, it is probable that a unified postal system throughout the Reich would have been authorized in the fall of 1945. As it turned out, a limited international service with the British and American Zones preceded this basic step.

The determined resistance of the Army Signal Corps was finally broken and a limited amount of use permitted of German telephone and telegraph systems by civilians. The tactical units of the American Army reserved such facilities as they required and the remainder was then made available within certain limits to American military government, German governments, doctors, various businesses, and other specified categories.

During this period the attention of American military government both at staff and planning and at field detachment levels was

<sup>1</sup> There were 203,000 civilian telephones in operation in May, 1946.

<sup>2</sup> By May, 1946 some 95,000,000 pieces of mail per month were being handled, substantially the normal load.

largely focussed on four major fields: denazification, reeducation, democratization, and the reconstruction of German industry. The programs in these areas are so significant that they will be dealt with in some detail in the four succeeding chapters.

Charges that American military government "bungled the job," even to the point of breakdown, during the third phase have been commonplace. Large numbers of people in the United States have become so cynical of American efforts in Germany that they have dismissed the entire project as an absolute failure. Some basis for such charges doubtless exist, though the charges have frequently been greatly exaggerated. The tasks involved in this phase of military government were so complicated that they often defied even the most expert handling; it is probable that few people in the United States who have not observed the operations in Germany from the inside fully realize the magnitude of the undertaking. Lack of background and experience on the part of many American military government officials, both military and civilian, especially in the details of German political and social institutions, contributed in no small way to the imperfect record. The inability of the United States to furnish clearcut policies in certain fields and to provide unified administrative machinery for handling occupation problems in Washington seriously handicapped operations in Germany. Nevertheless, when every mistake has been recorded and every weakness admitted, it still seems fair to claim that substantial progress was made by American military government in Germany in the routine problems and a fair amount of advance was achieved toward long-range objectives during this period.



## Chapter 11 Denazification

If one were to select the single item which received the most attention from military government officers of the United States in Germany, stirred up the widest controversy, occasioned the greatest perplexity among British, Russian, and French Allies, and gave rise to the most widespread publicity in the United States, it would without much question be the American denazification program. With public opinion in the United States at so high a pitch, American military personnel whether they approved or not of what was being done had to give detailed consideration to the problem of denazification, especially after General Patton who had managed to do about as he pleased in every other matter found his nemesis at this point.

Denazification came in for attention from the military government planners from the very early stages. No one had anything good to say about the Nazis of course and it stood to reason that one of the first jobs was to throw them out of their entrenched positions in Germany. But it is one thing to draft a plan and another thing to apply the provisions of that plan in the midst of about as difficult a combination of circumstances as could be imagined.

In the German Country Unit of SHAEF, which began to make detailed plans for the occupation of Germany early in 1944, it was recognized at the highest level that careful attention must be given to denazification. Indeed the problem was regarded as so important that it was lifted out of the general category and given a special status of its own together with a special chapter in the *Handbook for Military Government in Germany*. Though the Interior Division of the German Country Unit was naturally much interested

in this objective, inasmuch as it maintained a section dealing with German Government and Civil Service, it was decided that denazification had such ramifications that it could not be left to any one division to handle. Many hours were devoted by the Board of Editors and the Planning Section of the German Country Unit to the general problem of denazification and it was recognized that any general policy would be of little avail unless accompanied by a detailed guide listing the Nazis to be covered.

Inasmuch as the National Socialists had succeeded in permeating virtually every nook and corner of German government from the top to the bottom and not content with that had penetrated into the very heart of the social and economic institutions of the Reich, the task of drafting such a guide could not be dismissed lightly. Though reasonably well staffed by competent persons familiar with the Nazi system, the German Country Unit doubted whether it should because of the time element and other factors undertake the technical job of listing the positions to be purged. Therefore, it asked the Office of Strategic Services which had undertaken the compilation of black and grey lists of dangerous and doubtful Germans to contribute the basic data. After some delay the OSS furnished a list of the detailed categories of National Socialists which it considered appropriate for arrest or for mandatory removal from office and this was incorporated in the text of the *Handbook for Military Government in Germany*.

But despite the deadlines which had been set by half a dozen generals in completing the *Handbook* and the care with which the various provisions had been drafted, a very serious obstacle was suddenly encountered which had the effect of nullifying much of what had been done. The German Country Unit was unable to obtain policy decisions from Washington or London to guide it in preparing the basic plans for the occupation of Germany and hence it had to proceed as best it could, using its own judgment as to what should be done. Yet though the President did not see fit to furnish general American policy to the German Country Unit, he was more or less directly kept in touch with what was done through "a little dove," as he called it. Upon completion of the third preparatory and what it was hoped would be the first authorized edition of the *handbook*, "the little dove," who was actually Secretary Morgenthau's personal representative in the ETO, flew in the President's window

with a mimeographed copy and succeeded in arousing the President to a point of indignation by arguing that the plans represented a far too "easy" treatment of the Germans. Though the German Country Unit planners had not considered it probable that a basic German food ration of more than 1200 to 1400 calories would be possible in actuality, they inserted a ration goal of 2000 calories because that figure had long been regarded by food experts as the standard acceptable minimum. The planners had appreciated the very great importance of prohibiting German industrial operations either directly or indirectly related to war, but on the other hand they could not be oblivious to the necessity of permitting a reasonable degree of industrial activity unless the Germans were to be supported out of the public treasuries of the Allies. Hence the economic plans called for emphasis on extending agricultural output and light industry, with such medium and heavy industry as would be required to keep the Germans self-supporting and European economy on a reasonably even keel. These provisions, which were later accepted as essential even from the standpoint of American military security, were portrayed to the President by the Morgenthau group as so outrageous that their authors in so far as they were Americans had forfeited all claim to confidence. The President consequently became so aroused that he called in the press to castigate the offenders publicly.

Though arrangements had been made for the printing and official issuance of the *Handbook for Military Government in Germany* to the many military government officers who had long been waiting for a definite set of instructions as to what they were expected to do in Germany, the President's blast to the newspapers obviously made this step impossible for the time being. A certain number of bulky mimeographed copies were circulated without formal authorization for study purposes, but the chief of staff of SHAEF naturally was not in a position to give official approval to the *Handbook*.

The net result was that not only was the effort of many months of hard labor of several hundred persons under the most trying circumstances because of the lack of basic policy decisions more or less wasted but more important the military government personnel earmarked for Germany had no plans of any character at a time when it was extremely important that they become acquainted with their mission. With the decision to establish military government along

strictly national lines, the Anglo-American German Country Unit came to an end at this time and the job of revising the *Handbook* in such a fashion that it would be approved was handed over to G-5 of SHAEF. This took place in the early fall of 1944, several months after D-Day and while military government operations were proceeding apace. G-5 of SHAEF was not organized to take over where the German Country Unit had left off; indeed it never perfected a very adequate planning organization, handicapped as it was by no specialists in such vital fields as German regional and local government and civil service and only token facilities in public safety, education, and certain other areas.

When American military government detachments began to take over the German *Kreise* as the carpet was unrolled by the tactical forces, they should have had a very definite knowledge of what they were expected to do. But with the *Handbook* so long held up and then delivered at the last minute, still somewhat indefinite in status, when the exigencies of the situation demanded some sort of stop-gap, it is not surprising that they were ill prepared to take over the difficult job of controlling German government.

Nowhere was this unpreparedness more glaring than in the denazification field. With so many complications and intricacies that even the experts found the problem about as knotty as could be, denazification required more than cursory knowledge on the part of the military government personnel charged with direct control of German governmental units. But through no fault of their own, the field detachments in preparing for their jobs had not had at their disposal the detailed denazification plans prepared by the German Country Unit, OSS, and G-5 of SHAEF for their guidance.

As was to be expected under the circumstances, the early detachments in western Germany had little conception of the difficulties or pitfalls involved in denazification. Inasmuch as few of the military government officers had had any great amount of experience in dealing with Germans, they did not understand German psychology and found it difficult to distinguish dangerous Nazis from other Germans. Their general training had stressed the importance of dealing considerably with the German clergy, since a reverse course during the occupation in World War I had led to embarrassment. With little knowledge of their own as to denazification and little or no assistance from outside agencies such as Counterintelligence and OSS, which

might have been expected to give substantial assistance, there was a tendency during the early days of occupation and even long after in some instances to lean heavily upon counsel given by the German clergy.

The shortcomings of this procedure came into the most glaring of limelights at Aachen and military government took its first severe beating in what was to turn out to be an almost pitiful series of maulings. There had been a great deal of almost romantic publicity given to the AMG, military government, civil affairs, or whatever term may be used to apply to the administration of occupied enemy territory. The *Saturday Evening Post* had run feature articles illustrated with colored pictures; *Life*, *Time*, and *Newsweek* had given generous space; indeed there was scarcely a periodical in the United States which had not eagerly exploited the subject. Not to be left behind, the newspapers had reflected the widespread interest in this new military activity. Under these circumstances it was to be expected that the representatives of the press would be eager to file stories relating to the first military government operations on German soil. Perhaps few however had any idea of the number of correspondents who would surge in on the military government detachments or the feverishness with which they would write their stories. Aachen was of course not the first place to come under American control, but it was somewhat less of an empty shell than the earlier conquests and its population had not been dispersed to the extent of the very first towns. At any rate it was regarded by the press as the first major test of military government.

The military government detachment which was assigned to take over the administration of Aachen was probably fairly typical of military government detachments. Its officers included a variety of types and backgrounds; some were abler than others, but the average was not low. Like most other military government officers, the officers assigned to Aachen knew comparatively little about Germans in Germany. They were under considerable pressure to get a German government started at the earliest possible moment in order to deal with the emergency. Apparently they were impressed by the cordiality of the local German bishop and relied heavily on his advice as to the local inhabitants suitable for staffing that government. Unfortunately they chose as *Bürgermeister* a German business man who turned out to have a bad Nazi record and with his assistance they mired in more

deeply by filling the other key positions with Germans whose pasts more often than not could not bear the searchlight.

Of course the anti-Nazis expressed their indignation and the newsmen, given the cue, began to investigate the past records of the men used by military government to operate the local government. What they found was enough to fill many dispatches sent to their papers and to cause literally thousands of the most sensational head-lined stories to appear throughout the length and breadth of the United States. Being newsmen most of them were of course looking for juicy stories rather than attempting to report the routine operations or depict the over-all difficulties. A tremendous wave of indignation, anger, disappointment, resentment, bitterness, and even horror developed in the United States, especially on the part of the Jews and others who had had to bear the brunt of the Nazi crimes. Military government, which had enjoyed the status of a favorite child, became anathema; the pressure that descended on Washington caused even the strongest to quail.

The combination of the delay in getting the denazification plans to the military government officers and the hornet's nest stirred up by the news stories from Aachen was if not fatal certainly most unfortunate. It got military government in Germany off to a bad start. Moreover, it immensely complicated the denazification problem. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, stung into action, issued a directive which, though somewhat vague in certain particulars, seemed to have the effect of barring all who had Nazi affiliations from holding public positions of any type, even if they were clerical or mechanical in character. When this JCS paper was received in the ETO it led to virtual paralysis in the denazification program for a time because no one on the ground in Germany could see how it would be possible to organize a German system of government under its ban on all Nazis. Not that many officers had a brief for any German with the slightest Nazi contact: it would have been far more desirable to use only those who amid all of the Nazi orgy had managed to keep themselves entirely unsullied. But the question was where to find such Germans.

The Nazis had not contented themselves with organizing a political machine, such as is familiar in the United States; they had aimed at integrating every possible phase of German life under their control. Teachers had to belong to the Nazi teachers' association or sur-

render their positions; doctors and lawyers were compelled to join the Nazi organizations for doctors and lawyers if they desired to practice; artists, who were writers, painters, musicians, and actors, could only engage in their art by affiliating with the Nazi culture organization. Laborers were brought together in the Nazi Labor Front; civil servants into the Nazi civil servants' group; railroad, steamship, postal, and communications employees into Nazi organizations designed for them. Young people were regimented into the youth groups and into the students' association, while house wives found it difficult to remain out of the women's organizations. German business men were of course not neglected in this mania on the part of the Nazis to engulf the entire German population.

It would not be accurate to state that there were no Germans in Germany who had managed to keep themselves free from the Nazi contamination. Jews were of course not permitted to enroll or become affiliated and those Jews that remained after the Nazi regime were available for use by military government, but their number was not large and their misery was frequently so great that they were consumed in it to the exclusion of anything else. The inmates of concentration camps might or might not have kept entirely aloof from the Nazis; some of them had started out as Nazis but failed to get along as time passed. Many of those who had refused to be assimilated and consequently gone to concentration camps had been so brutally dealt with by the Nazis over a lengthy period that they were physical or mental wrecks or both. Business men perhaps succeeded in keeping free from formal Nazi affiliations in larger numbers than any others, but they had rarely kept out of bankruptcy unless they had carried on business dealings with the Nazis and these seemed as contaminating in many instances as formal membership in certain Nazi affiliated groups. The proportion of the German population with Nazi records has been variously estimated. Some would place the figure as high as ninety per cent; others consider two-thirds or three-fourths a more accurate proportion. A good deal depends on the definition set up as a basis for classification. But the fact remains that a very large majority of the German population from whose numbers public officials, civil servants, and teachers would ordinarily be recruited had to be labeled as "Nazis" of a sort under any definition.

As it became more and more apparent that the Joint Chiefs of

Staff directive to remove and bar all Nazis from the public service was impossible of application, revisions were undertaken which finally produced a provision calling for the mandatory removal and future exclusion of all "active Nazis" from policy-determining and other public positions above the clerical level. Military government officers in general considered this modification a distinct step forward in that it laid down the basis for a denazification program that could be carried out, though at the same time it was realized that there remained a substantial degree of vagueness as to what was intended. Obviously the term "active Nazi" could be interpreted quite diversely, while the positions from which such persons were to be removed and barred might also come in for debate.

On the basis of the latest Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions (JCS 1067) from Washington a directive was drafted and issued in the ETO ordering military government officers in the field to remove all active Nazis from non-clerical positions. Under the system of regular command channels this directive went to the Army Groups rather than directly to the military government detachments. Army Groups did not consider it sufficient to transmit the directive to the Armies, but framed their own directives which they then sent on to the Armies under them. With a similar psychology of independence and self-sufficiency, the Armies did not relish the idea of accepting and sending on at once the denazification directives from their Army Group headquarters to the corps and divisions for distribution to the military government detachments under their control. Instead they frequently prepared their own directives based on the Army Group directive. All of this required time and, when the Army directives finally went down to the field after several weeks of delay, their provisions, though all supposedly derived from the JCS decisions, actually varied substantially. One Army commanding general, not desiring to incur any risk arising out of the uncertain term "active Nazi," directed that *all* Nazis be summarily removed. Another feeling that the main job was to get things done as quickly as possible and inclined to regard denazification with suspicion used his discretionary authority to suspend the process of denazification for the time being. In another case those who had joined the party after 1936 were not considered as "active". The net result was that at one time during the early summer of 1945 the American military government detachments were operating under four different denazification direc-



tives. Not only did this produce anything but a uniform record, but it tended to destroy the respect which military government and other officers had for basic policies from above.

With all of Germany occupied and the lines of the American Zone established, the newspaper correspondents were not concentrated in a single area as they had been during the first entry into Germany, but with new additions to their numbers they were spread out throughout the American Zone. It is not strange that it soon became apparent to those who compared notes that denazification was not proceeding along the same lines in various parts of the American Zone. Some areas worked vigorously to remove Nazis; others did very little except give lip service to the program; perhaps the majority of military government detachments, harassed by many responsibilities which seemed to them urgent in character, proceeded with a fair amount of energy. Numerous stories began to appear in the newspapers of the United States pointing out the lack of uniformity in carrying out the denazification program and criticizing the slow progress in certain areas. Public opinion already active was further aroused, especially among certain elements of the population, and strong pressure began to be exerted in Washington in the direction of a more vigorous denazification effort.

Gradually this pressure in Washington resulted in decisive action in Germany. The deactivation of the Army Groups during the late summer of 1945 removed one link in the long chain of command. The removal of General Patton from command of the Third Army and as the district military governor of Bavaria because he had expressed his distrust of the denazification program to the press, remarking that Nazis were more or less like Republicans and Democrats in the United States, gave proof that the top authorities meant to proceed with the carrying out of the directive. Stronger steps were taken to insist that the Armies make use of the general ETO directive rather than draft their own denazification directive. But the problem was still far from a simple one. In general, the military government officers in the field were men whose civilian backgrounds had been those of business men, engineers, and men of affairs. It was to be expected therefore that they would be more interested in pushing through positive reconstruction of German government than in a negative program of denazification. The fact that the mandatory removal of all active Nazis from key positions meant that most of

the German officials with the know-how had to be discarded, thus seriously jeopardizing the military government accomplishment of the moment, naturally had the affect of not adding to its popularity in many quarters.

Long before the collapse of Germany, it was recognized by the planners that any denazification program beyond one of paper character would require careful guidance from above as well as definite organization in the field. It has already been pointed out that the German Country Unit with the aid of OSS prepared lists of those categories of Nazis that should be interned or summarily removed from public positions. As the basic policy became more inclusive in its coverage, the US Group, Control Council for Germany gave more and more of its attention to extending these earlier lists. The Political Division (Office of Political Affairs) of the US Group CC received the responsibility for coordinating the denazification policies. Its staff members working with other subdivisions and agencies, especially with Public Safety and OSS, labored faithfully over several months on the problem. It was realized that the detachments in the field could not possibly carry out a denazification program unless they were furnished definite lists of those Nazis who were to be arrested, those who were to be removed from official places without discretion, and those whose records were such that they should be watched by the local military government staff and removed if it seemed desirable. It was obvious that the detachments had neither the familiarity with Nazism nor the time to bear the burden of determining who were "active Nazis".

It is difficult for anyone not directly involved in the work to realize the difficulties inherent in preparing the lists to be used by the military government detachments. Of course, it was a simple matter to decide that the Reich ministers, the Gestapo, the *Gauleiter* (district leaders of the party), and others who had appeared in the limelight must either be arrested or at least subjected to mandatory removal from their public positions. The top officers in the Hitler Youth, the *Studentenbund*, and the various affiliated organizations including the lawyers, judges, doctors, and artists could hardly be regarded as safe. But how far down the line would one go before arriving at the point where "active Nazism" would not be involved? It was not enough to say that the leaders of the multifarious Nazi organizations were active and the adherents not active Nazis, for

with the German love for ranks and numerous offices there was a complex hierarchy of grades of membership and minor and major offices almost beyond belief. The information available relating to certain of the affiliated Nazi organizations was very slight and it was not possible to determine where the line should be drawn among their officers and members until substantial knowledge had been accumulated.

To begin with, emphasis had been placed on the denazification of German government, but, as more and more pressure was exerted by the press and various groups in the United States, the denazification of German industry came in for attention. If the task of preparing lists to guide the detachments in handling those Germans who held public offices and civil service positions was a heavy one, the job of extending these lists to cover business men was much more difficult. In the case of the former there was at least the holding of various offices and membership in certain organizations. Of course this applied to trade and industry to some extent also, but it could by no means be depended upon alone, since many business men for one reason or another kept clear of formal entanglement with the Nazis but actually had become seriously contaminated through business dealings. To ascertain what individual business relations had been with the Nazis was a major problem which could not be solved except through the examining of voluminous records and other time-consuming techniques.

Progress was made however and various lists were prepared and after more or less delay passed back and forth between the ETO and Washington, then circulated among higher headquarters in Germany, and finally sent down to the field. After lists had been prepared new information not infrequently suggested their revision. Moreover, the pressure from various groups in the United States tended to force the American planners to add more and more names to the lists. Starting out with tens of thousands of persons to be interned, the lists were extended to hundreds of thousands and still there was clamor to go farther.<sup>1</sup> Some proposals made by serious persons would have involved the arrest or at least punishment of millions of persons, though the facilities for handling such vast numbers could only have been provided if the United States had been willing to dedicate a

<sup>1</sup> In August, 1945 some 80,000 were actually interned in the U. S. Zone. By September, 1946 66,500 Nazis were under arrest in the U. S. Zone.


far larger proportion of its resources to Germany than seemed probable.






The machinery for preparing lists became more and more elaborate. The German Country Unit gave way to the US Group CC for Germany. The Political Division (Office of Political Affairs) of that organization started out with a single officer working on denazification. Before long more of its staff were probably working on that problem than on any other. The Public Safety Division (Section) gave an increasing amount of its time to denazification. Every subdivision of the US Group CC for Germany became involved to a greater or less degree. After the US Group CC underwent metamorphosis into the Office of Military Government for Germany of the United States (OMGUS), a board presided over by the director of the Legal Division was set up to give its attention to denazification.

During the early days the provisions in the field for denazification were comparatively simple. To start out, denazification was regarded as one of many jobs to be handled by the military government detachments, with no provision made for special denazification officers. But it soon became apparent that definite provision would have to be made for denazification machinery in the field and denazification offices known as Special Branches were set up as part of public safety sections in the detachments. As the magnitude of the task became increasingly clear, more and more military and civilian personnel were recruited to deal with the "vetting" process. *Fragebogen* (questionnaires) were prepared by the public safety people at higher headquarters to be used as a basic guide by military government detachments in processing the Germans. Going through several editions these forms were printed in large quantities and made available to the field detachments. Every holder of a public office and virtually all holders of civil service posts, including teachers, railway workers, post office employees, and many others, together with those who were applicants for such positions, had to fill out *Fragebogen*, giving their personal history and revealing their connection with the National Socialist Party if any. False statements carried penalties of prison sentences.

The *Fragebogen* were examined as carefully as possible by the Special Branch of the local military government detachment, checked with Counterintelligence, and investigated as far as resources per-

**NAZISM IN U.S. ZONE**  
**BASED ON SPECIAL-BRANCH FINDINGS IN MORE THAN 1,000,000 CASES**



-  **NON-EMPLOYMENT MANDATORY**
-  **EMPLOYMENT DISCRETIONARY, ADVERSE RECOMMENDATION**
-  **EMPLOYMENT DISCRETIONARY, NO ADVERSE RECOMMENDATION**
-  **NO EVIDENCE OF NAZI ACTIVITY**
-  **EVIDENCE OF ANTI-NAZI ACTIVITY**

Prepared by OMGUS

mitted. New appointments were not as a rule made until "vetting" had been completed, but those holders of positions who had been given their posts during the early period before denazification got well under way carried on pending "vetting." The Special Branches received a total of 1,613,000 *Fragebogen* up to June 1, 1946 when the German tribunals took over. They had processed all but some 4 per cent of these at the above date and rejected or removed 373,762 persons. Approximately 16 per cent of those examined were classified as seriously contaminated by Nazism and therefore subject to mandatory removal.<sup>1</sup>

The efforts of the combat period and the first year after V-E Day left the denazification job far from completed, though considerable progress had been made. The Minister Presidents of the three *Länder* in the American Zone gave their approval to a "Law for the Liberation of National Socialism or Militarism" which as of June 1, 1946 transferred responsibility to German hands under American supervision. Under this law five categories of Germans were specified as follows: I major offenders, II offenders, III lesser offenders, IV followers, and V non-offenders and exonerated after trial. Approximately two and one-half million persons were placed under tentative charges in the American Zone and made subject to German denazification tribunals. Ministers of Denazification were appointed in the three *Länder* to oversee the investigations as well as the 316 local denazification tribunals and the eight appellate tribunals.

The record of the German denazification tribunals naturally varied. Almost at once the tribunal in Munich found itself in difficulty and had to be reorganized. During the first five months the tribunals examined 583,985 cases, eliminating 530,907 without trial. Of the 53,078 cases found chargeable, 116 were convicted as major offenders under Category I, 1195 as offenders under Category II, 3442 as lesser offenders under Category III, 29,582 as followers under Category IV, and 7,447 as non-offenders. In 11,296 cases charges were subsequently dropped on the motion of the public prosecutor. Lt. General Clay professed distinct dissatisfaction with this record and gave the Germans sixty days to tighten up or have American agencies take over.

At Christmas time in 1946 General McNarney granted an amnesty to more than 800,000 Germans in the lowest-income groups

<sup>1</sup> Report of American Military Governor, June, 1946.

who fell in Categories III and IV. This had the effect of relieving numerous "little fellows" who had earned less than RM 3600 in 1943 and 1945 and owned taxable property in 1945 not exceeding RM 20,000 from prosecution in the denazification tribunals.

After the warning uttered by the Deputy Military Governor in the fall of 1946, the denazification tribunals made somewhat greater progress in handling the some two million cases left after the amnesty referred to above. In February, 1947, Lt. General Clay reported that approximately 2000 Germans had been sentenced to jail, 4000 excluded from public office, and 16,000 sentenced to hard labor by the denazification tribunals, adding that "if the figures hold up on a percentage basis, I would call it a good job."<sup>1</sup>

An evaluation of the denazification program of the United States depends in large measure upon the background of the person making the study. There are those who feel that denazification has not been pressed far enough and that the net effect has been far less than it should have been. To these observers denazification probably seems easily the most important job to be done by the United States in its occupation of Germany. Many others regard the record as eminently satisfactory and are inclined to maintain that the denazification program has gone neither too far nor fallen short, though it has of course encountered difficulties.

In comparison with the British, Russian, and French denazification programs the American effort has been by all odds the most comprehensive and energetic. The Russians started out with more of a dynamic effort in this field and ruthlessly liquidated numerous Germans whom they regarded as dangerous. But they have never been interested in an elaborate denazification organization. More has been left to the discretion of the local military commanders in their zone; less attention has been paid to the past records of individual Germans and more to the prospects of whether these individuals would contribute to the Russian goals of the future. Neither the British nor French have seen fit to expend anything like as much of their energy on denazification as the Americans. The British have used lists somewhat similar to those prepared by the United States, but they have not revised these at intervals so as to include more and more Germans, because there has been far less in the way of pressure arising out of public opinion in England. The British and

<sup>1</sup> See the *New York Times*, February 19, 1947.

French attitudes have stressed the big fellow and more or less ignored the little fellow on the ground that the latter was a victim or pawn who could not be blamed too severely because his very life and livelihood depended on buckling to the Nazis.

There is some basis for concluding that the United States has not been as wise as it might have been in devoting so great a part of its military government energy to the one problem of denazification. It is probable that no other single problem, whether it be democratization, education, economic reconstruction, or food has received as much attention over so long a period from both higher headquarters and field echelons as denazification. Denazification represents primarily a negative approach to the German situation, it harks back to the past more than it points to the future. The preoccupation with carrying the campaign to get rid of Nazis even in the lowest levels has perhaps partially blinded the American occupying authorities to the very great importance of the constructive problem of filling the key positions with those persons who have both democratic sympathies and ability. That is not to say that no attention has been paid to the recruiting of able men with democratic beliefs, but this effort appears as a dwarf alongside of the giant denazification program.

The experience of the first World War in Germany seems to indicate that it is more important to fill key positions with the strongest available men than it is to get rid of followers of the conquered regime, important as the latter may be. In that earlier occupation the Allied authorities ousted the supporters of the kaiser, but they left in their stead bureaucrats who espoused other nationalistic cults and had little or no love for democratic institutions. It is a matter of record that the German bureaucrats did little to resist the scuttling of the Republic when the Nazis brought their guns to bear. The question remains to be answered whether a similar mistake has been made in the American Zone this time as a result of the concentration of attention on the negative approach as represented by denazification. If that should prove to be the case, the blame will in large measure be attributable to public opinion in the United States which was focused on this aspect of military government in Germany far above any other, and demanded an expenditure of energy out of all proportion to such activities as democratization and reeducation. In fairness it should be added that many of the most ardent proponents



of a denazification program that would seek to extirpate every root of National Socialism regard such an effort as an absolute prerequisite to any worthwhile attempts to establish a democratic system or a sound educational set up in Germany.

## *Chapter 12* The Problem of Reeducating the Germans

There has been much discussion in the United States of the importance of reeducating the German people. Even before the war broke out numerous articles and books appeared relating to this subject, many of which received wide attention. Virtually all of the printed as well as the oral discussion has pointed out the difficulties involved, while some has gone so far as to conclude that reeducation, especially in the case of those who have been members of the various Nazi youth groups, seems virtually out of the realm of feasibility because of the depth of the vicious influence exerted by the Nazi training. Since V-E Day interest in this aspect of the German problem has been maintained, though it has apparently reached a distinctly lower level than denazification.

In the recent discussion there has been a tendency to take one of two extreme positions. Perhaps the most popular thesis has stressed the basic importance of reeducation in any permanent reconstruction of the German nation. It has been stated that democratization in Germany and indeed the ultimate goal of transforming Germany from an outlaw nation to a member of the United Nations depends very largely on the program of reeducation. The reverse position has been well stated by Walter Lippmann, who expresses cynicism as to the possibility of reeducating the Germans and criticizes the military government authorities in Germany for biting off more than they can possibly chew.

In listening to the discussion both in the United States and in the European Theatre one is almost invariably aware of the somewhat vague character of much of what is said. Reeducation is of course the sort of phrase which permits wide interpretation and it

is apparent that some of those who express an ardent interest have in mind one type of program while others envision something quite different. It is perhaps unfortunate that there has been so much vagueness associated with the phrase, for it has undoubtedly been reflected to some extent in the military government planning and operations in Germany.

Although the interpretations of what would constitute an effective reeducation of the German people are many, there seems to be two commonly held points of view. One conceives of reeducation as primarily formal and comparatively limited in scope. Emphasis is placed on the German school system extending from the kindergarten up through the universities. Trade schools are of course included and some attention is given to public libraries, to youth groups, and to a program of adult education. Under this concept there are three matters that require particular attention: an adequate supply of professionally trained teachers thoroughly infused with democratic ideas, a curriculum which would enable these teachers to exert maximum influence on the students, and a supply of textbooks and other aids to teaching which would embody the best in German culture and at the same time stress democratic ideals rather than supernationalism.

The second definition of reeducation, which is doubtless the one against which Walter Lippmann has fulminated, is a far broader one. Those who hold this view have as a goal the reconstruction of the entire pattern of German life. While they would of course not rule out the schools, they would go far beyond by including German newspapers and periodicals, books, movies, radio programs, social groups, family relationships, music, painting, the opera, the theatre, philosophy, individual reactions, religious activities and indeed virtually everything in Germany beyond the physical. Some would go farther than others in carrying their efforts into every nook and cranny of German life, but all would regard a broad program as essential. Some of the proponents of this interpretation of reeducation point out that the Nazis aimed at permeating every aspect of German life and that any worthwhile program of reeducation will have to adopt a similar counterrole if it offers any reasonable prospect of success. It is readily apparent that the latter concept involves a far greater undertaking than the one which centers around the school system.

The problem of reeducating the Germans has received attention

from military government from the early stages of planning. The German Country Unit of SHAEF set up an Education and Religious Affairs Division soon after its activation. This was the period when it was expected that a central German government would surrender to the Allies and before national zones had been anticipated. The Education Section of the Education and Religious Affairs Division consequently centered its plans around the German Reich Ministry of Science, Education, and Popular Culture. This Anglo-American agency contemplated the direct control of this ministry in collaboration with the Russians and the indirect supervision of the entire educational system of Germany. The military government planners had in mind a considerable degree of decentralization as far as local school matters were concerned, but they regarded it as essential to keep a firm hold over curricular content, the qualifications of teaching and administrative personnel, and textbooks until such a time as the Germans demonstrated their ability and willingness to assume responsibility in an acceptable manner.

At the same time it was never the policy of the Educational Section to take over the job of direct education. From the very beginning it was recognized that it would be unwise both from a practical and a psychological standpoint for the Allies to attempt the direct reeducation of the Germans. Allied manpower resources could not possibly have supplied administrators, professors, and teachers for German universities, trade schools, high schools, and elementary schools in adequate numbers. Nor could Allied representatives undertake the detailed planning of the curricula of the various schools or write the numerous textbooks required. Even if this had been practical, it would not have been regarded as desirable as a policy to be followed in the opinion of the Education Section since it would have resulted in all sorts of psychological barriers erected on the part of the Germans. It was the firm conviction of the planners that German reeducation would have to be accomplished in the last analysis by the Germans themselves, that the teaching would have to be done by Germans, the curricula prepared by Germans, and the textbooks written by Germans. However, it was realized that the current situation called for vigorous steps on the part of the Allied military government authorities.

With almost irresistible Nazi pressure to absorb all German educational personnel, it was not surprising that the majority of school

administrators and teachers had become members of Nazi organizations. Some of them had given themselves ardently to the Nazi cause and indeed proved themselves more National Socialist zealots than educators. Others had been drawn in against their will and had never given personal allegiance to the Nazi cult. But it was clear that much needed to be done in screening German educational staffs before the schools could start the process of reeducating the people. Moreover, the Nazis had perverted the curriculum by insisting on the inclusion of courses dealing with their theories of race, geopolitics, and biology. Even the traditional courses had in many cases been badly contaminated as a result of inclusion of Nazi doctrines. The detailed revision of the curriculum would have to be done by the Germans, but military government would have to furnish supervision. Virtually all of the textbooks in current use had either been prepared by the Nazis or at least revised to include Nazi material. The task of writing large numbers of new texts would require vast effort and a considerable period of time and in the meantime it was the opinion of the planners that emergency texts as free as possible from Nazi contents must be made available.

Much of the early work of the Education Section of the German Country Unit was channeled toward making provision for emergency texts that might safely be used in the elementary schools. After considerable search it was discovered that the library of Teachers College at Columbia University contained texts which had been used in pre-Hitler Germany. Arrangements were made to have these micro-filmed and the films sent to England for use by the staff of the Education Section. These were gone over as carefully as time and the small staff permitted to enable a selection of those most suitable for current use. An attempt was made to revise texts so as to strike out the material embodying extreme concepts of German nationalism, but time did not permit anything like a thorough revision. The next problem was to get these texts printed so that they could be used when the German schools were opened. Publishing facilities in the United States were so strained that there seemed little chance of obtaining substantial assistance there. British presses were also badly behind with their work, but it seemed possible that they might be able to print a reasonably large number of these books if paper could be found. But after all of the efforts expended by the Education Section, few copies actually were turned out by British publishing concerns

and one of the first jobs to be undertaken in Germany by the successor to the Education Section of the German Country Unit was the arranging with German presses to bring out school texts.

The Education Section of the Anglo-American German Country Unit was at best a very modest affair, staffed by a handful of officers and men. It never received the recognition that Legal, Finance, Economic Affairs, and other no more important fields received and only managed to achieve division status in combination with religious affairs. However, considering the size of the entire staff of the German Country Unit, its small personnel made a relatively good showing. Strangely enough in light of the general emphasis on education in the United States, education did not fare as well under strictly American auspices as it had under the Anglo-American German Country Unit. As the US Group, Control Council for Germany took over the planning, education began an experience of being buffeted about that finally became almost notorious. Not only was education not given major recognition in the US Group CC for Germany, but it was not, despite the great responsibilities assigned to it, even permitted to share that status with religious affairs. Though manpower, transportation, natural resources, trade and industry, political affairs, legal system and courts, finance, and other functions were recognized and set up as major subdivisions of the US Group CC for Germany, education always remained a section of some other rather unrelated major division. Sometimes it was placed under public health; again it strangely enough fell with communications; but always it remained submerged.

Though the shifting organization structure of the US Group CC for Germany brought some uncertainty for almost all of the functional subdivisions, it is probable that no function surpassed education in this respect. One hardly knew from day to day exactly where to find the education planners. Obviously this lack of recognition of what was generally regarded as one of the most important functions to be performed by American military government in Germany was most unfortunate and seriously handicapped the efforts of the officers who labored to bring some order out of the chaos of German education. For one thing, it was reflected in the number of officers and men assigned to do this work. At a time when the Army Ground Division, the Air Division, and the Navy Division all had large staffs, in some cases fifty or more officers, education found itself with one

and two officers. As the US Group CC for Germany expanded until it finally had some two thousand officers, the Education Section of course received additional personnel, but even during the summer of 1945, when activities were at a height, its officers could be numbered on the fingers of two hands. When generals and full colonels were the rule in the various functional subdivisions, education had only captains and majors on its staff.

Yet, despite the sharp discrimination against education, there was little ill-feeling toward it on the part of the top brass. Generous lip service was always given to the importance of education in military government and pleasant compliments were extended to the work being done in education. One can perhaps best explain the situation by looking at other areas in the Army where education entered in. The program developed by the Army to instruct the GIs as to why the United States was fighting received wide publicity and considerable lip service. But its officers were for the most part second lieutenants and its prestige was so low that it found it impossible to carry on an effective program. The Air Force recruited educators to offer instruction to its personnel on various matters; here again the ranks given officers were low and the prestige slight. In the highest Army circles education is apparently regarded as quite important in theory, but it is nevertheless a cheap function that can be performed by a small number of junior officers.

The situation in G-5 of SHAEF and later in G-5 of USFET was similar to that noted above in the US Group CC for Germany. Both assigned very small numbers of officers and men to education—G-5 of SHAEF at one time had no personnel working in education and then for a considerable period one or two officers. G-5 of USFET could make a better showing, inasmuch as it was activated at a time when there was a plethora of officers seeking berths. But in both cases ranks were relatively low, though they were perhaps somewhat higher than in the US Group CC for Germany.

The lower echelons reflected the prevailing Army attitude. The Army Groups and Armies usually had someone responsible for education, but this person was ordinarily expected to combine this function with religious affairs and perhaps one or two other jobs in contrast to legal affairs, economic affairs, public safety, and other functions which invariably were assigned one or more full-time officers. In the field detachments it was an almost unheard of thing

to have an officer who devoted his time entirely to education. Even when there were fifty or more officers assigned or attached to the E and F detachments, education usually shared a single officer with religious affairs. Obviously the smaller detachments could not have been expected to have education specialists, but the elaborately staffed detachments operating at *Land*, *Regierungsbezirk* and *Stadtkreis* level might under any reasonable system have been assigned at least one full-time education specialist officer. There was certainly enough to be done by professional educators in any headquarters or in any military government detachment, but the work was either ignored entirely or given the merest token of attention. In certain instances the situation was made even more acute by the assigning of education functions to officers without experience or training in the field of education.

If this picture seems a gloomy one, it may be added that it had certain bright aspects. The relegation of education to an insignificant place removed education sections of higher headquarters from the parade ground which after V-E Day was avidly reviewed by top brass. The hordes of generals and full colonels who found themselves surplus in the United States and the ETO after V-E Day and sought assignments in the US Group CC for Germany, G-5 of SHAEF, and G-5 of USFET were rarely if ever attracted to education, since its status seemed beneath their dignity. The result was that while most other functional subdivisions of these higher headquarters found themselves headed and in large measure staffed by these newcoming generals and colonels who frequently had no specialist background for the work to be done, education kept its low-ranking but highly expert personnel. And if education never carried the numbers of officers and men that other far less important sections displayed, it could boast of a general uniformity of professional skill and experience that perhaps no other subdivision with the exception of religious affairs could offer. After V-E Day it might have added many officers to its staff, inasmuch as officers became so abundant that they were to be had for the asking irrespective of who requested them. Education did increase its personnel during this period, but it took for the most part only those whose professional records promised valuable contribution to its program. Occasionally it had other officers thrust on it. One Naval officer with political background who claimed to be a protege of the late President Roosevelt camped on its thresh-



hold for many months when he reported at all for duty, but education finally managed to shuffle him off.

Almost without exception those who observed the work of the education officers and men at higher headquarters—the German Country Unit, the US Group CC for Germany, G-5 of SHAEF, and G-5 of USFET—expressed admiration and respect. With a tiny staff this group managed to turn out some of the best plans to be encountered anywhere among the higher headquarters subdivisions. Not content with the minimum requirements, it set itself to the task of preparing “black” and “grey” lists of German educational personnel at an early stage; perhaps no other functional subdivision except religious affairs maintained as close contact with current developments in Germany. It is probable that it surpassed any other functional group in stability, for its key personnel continued at the job from the early days of the German Country Unit through the entire existence of the US Group CC for Germany and well into the OMGUS period.

If there were weaknesses in the record of accomplishments in Germany, no great onus can be fairly attached to the education officers at higher headquarters. The inadequate supply of German teachers and administrators resulted from the Nazi infiltration, not from any lack of attention from the education officers. Indeed the latter, recognizing the problem, opened teacher-training institutes and drafted emergency programs aimed at providing temporary personnel at an early date after V-E Day.

Some correspondents have filed news stories criticizing the nationalistic character of some of the textbooks used in the German schools, but it must be borne in mind that the Education Section had the difficult job of selecting numerous texts from a very unsatisfactory supply.<sup>1</sup> Current texts were so thoroughly permeated with Nazi viciousness that they had to be discarded entirely. Even the texts antedating 1933, from which selections were finally made as an emergency measure until new texts could be prepared, were not infrequently colored by various objectionable slants of a supernationalistic character. The Education Section had to be satisfied with taking the least objectionable for the time being.

When the schools in Germany were opened, it was discovered by

<sup>1</sup> By May, 1946 manuscripts of fifty-three new textbooks had been examined by the Education Section, of which 39 were approved.

the reporters that the supply of texts was not adequate. But here again it was through no fault of the Education officers at higher headquarters. As stated above, they had started work on the problem in England long before the capitulation of Germany. Printing facilities in the United States and Britain simply did not permit large-scale reproduction of school texts for Germany in those countries. Hence most of the printing job had to be delayed until the entry of the Allies into Germany and the general confusion and destruction existing in the Reich held up printing of the desired quantities.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, the record in the American Zone in this field surpassed that of any other zone.

Some critics have characterized the educational planning in the American Zone as overly cautious, negative in concept, and lacking in dynamic character. Others have assumed that because German schools were not reopened until several months after V-E Day little or nothing was done in the way of making plans until a late date. Anyone who has read the preceding pages will appreciate the lack of basis of the latter criticism, since education stood very high on the score of early planning. The charges that American educational plans for Germany lack vigor probably arise chiefly from a comparison of the Russian policy with that of the United States. The Russians opened schools in their zone within a few days of occupation. They left the screening of teachers to the future; the matter of curriculum also received slight attention. The problem of adequate textbooks was hardly considered by the Russians at all; they apparently depended on the ingenuity of the teachers to get along in some fashion despite the lack of supplies.

If this approach represents a dynamic handling of the educational problem, then the Russians certainly must be given credit for more than was done by the American planners. However, in contrast to the careful planning and study by highly professional American military personnel in the education field over a period of almost two years, the Russians as far as is known did nothing in the way of preliminary preparation. Then when Germany surrendered, the Russians contented themselves with ordering the schools opened. One cannot refuse the Russians credit for taking action, but it is difficult

<sup>1</sup> As late as the summer of 1946 only about half of the textbooks urgently needed were available. Though printing facilities were fairly adequate by this time, the paper shortage held up the program.

to perceive either the dynamic character or the brilliance of their policy. It is possible that the American educational personnel were too devoted to the program of purging the schools of the most vicious Nazis, throwing out the worst Nazi propaganda, and furnishing a supply of non-Nazi texts before the schools were opened, but they very strongly believed that no good would come from operating the schools until this had been done. Perhaps they should have set the opening date earlier than October first, but, considering the task to be performed and the fact that the summer months are ordinarily vacation months, this date seems reasonably justified.

Of course it is one thing to plan and another to have plans carried out. The education officers of higher headquarters were not of the type to content themselves with mere planning, leaving to others the implementing of the plans. Indeed they spent much of their time visiting the field and conferring with the detachment officers in charge of education. However, their very number was so small that they had to depend on the detachment officers to carry out the education plans in large measure. And here the fallacy of the policy of giving the most niggardly recognition to education on the operating level became glaringly apparent.

A fairly sizable group of professional schoolmen were recruited for military government duties, but as time passed most of these were assigned to general administrative work or to other functional specialties such as welfare, finance, archives, monuments, and fine arts, etc. Though the higher headquarters education officers vigorously urged those responsible for setting up the military government organization in the field to provide education specialist officers at least in the larger detachments and if possible in all except the smallest ones, they found their pleas largely unheeded. It was apparently not the opinion of those in authority that military government would have heavy responsibilities in the field of education. In so far as education might have to be given attention, it was the official view that it called for little or no specialist assistance. The result was that despite all of the efforts of the education people at higher headquarters almost no provision was made for the use of education officers in the field. In the few cases where it was agreed to assign education specialists they had to combine religious affairs with education.

Hence, though there were numerous specialists in law, finance, public safety, agriculture, trade and industry, labor and so forth in




the field detachments, there were almost no education officers. Obviously much of the work in education actually had to be done by the detachments, since the elementary schools, the high schools, and certain other schools were within their areas and administered by the governments which they controlled. Universities and other special types of educational institutions might be handled otherwise, but the rank and file of the schools simply had to be taken care of at the detachment level. The German school administrators had to be controlled at this level until the end of 1945, when a German system of control based on the *Land* began to operate. Teachers had to be "vetted" by the local military government detachments; buildings had to be made available for schools--virtually all school buildings had been taken over for military or hospital use; and supplies had to be obtained. In the absence of education specialist officers these functions had to be performed by any detachment officers who happened to be available. Some of them gave themselves wholeheartedly to the work despite their lack of professional background; others resented the assignment and did as little as possible. Naturally many mistakes were made.

The surprising thing is that as much was achieved as the record shows. In almost every instance elementary schools actually opened on October 1, 1945 and high schools, trade schools, and universities got under way as time passed and it was regarded as desirable to reopen them.<sup>1</sup> Medical training at Heidelberg was actually started during the summer of 1945 to meet a serious shortage of doctors, while certain facilities for training teachers and clergymen were also authorized, even before the date set for opening the elementary schools. Forty-two teacher-training schools had been reopened or created anew by mid-1946 to meet the crying need for teachers.<sup>2</sup>

Despite all of the lip-service given to the importance of reeducating the Germans, especially the German youth, the official policy of the United States was not such as to permit the military government organization essential to an entirely adequate program. Any number of officers could be made available for handling German prisoners

<sup>1</sup> On July 1, 1946 there were 1,952,839 children enrolled in elementary schools in the U. S. Zone, which represented 95% of those between the ages of 6 and 14 years. Secondary schools reported 187,853 students and vocational schools 201,477 on the same date.

<sup>2</sup> There were 24,732 teachers at work in the schools in the U. S. Zone on July 1, 1946, but there remained a shortage of 11,140.



Prepared by OMGUS

# ELEMENTARY EDUCATION IN THE AMERICAN ZONE 1945-1946

of war and supervising the disbanding of the Wehrmacht. Large numbers of American military personnel were assigned to denazification. But the constructive problem of reorganizing the German educational system received meager support from the top authorities, despite the vigorous efforts of the educational planners. As military government settled down in Germany, it is true that some improvement was to be observed in this respect. But mid-1946 saw only some sixty on the American education staff—about one for every 270,000 Germans in the American zone.

What has been written thus far about military government educational activities in Germany relates to the limited concept of education referred to earlier in this chapter. The Education Section of the US Group CC for Germany and other higher headquarters education officers were by no means oblivious to the importance of the press, the theatre, the arts, the radio, and various cultural activities in reeducating the Germans. But the instructions which guided their planning limited them to the formal educational structure in Germany. For a considerable period no attention was given to the press, the radio, and the cultural sphere by military government. In the US Group CC for Germany the early organization charts indicated that some responsibility in this field belonged to the Political Division, but subsequent discussions revealed much ambiguity in the minds of the chief of staff and office of commanding general as to how far this went. However, the Political Division began to draft plans for the control of the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda which under the Nazis had literally dominated not only the press and radio but virtually all German cultural life.

As time passed it became apparent that there were strong influences at work in the ETO aimed at keeping the main military government organization out of this field. Psychological Warfare had built up one of those spectacular organizations which more or less enjoyed autonomous authority. Though designed to assist in bringing about the defeat of the Germans, it did not view its mission as ending with the surrender of the Reich. Its commanding general had ambitions to play a prominent role in Germany after V-E Day; many of its officers also were eager to carry on their activities in a defeated Germany. Of course much of its program had little or no bearing on the occupation of Germany and it was not intended to move all of its personnel into the Reich, but its commanding general

who had considerable influence in regular Army circles exerted himself vigorously to carry over as much of his organization as possible into Germany. Despite the fact that the time was well advanced and Psychological Warfare personnel had had no military government experience and training and indeed existed as a distinct unit apart from military government, the pressure brought to bear by this general was sufficient to check the inclusion of control of the press, the radio, movies, and the theatre in the regular military government setup. In order to make a proper impression an Office of Information Services (Information Control) was organized to be immediately under the Office of Commanding General in the US Group CC for Germany. This office was to be directed by the general who headed Psychological Warfare and it was expected that he would bring over much of the personnel of Psychological Warfare with him.

But Psychological Warfare was in the very midst of its hostility efforts at this time. Its officers were calling on the German field troops by loud speaker to lay down their arms and surrender to the Americans. It was beaming radio programs into Germany aimed at breaking down civilian morale. It prepared numerous pamphlets and broadsides which it scattered over Germany. Hence it was in no position to participate in the work of the US Group CC for Germany in more than a nominal fashion. Its commanding general occasionally visited the headquarters of the US Group CC for Germany to attend meetings and it supposedly maintained a small staff there to prepare plans and be available for consultation. But this staff actually spent most of its time far away in the Psychological Warfare offices on the continent while the US Group CC for Germany was in England. When the latter moved to Versailles, Psychological Warfare people had offices in Paris, but they tended to be absent in Luxembourg and various other places nearer the front much of the time.,

The Office of Information Services (Information Control) contributed its paper plans after more or less prodding, but it never became an integral part of the US Group CC for Germany during the planning period. Its plans were drafted without much reference to the general plans for the occupation of Germany; its officers, though frequently able, never became a vital part of the body of the US Group CC for Germany. Thus despite any intentions on their part they remained a separate group cut off from the main body of

military government and not even well informed as to the psychology and program of military government. The autonomous position of Psychological Warfare during the tactical period may have had little significance, but the corresponding status of its reincarnation, the Office of Information Services (Information Control), in military government was unfortunate.

Whether one regards the press, the radio, movies, the theatre, and other cultural activities as part of education or not, it can hardly be denied that they are very intimately related to the general program of military government. To cut them off from the main body of military government in Germany was hardly less serious than divorcing economic or financial matters or the German courts from military government. A field that should have been tied up in the most intimate fashion with the other fields in military government and administered as an integral part of military government from the planning level on down through the operating detachments was permitted to exist apart. The most effective liaison could never have made up for such separation, but even the liaison was not too close. Psychological Warfare could argue of course that it had certain experience and equipment that gave it a claim on this field in occupied Germany. But the same arguments could have been advanced by other Army units in other fields such as communications, transportation, and public health. And it is only fair to say that they were to some extent in certain cases, with the result that military government at times found itself in conflict with the Signal Corps, the Transportation Corps, G-4, military police, and the medical corps. But in all of these other cases military government insisted on maintaining its own subdivisions in these fields and staffed them with its own personnel to the extent that they were actually an integral part of military government. Psychological Warfare was able to maintain its own identity and to operate in a more or less autonomous relationship to military government despite the paper transformation into an Office of Information Services (Information Control).

The work performed by Psychological Warfare-Public Information Services-Information Control was often well done. The newspapers which it put out during the first months of occupation frequently received high praise and were preferred by the Germans in many cases to the corresponding papers published in the other zones. Its radio programs may have been less striking than those broadcast



by the Russians from Berlin, but they were certainly less inaccurate and propagandistic. A rather cautious policy was adopted in the entertainment field. Movies and theatres were not permitted to operate in the American Zone for several months after V-E Day, though the Russians had authorized such entertainment almost immediately. A number of Hollywood films were finally assembled and circulated among the licensed German movies for showing together with a limited number of old German films that had been passed. The Germans attended these movies in large numbers, but they seemed to be critical of many of the American products on the basis of their melodramatic character. Even for an American it was not always easy to relate the choice of the films to any mission of military government in Germany.

For a time Psychological Warfare devoted a considerable amount of energy to a public opinion poll among the Germans. All sorts of questions were asked the German population in the American Zone as to their reactions to current military government practices as well as to pre-surrender events. Some of these questions were well chosen and carefully stated so as to get at information of value to military government; others were not especially pertinent and indeed were so carelessly phrased as to make the results highly doubtful in validity.

In the case of the newspapers it was decided to discontinue publication after a few months despite the reasonably wide circulations and to give this field over to German newspapers licensed by Information Control. This was regarded by some persons as premature to say the least. These critics believed that there was a place for regional newspapers put out by the occupation authorities and presenting to the Germans American points of view, even if German newspapers were desirable at the same time. But the general policy was to turn such activities over to the Germans as soon as possible.<sup>1</sup>

In examining the actual record of Information Control in Germany it is difficult to perceive the basis for Walter Lippmann's assertion that the United States has undertaken too much in reeducating the Germans, though the early plans of Psychological Warfare may have pointed in this direction. Most of the activities of this agency have been far from aggressive; indeed they strike one as almost

<sup>1</sup> During the period prior to July 1, 1946, 35 German newspapers had been licensed in the American Zone.

routine in character. No American newspapers after the early days of occupation; Hollywood and German films, the former usually without German sound tracks, and in both cases primarily of the sentimental escape variety; radio programs of traditional character; and a more or less indifferent attitude toward cultural activities. These do not suggest an overly ambitious program. One might criticize the United States for doing too little in this field if one conceives of reeducation as an extremely important task which while basically a German problem nevertheless requires the substantial assistance of the American military government authorities. Just what Mr. Lippmann would regard as excessively ambitious or vigorous in this program is not clear.

In addition to the formal education program and the information control setup some mention might be made of the effort directed at improving the morale of German youth. Accustomed to the multifarious and frequently sensational activities of the Nazi youth groups, the young Germans perhaps found the Allied occupation more dreary than even the older ones. Recognizing this, the American occupying authorities enlisted the aid of the military forces throughout Germany. American youth in uniform have been encouraged to organize athletic events, discussion groups and other activities which would include German young people. Out of the association between the Americans and Germans it is hoped that a certain basic impact can be made on German psychology and standards of conduct. In addition, music festivals and various cultural activities have been scheduled to assist in the reconstruction of German youth.

In conclusion, one may reiterate that the American occupying forces in Germany have by no means ignored the problem of German reeducation. Indeed a great amount of thought has been given to the matter by a small group of highly trained and distinctly able education officers at higher headquarters. The niggardly support given to these higher headquarters as far as a field staff goes has seriously hampered their work, but, despite this, something has been accomplished in starting the reconstruction of the German schools and universities. The process will not be completed overnight; indeed much of it will require several years to bring about even partial fruition. The underlying philosophy back of this program is that the basic job must be done by the Germans themselves under the sympathetic but firm supervision of the American specialists. It is

to be regretted that there has been dispersion rather than integration in the over-all task of reeducation, with formal education more or less completely separated from the press, the radio, the movies, and cultural activities. An ambitious program of reeducation undertaken by the occupying forces and offered to the Germans would require the unification of the existing efforts, but with basic responsibility assigned to the Germans the existing division of responsibility in the American setup is a serious handicap though not completely crippling. There seems little doubt that more attention has been given to the problem of German reeducation in the American Zone than in any other zone, though the Russians have received greater credit in some quarters, largely perhaps as a result of their decisive action without preparation and their apparently greater appreciation of the importance of German cultural life.

## *Chapter 13* The Goal of Democratization

If there has been any American long-range goal in Germany that could be designated as ranking above all others, it has been that democratization. That is not to say that all Americans have believed that Germany could be democratized or that the efforts expended in this field have always been outstanding in their vigor. Certainly large numbers of Americans regard the Germans as so immature politically, so inclined to run after false Messiahs promising the millennium, and indeed so generally incapable of handling their own self-government that they have held slight hopes of any large measure of success in bringing about the democratization of the Reich. Nevertheless, despite the far from rosy prospects, this goal represents the key, in so far as there is such a thing, to the American mission in Germany because it is in the last analysis the only approach which seems to lead to substantial results of a lasting character.

The United States has fought two very costly wars with Germany during the present century. It is our fundamental object to prevent future German aggression. Disarmament, economic strangulation, occupation by military forces, dismemberment, and other related techniques may be employed to destroy the German military might for the immediate future. Some even regard them as long-range instruments of possible utility in warding off German rampages. But the general reading of history by Americans does not lead to the conclusion that the above measures are likely to prevent the Germans from rebuilding their country and embarking on a new program of militarism beyond the immediate future. Victorious Allies can disarm Germany now, but the job of continuing that disarmament far into the future is to say the least not an easy one. The Germans have a flair for invention and industrial management that makes the

most stringent program of economic control of questionable effectiveness in the future. The occupation of a country over a long period leads to constantly increasing difficulties, the enormous expenditure of resources, and the probability of an intolerable situation of aggravated character leading to further aggression. Dismemberment may seem to offer the greatest hope, but there is considerable evidence that it would only serve to stir up greater German nationalism, which in the long run would lead to an international outburst despite all of the efforts of foreign states.

Irrespective of viewpoints, there appear only two approaches to the German problem that seem to offer any promise for the long-range. One would involve a far more ruthless plan than even Morgenthau and his colleagues have thus far advanced, though they have expressed the general philosophy. This would entail the extermination of the German people as pariahs, outcasts, human devils. It could be done by wholesale slaughter which would in the last analysis be the most humane method. Or it could be brought about by a slower starvation. Another possibility would be the moving of the German people as slaves into other countries of the world, hoping that the high mortality rate, the intermingling of Germans with other nationalities, and the settling of people from other countries in what is now Germany would eventually lead to German extinction. Such an approach would require an inhuman ruthlessness fully equal to that of the most extreme Nazis; it would constitute a betrayal of all ideals held by the western Allies and presumably by the Soviet Union. There is little reason for believing that the Allies could ever muster the cold, stark resolution necessary to carry out such a program, and if it were not carried out without deviation from completeness, it would in all probability backfire and defeat its ultimate purpose. If by any chance the Allies did succeed in eliminating the Germans from the face of the earth, they would themselves have become such butchers of humanity, such monsters that they themselves would probably actually be the victims of the process. What would in all probability happen if such an approach were adopted would be the half-way measures advocated by the Morgenthau school and others which would leave the Germans as objects of charity to be supported by the Allied countries until such a time as they could muster sufficient strength to stage a slave rebellion and throw off their yokes.

The second approach seems more realistic to many Americans, despite all of its admitted obstacles. And this is the development of such responsibility on the part of the rank and file of the German people that they will perceive the folly of war and bend their efforts toward making their nation a member of the United Nations rather than an international outlaw. With the experience which the United States has had under the democratic form of government, it is not surprising that this development of responsibility and political maturity on the part of the Germans is tied up with democratization. We have noted that neither an absolute nor a limited monarchy has brought about such an attitude on the part of the Germans. The Nazis and their ilk have not only not contributed to such an end but have corrupted the Germans almost beyond belief. About the only possibilities left are representative democracy and communism. The United States naturally favors the former. It is true that the Germans operated the Weimar Republic during the period between the first World War and the coming of the Nazis. Despite all that has been said of the ill-fated Weimar Republic, it did incorporate certain democratic principles and managed to achieve certain worthwhile ends. But its life was short; the provision for an executive endowed with emergency powers far more characteristic of dictatorships than of democracies was a fundamental weakness; and the economic vicissitudes which it encountered were acute. Altogether it can hardly be said that the Weimar Republic represents an adequate test of representative democracy in Germany.

Though the United States has since the actual occupation of Germany probably placed democratization above all other goals and linked its educational, denazification, and other programs with such an objective, it would not be accurate to state that the official American policy has always been that of democratization. The American policy during the early stages of the war was uncertain, though the Atlantic Charter was regarded by some as a basic statement. It certainly seemed with its four freedoms to set forth the principles of democracy as fundamental, but there was considerable doubt whether it was meant to extend to the Axis countries. As the President began to give attention to the treatment of defeated Germany, the influence of Secretary Morgenthau became very great despite the attempts of other presidential advisers to point out to the President the serious weaknesses in the so-called Morgenthau plan. The discussions held

at Quebec, Teheran, and Yalta reveal that the democratization of Germany was not highly regarded, though it is probably fair to say that it came progressively into favor as the successive conferences were held. The Potsdam Conference saw the Morgenthau proposals largely defeated and the democratization approach in the ascendance. The official statement made at the end of the Potsdam Conference provided some foundation for a democratization program, though much more attention was paid to economic matters than to the political future of Germany.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff paper which was drafted on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement to guide the European Theatre set forth ultimate democratization as the official policy of the United States in Germany. It authorized political parties, provided for the holding of elections, stressed the importance of developing responsibility among the German people for local government, and pointed the way toward a federal system of government which though contemplating an adequate central government also provided for the destruction of Prussian dominance and the establishment of fairly strong state governments.

Long before the Joint Chiefs of Staff took action in 1945, the planners in the ETO had given attention to the problem of the democratization of Germany. The German Country Unit of SHAEF included an Interior Division which in turn had a Government and Administration Section. This section was much interested in the reconstruction of German government and it proceeded in its planning on the assumption that a democratic system offered the most promise. G-5 of SHAEF, on the other hand, gave slight attention to this aspect of the German problem and did not see fit to establish machinery for dealing with even regional and local government in Germany until just before its dissolution.

At the time the US Group, Control Council for Germany was activated in 1944, the Morgenthau influence was very powerful in Washington. Consequently though an organization chart had been drafted in the ETO which provided for a subdivision of the US Group CC to plan the reconstruction of German government, Washington ignored this recommendation and sent over an official organization chart which left out even a token provision for dealing with this field. The Political Division of the US Group CC for Germany immediately recognized the seriousness of such an omission and

began to press for an amendment to the organization chart that would remedy the lack. The British in the meantime had set up their British Element, Control Commission for Germany which included definite provision for this function. The American Group found itself in the embarrassing position of having no corresponding agency to deal with the British. But despite the Political Division's efforts and the British activity, the top authorities in the US Group CC for Germany were reluctant to take steps. Doubtless they were made well aware of the opposition of the Morgenthau interests toward such a move.

For a time it seemed that the Political Division would have to undertake this planning job itself—indeed it did include in some of its early organization charts a section on German governmental structure. But it seemed desirable to have a separate subdivision of the US Group CC for Germany to give its attention to the difficult job of planning for governmental reconstruction in Germany, though the Political Division always maintained an active interest in what was being done. Finally, in the late autumn of 1944, after the other functional divisions had been active for several months, the commanding general and chief of staff of the US Group CC decided to establish a section—though not a major division—to give its attention to German local government and civil service.

In contrast to the British agency which was headed by a brigadier and well staffed with some twenty colonels, majors, and captains, the Local Government and Civil Service Section in the US Group CC for Germany started out with little more than token status. For a considerable period it had only three officers assigned to it. None of these officers had seen service in the earlier German Country Unit of SHAEF, though a fourth officer was added after a time with such background. Nor had any of the first American officers specialized on German government and politics or spent any considerable time in Germany. Yet theirs was a job that would have been a very heavy one even for a large staff of experts. As late as the move into Germany, at a time when most of the functional subdivisions had gathered together sizable staffs, the Local Government and Civil Service Section had approximately half a dozen officers assigned to it.

Shortly after arrival in Höchst the Local Government and Civil Service Section underwent a great reorganization. An Air Force brigadier general fresh from the United States arrived to take over and the section was reconstituted as the Civil Administration Divi-



sion and made one of the major functional divisions of the US Group CC for Germany. Planning subdivisions were rapidly set up to deal with regional and local government, civil service, elections, administrative courts, the reorganization of German government, and spatial planning, together with an elaborate system of administrative, research, secretarial, supply, coordination, and records sections. Within a very brief period the staff jumped from approximately half a dozen to fifty or more officers. The newcomers included both civilians and military personnel, with the latter predominating. A few of the additions brought with them substantial knowledge of German governmental structure and political problems, but the great majority were surplus officers from the United States or the ETO who were available for assignment but without expert background for the work to be done.

As a matter of fact most of those who came to join the staff of the Civil Administration Division had not had any military government training at all and consequently lacked even the general orientation into German problems provided in the areal instruction of that program. They were Air Force officers, administrative officers of one kind and another, officers who had been on duty in the War Department in Washington, and tactical officers from the ETO. Most of them were agreeable personally and competent in Army administration, but they could contribute little to the primary work of the division which was to make plans for the control and reconstruction of German government. The result was that a very elaborate administrative organization was set up to support or perhaps it would be more accurate to say be supported by the ten or a dozen officers who had sufficient knowledge to draft plans.

It is interesting to contrast the machinery provided for planning the democratization of Germany with that set up to deal with another major problem: the reeducation of the Germans. Education started out in a modest fashion and remained relatively small. Its staff underwent few changes, inasmuch as its key officers remained the same through the German Country Unit, the US Group CC for Germany and well into the OMGUS stage. Its officers were well informed in regard to German educational organization and problems and could speak with authority on the various aspects of what was required. The Education Section never received major status as a subdivision and was kicked from major division to major division as an append-

age. The German Government subdivision started out quite promisingly in the German Country Unit and then was wiped out in the early period of the US Group CC for Germany. It was then re-established on a modest basis, operated for some months with a staff about the size of Education, but was then suddenly expanded until it became one of the sizable major subdivisions.

The staff of Civil Administration, even when small in size, in contrast to the Education Staff was never stable. Its first head remained during the duration of the German Country Unit, though he devoted himself increasingly to special service activities. The first head under the strictly American setup stayed only a few weeks; he was succeeded by an acting head who was replaced after a few weeks by another officer. This colonel gave way to a brigadier general, who in turn handed his job on to a colonel. The colonel was supplanted by a civilian who had been a military government officer earlier. Certain of the officers assigned to this subdivision were highly expert in the German field, but the rank and file could not have qualified in that category under the most liberal definition. The German Government subdivision found its status uncertain, though not to the extent of Education. It started out as a section, was abolished, recreated as a section, given division status, reduced to the rank of section, and then again made a division. During its existence as a section it could never be quite sure under which major division it might be. For some strange reason it occupied a position as an appendage of Communications on at least two different occasions.

Supplementing the work of the Civil Administration subdivision there was certain other machinery to plan the democratization program. The Political Division (Office of Political Affairs) always maintained a deep interest in the area covered by this subdivision and indeed had its own officers to study and assist in the handling of such problems. It of course represented the State Department point of view, inasmuch as it served as the State Department agency in the US Group CC for Germany (OMGUS). An interdivision committee on the reconstruction of German Government was created by the US Group CC for Germany during the winter of 1944-45. Presided over by the director of the Civil Administration subdivision, this committee included representatives of the Political Division (Office of Political Affairs), the Legal Division, and the Planning and Coordination Section. It devoted many hours to meetings, set up

subcommittees to prepare various drafts and reports, and at one time hoped to be able to make a substantial contribution. However, its work dragged on past the point at which it should have been prepared to make its influence felt and, with the psychological moment past, the net result of its extended labors was not impressive. However, it did serve a useful purpose in coordinating the thinking of the Civil Administration subdivision, the Political Division (Office of Political Affairs), the Legal Division, and the headquarters Planning and Coordination Section. Its members included several highly expert persons in German affairs; it is to be regretted that its influence was not greater.

So many of the problems involved in the occupation of Germany present unusual difficulties that there is a tendency to designate each one of several as the most complicated. Very few would question the enormous undertaking arising out of the reeducation of the German people; physical reconstruction will require vast amounts of materials, labor, and capital; the economic reorganization of Germany calls for great wisdom and effort. But if one field is to be picked out on the basis of the attending obstacles to be surmounted, it is probable that democratization deserves that place. In reeducation there is the problem of how to carry out a fairly well defined program; in physical reconstruction it is primarily a matter of supplies, labor, and time; in the economic field there is more uncertainty, but even so there are reasonably clear paths to be followed. However, in democratization it is not at all easy to ascertain what techniques will bring about the desired goal and after a detailed plan has been drafted there remains the almost infinitely difficult job of implementation.

In making plans for such an undertaking as democratization there is always the tendency to emphasize paper provisions and to ignore reality. Elaborate over-all plans can give an impressive appearance if properly organized and artfully presented without too great attention to the practical application. Although the planning units in American military government in Germany were not immune from this weakness and sometimes wasted a great amount of time in such endeavors, it may be stated without too great exaggeration that this inclination did not display itself in connection with democratization to any great extent. The size of the early staff may have assisted in avoiding this pitfall, but perhaps even more there was a preoccupation with immediate objectives on the part of the top brass who might

have brought the necessary pressure in the direction of a grandiose set of paper plans in this area. The officers directly responsible for this planning either had so little background that they contented themselves with the routine of Army life or they were so aware of the multiplicity of difficulties and so disposed to keep their feet firmly on the ground that they were not beguiled into expending their energy on beautiful but impractical paper plans. This situation served to minimize the publicity received by this particular area which in turn may have spread the impression in the United States that little thought was being given to democratization. But in general it is not to be regretted that the planning officers concentrated their attention on various items of a not very sensational nature that seemed to promise a reasonable amount of progress toward the general goal of democratization in Germany.

With no sense of Messianic status or vision, the officers assigned to labor in the democratization field were always deeply conscious of the problem of what concrete steps could be taken to advance the main goal. They held no illusions that the German nation could be democratized overnight or indeed in a few years; thus they had no intention of wasting their efforts in planning a single grand assault which was doomed to failure. Rather it was their firm intention to carry on their assignment in such a manner that through a series of attacks a foundation could be laid which it was hoped might eventually serve to support a democratic system in Germany. The ever-present question in their minds was what immediate and preliminary steps might be taken that would contribute to the building of the foundation upon which any enduring system of German democracy would in their opinion depend.

To begin with, it may be stated that it was the studied opinion of the planners with expert German background that a unified Reich was if not an absolute essential at least highly important in the final achievement of democratization. Hence they regarded the proposals to divide Germany into a number of autonomous confederated states as unsound. They could see that those who aimed at a perpetual enslavement of the Germans would find comfort in such a scheme, though they doubted its success over a long period. But to those who regarded democratization as the final goal a German confederation seemed to offer very little. Indeed instead of promoting the stability, the breadth of view, the resources so essential to a democratic system,

the division of Germany into a number of autonomous states gave every evidence of bringing about instability, a chauvinistic point of view, various supernaturalist philosophies, and a dearth of resources which could not be expected by any sane person to support a truly democratic structure. Though numerous early proposals were made looking toward a confederation, they were all discarded. Moreover, it is significant to note that those military government officers and State Department representatives who had not been entirely certain in their minds upon arrival in Germany virtually without exception came to a position where they believed a unified Germany necessary for achievement of the goal of democratization.

The failure of the Allies to proceed in the setting up of certain central administrative agencies, as agreed at the Potsdam Conference, was therefore a disappointment. Much more serious however was the blow which threatened as a result of the failure of the Soviet Union and France to agree to a unified administration of Germany. The proposal to provide for a permanent organization of Germany into autonomous states were variously interpreted. To some it meant a confederation somewhat like the system which had characterized Germany prior to unification in the 1870s, though with Prussia broken up. To others a federal system rather than a confederation was intended, with states that would have a status somewhat like those in the United States but with no real autonomy. If the former interpretation had to be accepted, there seemed little prospect for any substantial progress toward democratization. Not all of the expert planners viewed federal government in Germany with enthusiasm, but many of them regarded a federalized system of government as offering the most fertile field for eventual democratization in Germany.

Though the planners supported the necessity of a strong central German government, they did not in every case consider that step desirable immediately. The decisions taken by the Big Three at Potsdam in this respect met a varied reaction from the American military government personnel in Germany. Some had bent every effort toward the establishment of a full-pledged German central government at an early date. Others felt that the partial central administration as provided by the Potsdam Agreement for the immediate future had distinct advantages, though it meant delaying certain plans. The failure to set up even the fragmentary central administra-

tion made it impossible to deal adequately with such problems as food, trade and industry, finance, transportation, and communications and thus weakened the democratization prospects.

Though convinced that a vigorous democratization effort depended in the long run on a unified Germany and conscious of the severe limitations imposed by the four national zones during the current period, the American Civil Administration and Political Affairs officers nevertheless gave their vigorous efforts to planning within the limits as prescribed. With some difficulty they reconciled themselves to the point of view that immediate military considerations must take precedence over long-range military government objectives. Thus in the drawing of the boundaries of the American Zone they could not escape a feeling of outrage that the states of Hesse, Württemberg, and Baden and the province of Hessen-Nassau had been carved up in such a manner as to ignore more or less completely basic political lines, economic dependence, and cultural traditions. American tactical top brass maintained that they had to have free communications and transportation lines from Bavaria to Bremen and the sea; France wanted a bridgehead on the east bank of the Rhine. The result was that the states of Hesse, Württemberg, and Baden and the province of Hessen-Nassau had to be mangled almost beyond recognition. The breakdown in the governmental machinery was serious enough. The economic disturbance was even more serious in its effect on the democratization program. It is apparent that democratic forms are not likely to be nourished at least during infancy by the most acute economic depressions. Under the most favorable circumstances German economy under defeat was depressed, but, when cities such as Karlsruhe, Stuttgart, and Frankfurt are separated from the areas that support them, the situation becomes aggravated. After observing this condition for a year, the French asked the United States to rectify the situation by exchanging Karlsruhe and northern Baden for western Württemberg.<sup>1</sup> The British planners were amazed at what they regarded as the obliviousness of the Americans to the seriousness of the effect of this carving up and went so far as to suggest an appeal to Washington and London to reopen the matter of boundaries, but the American planners saw little to be gained from such a step and assumed this additional handicap.

<sup>1</sup> But this was not acceded to by Washington.

It is probable that the most significant decision made by the American planners in charge of democratization was that which based their plans on a federal system of German government. While they realized that a completely centralized German government would have its advantages in grappling with certain difficult problems, they concluded that a federal form would offer the best background for democracy. The highly centralized type of government characteristic of Germany even before the Nazis and the almost complete centralization effected by the Nazis did not encourage democratic traditions in Germany, at least as democracy was understood by Americans. By giving reasonably important authority to the states and emphasizing the desirability of local control in such areas as local public works, recreation, and certain aspects of education it was the belief of the American planners that a democratic system of government would be given impetus. Obviously many problems called for central handling and could not be dealt with adequately by the states and the *Kreise* and therefore it was regarded as desirable to confer extensive authority on the central government over such fields as industry, food, certain aspects of finance, transportation, communications, foreign affairs, and so forth. At the same time it appeared that there remained considerable authority that could be effectively exercised by the states. Many public works, some of the financial field, certain educational problems, various aspects of trade and industry, and so forth seemed suitable for state administration.

In planning for states it was everywhere recognized that the old Prussian dominance must be destroyed. Prussia had had more than half of the population and embraced more than half of the territory of the Reich under Hitler and for many years before. This gave Prussia a preponderance of influence that was far from salutary. It certainly would not contribute to a democratic system, since it had constituted a serious source of weakness of the Weimar Republic. There was some consideration given to organizing the Prussian provinces as states. Some of these were large enough in population and area to match states other than Bavaria and were economically and culturally reasonably well suited for recognition as states. However, this was not a problem which received detailed consideration from the American planners, since with the exception of two of the provinces of Prussia, neither one outstanding, the American Zone contained none of Prussia. These two provinces, Hessen-Nassau, which had been

split up into two parts so that the French could have one, and Kurhessen, were joined with the fragments of the state of Hesse into the state of Greater Hesse.

In planning for new states it was the opinion that they should be more uniform in size and population than the older states, even with Prussia excluded. It seemed obvious that traditions should be taken into account as far as possible, but states such as Schaumburg-Lippe with just over fifty thousand inhabitants in 1939, Lippe with less than two hundred thousand, and even Anhalt, Brunswick, and Oldenburg with approximately half a million each, seemed too small to function in an adequate manner under modern conditions. The status of Bavaria, with more than eight million population before the war, presented peculiar difficulties. Its historical development seemed to support its retention as a state to some extent, but its overweening size and area led some to favor reconstruction. After organizing state governments in its zone, American military government directed the German authorities in the three states to study the problem of a political and administrative structure for their states and to draft constitutions for submission to military government. The resulting proposed constitutions were studied, modifications suggested, and general approval given. They were then submitted to a popular referendum of the voters in the three states in 1946.

There is substantial reason to believe that the best single method of promoting democratization in Germany is through the infusion of vigor into local self-government. At one period in German history a beginning was made in this direction through the Stein reforms and a degree of local responsibility was granted in a limited area. But the top authorities soon looked with suspicion on such freedom, with the result that the local governments became completely integrated into the highly centralized structure of government. It is not a simple matter in this day and age to segregate certain governmental functions to be assigned to local control, but it can be done. After a formal authorization has been given to local self-government in such an environment as Germany offers, it can hardly be expected that a large degree of popular interest and responsibility will immediately result. Expertness in this field requires the experience of many years. However, unless a widespread interest can be developed among the Germans in their local governments together with skill in handling local problems, it does not seem very probable that popular participa-



tion at state and Reich levels will be successful. Americans sometimes hold a sentimental attachment for the dogma of local self-government which may not be justified by the actual record in the United States, but they seem to be on firm ground in maintaining that political democracy can have little in the way of solid foundations unless it is based on democracy at the grass-roots.

Though the basic JCS directive from Washington recognized the desirability of vigorous local self-government in Germany, it was not always easy for the military government authorities in the ETO to keep this goal in mind. Being administrators they were naturally impressed by the importance of an immediately efficient system. Obviously it was easier to provide for the control of public works, education, and similar functions at the state level or district level if not the national level rather than at the local level. The German pattern upon which they always leaned to some extent favored centralization rather than local self-government. The very military government system militated to some extent against building up a strong local government, at least after the early phase when there were military government detachments in every *Kreis*, since it was intended to control German government from the state level through the hierarchy of German officials. Under this arrangement—which it may be added was almost the only possible one feasible—emphasis was naturally placed on more or less complete control of all governmental functions from the state through the district to the *Kreis* and through the *Kreis* basic control of the thousands of towns, villages, and rural areas.

An examination of the military government plans again and again revealed little more than a substitution of state control for Reich control—the same high degree of centralization below the state level remained. When reminded of the JCS directive calling for local self-government and the important role of a vigorous system of local government in establishing a democratic Germany, the military government officers found it difficult to reconcile what appeared to them to be a basic conflict between their immediate task and the fundamental policy. It is always difficult when one is close to a scene to see clearly the overall contour, the mountain peak through the forest, and military government in Germany is no exception. It would not be fair to say that no progress was made in realizing the goal of local self-government, but it is not realistic to paint a rosy

picture of the accomplishments in this field. As the occupation continues and military security perhaps becomes less decisive, it may be more feasible to push ahead in the direction of building a strong German local self-government, but after general patterns, such as constitutions, laws, and structures have been hardened, as they are in the process of being during the first years of occupation, it is no light task to modify them in a far-reaching manner.

If the going was hard in the local self-government field, it was somewhat easier in the sphere of elections. Paradoxically enough, there was a feeling among certain American military government officers with specialist knowledge in the German field that while too little progress was being made in the former program too much action perhaps was to be observed in the latter. For some reason not entirely clear the top brass were anxious to proceed with elections at a very early date. It was pointed out to them that the holding of elections required the complete revision and even rewriting of the election laws of Germany and that, even after this had been done, elections of any significance could hardly be expected until political parties had had an opportunity to develop and the German people had been aroused as to the nature of their responsibility. There seemed considerable doubt whether all of this could proceed to a point where elections could be justified within a period of at least a year after V-E Day and more probably eighteen months. But instructions were given to push ahead.

German officials in the three states of the American Zone were directed to prepare election codes for submission to the military government higher headquarters in the fall of 1945. Not much time was available for the initial drafting nor for the careful examination of these proposed codes by the American Civil Administration Division. But with deadlines set and the first elections scheduled for early in 1946 the task had to be marked as "urgent" and pushed to completion. A fairly satisfactory set of election rules was prepared, which extended the franchise to both males and females above the age of twenty-one years. A more adequate provision doubtless could have been made if more time had been available.

Much more serious than the hasty preparation of the formal election regulations was the problem of German attitude. The preoccupation of the rank and file of the Germans with the difficult problems of food, shelter, fuel, clothing, and other personal matters

quite naturally tended to obscure general political matters. Add to this, the severe shocks which most Germans had undergone as a result of loss of relatives, bombing, destruction of property, and the almost complete disintegration of what had been perhaps the most elaborate politico-economic structure in the world, and one can have some understanding of the relative indifference on the part of the Germans to political parties and programs during the first months after defeat. Although the top brass desired to push elections, they had been reluctant to authorize political parties. Indeed it was not until after the Potsdam Conference, when it had been decided that all zones would follow the Russian pattern of permitting active political parties, that the American military government agreed to recognize political parties at all. Even then, there was much caution displayed and the directive which eventually was issued carefully limited the activities which political parties could undertake. The organization of political parties on a *Land* basis was not completed until March, 1946, almost a year after V-E Day.

During the summer of 1945 political parties could operate only on a local basis in the American Zone in so far as they could carry on at all. This was the period when the Communist Party was deeply feared by American military authorities and there were many who expected the rank and file of Germans to give their enthusiastic support to this party. Lest there be serious trouble in controlling such a movement, the policy of severe limitation was adopted. Local meetings of political groups had to be authorized by the American military government offices; outside speakers were not permitted.

With the German people still dazed by their defeat and exerting much of what energy they possessed toward feeding and housing themselves and political parties so strictly limited in their scope, it was not to be expected that the voters who went to the polling places shortly after the beginning of 1946 exhibited much interest or preparedness. These first elections were held only in the towns and villages (*Gemeinde*) and involved the election of local councils.<sup>1</sup> Thus they had less relation to national political parties than the later ones, emphasizing personal relations to a considerable extent. Nevertheless, party labels were used and the results of the election revealed that the people instead of following the Communist line quite definitely supported a middle of the road program. The Christian Democratic

<sup>1</sup> 86 per cent of the registered voters participated in the *Gemeinde* elections.

# PARTIES

M.G.	LAND
<p>Speakers make application to M.G. for authorization of the formation of democratic political parties. Application is reviewed. Speakers are visited. Members required number of speakers making application to form party. Land law 25 from law-10</p> <p>Provisional names granted by M.G. to form approved party subject to review of higher level.</p> <p>Party periods and party uniforms prohibited but party banners and emblems permitted if not identical or similar to each authorized under the Nazi regime</p> <p>Party makes periodic report to M.G. at the collection of funds. Political literature and radio broadcasts are subject to prior M.G. approval. M.G. grants permits to hold public meetings</p> <p>Candidates are allowed to campaign with M.G. demarcation regulations</p>	<p>Land law sets qualifications for office and requires registration of candidates by trade by persons listed by specified number of voters and filed a prescribed time before election</p>


# ELECTORATE

M.G.	LAND
<p>Candidate vetted</p>	<p>Committee chosen by Bürgermeister and represents the different parties</p> <p>Land election legislation contains information, cost, and residence requirements for voting. Disqualification includes Nazi party membership or activity</p> <p>Bürgermeister posts list of eligible voters 14 to 16 days previous to election. Appeals and objections by technicians accepted and passed on by Bürgermeister and Election Commission</p> <p>Voting list closed 7 days previous to election</p>

Land election law covers Determination of voting precinct and voting place Appointment of precinct election board Preparation of ballot Marking and casting of ballot Counting and certification of election returns Notification of winning candidate Land law states form of office and duties

Secret registration

## GENEVA COUNCIL ELECTION OF JAN 1946



Notes: Parties do not always total 100% because of prohibited ballots or undeclared abstentions

Landkreis elections will be held throughout the U.S. Zone on 25 April. In addition, Gemeinde elections will take place in eight communities.

On 26 May, Stadtkreis Councils are to be elected throughout the U.S. Zone.

Each of the three Länder will elect its Constitutional Assembly on 30 June.

Prepared by OMGUS

## RESTORATION OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES

Union and the Social Democrats attracted most of the votes in the two western states while the Christian Socialist Union took first place in Bavaria. The elections held in the spring of 1946 in the *Kreise* saw the voters a little more cognizant of the situation, but again the results were similar to those in the first elections.<sup>1</sup> State elections were delayed until later in 1946 and gave the voters an opportunity to choose members of state legislative bodies as well as to approve the new state constitutions. It is probable that no great harm was done by holding the elections so early, though the Russians apparently regarded the United States course as distinctly unwise. The English and French did not see fit to adopt plans calling for immediate elections; the English arranged local elections for the fall of 1946. On the other hand, it can hardly be argued that much was gained in the American Zone by pushing ahead so rapidly with elections at a time when the Germans in large numbers were not as yet alert to political problems.

A sound system of political parties is an important factor in a democratic political setup. This was generally recognized in theory by American military government personnel, but many actually looked upon political organizations with basic suspicions. The Russian policy of recognizing political activity almost immediately, at least if it was favorable to their program, contrasted sharply with the American practice of caution. One of the most curious aspects of the American experience was the refusal to cooperate even with those German groups that sought to assist it. The general policy of non-fraternization was still in formal force in the American Zone and the American military government officers did not see fit to distinguish between Germans favorable to democratization and those thoroughly hostile to it. German groups that organized to offer their assistance in connection with denazification and related matters were dealt with quite sternly and forced to disband, though at a later date, when many regarded the psychological moment as passed, it was decided to turn the denazification program over to the Germans.

After the United States finally recognized political parties, they were still not dealt with very effectively. Considering the attachment of Americans for political parties and their flair for political activity, it is difficult to account for the awkwardness with which they handled

<sup>1</sup> *Landkreis* elections were held first and attracted 71 per cent of the registered voters; *Stadtkreis* elections which followed brought out 83 per cent.

this problem in Germany. The fear of a Communist landslide, which has already been mentioned, probably entered in, though it does not entirely explain the American record. Perhaps the distrust of the professional military for political parties and political activity had something to do at a high level. Possibly the main explanation was the general lack of familiarity of Americans with the German system of political parties. Party labels are very different in Germany from those in the United States; moreover the multiparty rather than the biparty system has long been the rule. With their lack of knowledge of German political backgrounds, American officers found it difficult to know what German political parties stood for, which ones they could depend upon, etc. An attempt was made by the Office of Political Affairs to draft a brief guide to German parties, their past records, and their probable current aims so that the American military government officers in the field might have a little assistance, but this was held up in USFET. The American connotation of "socialist" perhaps played some role in making for suspicion of the Social Democratic Party which among the old parties probably offered the most support of American objectives.

Amid the host of those who saw in the denazification program the main hope for the future there were always those who believed that democratization could be substantially promoted by filling the key offices and civil service positions with Germans who combined sympathy for democratic principles with personal ability. Inasmuch as the supply of such Germans was very limited, it was necessary to develop a technique of looking for a needle in a haystack so to speak if progress was to be made in this direction. Unfortunately little support was forthcoming for the necessary program. As far as the states, districts, and *Kreise* were involved, the initiative was left to the local military government detachments to find suitable persons. The detachments were harassed by many emergencies and ordinarily had neither the time nor the facilities for doing too much in this field. A proposal to provide assistance to the local detachments by setting up a zone personnel agency was vetoed by the director of the government subdivision of USFET. A committee composed of representatives of the Civil Administration, Political, and Planning and Coordination subdivisions was organized in the US Group CC for Germany (OMGUS) to canvass this big problem at the Reich level. A considerable amount of progress was made by this committee in list-

ing Germans who might be suitable for ministerial positions in a central German government. Numerous interviews were held with prominent Germans who were considered prospects and after records had been checked as carefully as possible lists were prepared for recommendation to the Deputy Military Governor of the United States. But the Potsdam Conference ruled out a central German government for the time being and the French vetoed the setting up of even the central German administrative agencies provided in the Potsdam Agreement. Consequently these lists could not be made use of at once.

In preparing for the reorganization of the German civil service the American planners hoped to be able to eliminate the many bureaucratic traditions of an undemocratic character. Attention was given to the old psychology which had made the civil servants a class apart tending to regard the rank and file of the population with condescension. Emphasis was placed on the civil servant as a servant of the community rather than a petty autocrat. By eliminating uniforms except in the case of policemen and firemen and abolishing the absurd titles of address it was anticipated that something might be done to fuse civil servants with the body of the citizenry.

Finally, mention should be made of the personal influence which the American occupational forces might be expected to have in democratizing the Germans. While the early non-fraternization directive could hardly be interpreted as tending in this direction, the decision was taken at an early date in the ETO to modify the general ban so as to permit fraternization with the children. It was argued that any occupying force which dealt meanly with the children would violate a cardinal principle of democracy. With the further relaxation of the non-fraternization ban, the American occupation personnel were strongly urged to conduct themselves in such a manner that they would be an example to the Germans. It is too much to say that this exhortation on the part of the top brass was always heeded, but it is probable that the German observation of American troops played a major role in any progress made toward democratization during the first months after German collapse.

During this period the formal program of democratization was largely in the paper stage. Yet almost everywhere throughout the American Zone there were various American military units. The German population could not be oblivious to the equipment, mess

standards, and personal relations of these American forces. If they had seen Russian, British or French troops, they were aware that American equipment and supplies were distinctly superior and that the personal relations were perhaps less formal and on a somewhat more equal basis. This along with the reputation which the United States already had in Germany as the land of opportunity contributed to a prestige which gave the United States first place during the early period. If concrete evidence of this were desired, one had only to note the massing of Germans from the other zones, especially the Russian Zone, in the American Zone. The fact that the American forces were greeted as liberators rather than as conquerors, despite their insistence that they had come to occupy a defeated Germany, points in this same direction. As time passed, a considerable amount of this early prestige wore thin. The Russian policy as regards denazification, opening of industrial plants, and cultural life, together with their vigorous program of radio propaganda, served to improve the Russian stock, while the American reputation suffered. The slovenly appearance of some Americans, their rowdy behavior and their objection to reasonable discipline also probably led many Germans to revise their early opinions. Nevertheless, the personal influence and example of the American occupying forces remained an important influence in furthering German democratization.

Perhaps the greatest weakness in the American efforts in this field lay in their formality. Too much emphasis was placed on the holding of elections, the framing of constitutions and laws, the setting up of machinery, and other more or less mechanical techniques. Too little attention was given to cultivating Germans disposed to support a democratic system in Germany, filling public offices with able Germans who could be expected to fight for the democratic cause during critical periods of attack in the future, and educating the Germans as to the meaning of representative democracy. Though numerous Germans in the American Zone displayed sufficient interest to attend meetings to discuss the meaning of democracy in the western sense, little effort was made by American military government to furnish any assistance either in the way of participation by informed Americans or printed material.<sup>1</sup> But it is significant that even the

<sup>1</sup> U. S. Information Centers were set up after a time in seven cities. These were furnished with German translations of American books, newspapers, and periodicals. However, this was hardly more than a drop in the bucket as far as meeting the demand went.




professional military increasingly recognized the bearing of economic conditions on the democratization goal. They stressed the importance of free labor unions, the essential character of an adequate food ration, the necessity of a reasonably prosperous German economy, and the vital need of treating the Reich as a unit for economic purposes in creating an environment which would support a democratic system in Germany.

## *Chapter 14* The Economic Program

The early plans relating to the reconstruction of German trade and industry probably erred in the direction of too great a measure of industrialization, though they provided for the wiping out of munitions plants and aircraft establishments. They were carried to President Roosevelt by Secretary Morgenthau's right hand man in the ETO, and caused the President to castigate those who had prepared them. The influence of the Morgenthau plan on the President was so great at this time that at the Quebec Conference the United States took a stand against permitting even moderate industrialization in Germany. The military government officers in the ETO were unable to see how Germany could be reorganized without a substantial amount of industrialization. They tried to fit the Morgenthau dictates into their economic plans, but they ended up more or less in a state of paralysis.

Then the meeting of the Big Three was held at Potsdam and the Potsdam Agreement came forth. This agreement naturally followed general lines and set forth policies rather than detailed provisions. But the policies upon examination, though recognizing the necessity of a reasonable amount of German industry, did not afford clear-cut guidance because of their vagueness as well as the fact that they seemed to conflict with one another in certain cases. In order to prepare plans under the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive based on this agreement numerous experts, many of whom had impressive records of experience, were brought to Germany from the United States to give their attention to the economic aspects of military government. Several hundred officers or civilians of officer status assembled in Berlin and Frankfurt to focus attention on economic plans which in turn could be sent down to the military government detachments in the field for guidance.

# PRE-WAR PRODUCTION EQUALS 100%



## Prohibited Industries:

Aircraft  
 Arms, ammunition, and implements of war  
 Ball bearings  
 Certain machine tools  
 Radio transmitting equipment

Seagoing vessels  
 Synthetic ammonia  
 Synthetic gas and oil  
 Synthetic rubber  
 And others

## LEVEL-OF-INDUSTRY PLAN FOR 1949 PRODUCTION BASED ON THE POTSDAM AGREEMENT

The economic planners certainly did not shirk their job. Many of them spent much time and energy in surveying the problem in the field. They held numerous conferences and covered reams of paper with reports. But in the last analysis they were never able to discover how the American Zone in Germany or Germany as a whole could be reconstituted without authorizing a considerable degree of industrialization.

The plans which they did turn out faced the vigorous onslaught of the Morgenthau people in Germany as well as the determined opposition of the main Morgenthau camp in the United States. To the extent that they were put into effect they often brought embarrassment to the military authorities because of the storms of protest stirred up. The refusal of the French to permit the Allied Control Council to proceed with the setting up of a central German administrative agency to deal with trade and industry further handicapped efforts in this field in a most serious manner.

Had the United States been located in Europe, it is probable that the situation would have been different at least as regards American economic policy. Our country might have been laid waste as happened to Russia, in which case the demand for industrial products would have led to a reasonable degree of German industrialization as soon as possible. At any rate we would have appreciated, as the British have done from the very beginning, the important role of German economy in the whole economy of Europe. With Germany producing more than half of the steel and much of the coal in Europe during ordinary times, we would have been well aware of the dependence of other European countries on German industry. It would have been clear that our own future prosperity was tied to restoring Germany to such a point that she would not constitute an economic whirlpool that might pull down other economies. Had we been France, we might at least have had a great desire for coal from Germany. But having enormous industrial resources of our own, many of which were so stimulated by the war that they presented grave problems as to their future use, and being far enough away from Europe to feel remote from the economic problems there, we allowed ourselves to be beguiled for a considerable time by the superficially logical arguments of those who believed it possible to transform Germany into an agricultural country.

Other factors that entered into our inability to adopt and imple-

ment an economic program for Germany may be cited. The experience following World War I, when German industry was rebuilt with American capital to the point where it displayed not only enormous peacetime strength but also preparedness for war, naturally made many Americans fearful of a repetition. The practice followed to some extent by the Army and to a much greater extent by the Foreign Economic Administration of sending to Germany representatives who either had been or still were high officials of General Motors, Goodyear Rubber, Standard Oil of California, U.S. Steel and of well known investment banking firms, convinced some people that plans were being made for a repetition of the mistakes made after the first World War.

Finally, there was the lack of responsibility or at least divided responsibility in economic policy-determination in the United States. The Department of Commerce, the Federal Trade Commission, and other existing agencies were not entrusted with economic aspects of the war in foreign countries. The Board of Economic Warfare exercised the chief authority in this field at one time, but it was displaced by the Foreign Economic Administration. The Foreign Economic Administration in turn had its existence terminated and its responsibilities divided among the State Department and other agencies. The effect of such confusion undoubtedly played an important role in preventing anything like adequate attention to economic planning for Germany in Washington.

The inability of the Allied Control Council for Germany to agree on an over-all program in the economic field has contributed substantially to the difficulty. The American military governor has hardly missed an opportunity in connection with his monthly reports to stress the impossibility of economic reconstruction as long as Germany remains divided into four national zones with trade barriers preventing the flow of trade from one to another. In the pre-surrender days Germany had maintained one of the most complex industrial systems in the entire world. The Ruhr turned out immense quantities of coal and steel along with many types of manufactured goods, but depended on eastern Germany in a considerable measure for its food. Bavaria and the Rhineland, though far less industrialized, carried on numerous light and medium industries which depended upon Ruhr and Silesian coal and steel, together with various other raw materials. Cities such as Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, Frankfurt, and Mann-

heim looked to their hinterlands for food and general trade. And one might go on almost without end to multiply these instances of economic dependence. The division of the Reich into four more or less water-tight compartments occupied by the Allies made it virtually impossible to put in operation this intricate mechanism which the defeat of Germany had brought to a standstill. The Soviet Union, with Silesian coal and steel as well as the most important food-producing areas either under its direct control or included within the borders of its satellite, Poland, was relatively well off under this new arrangement, but the British and the American Zones were badly hit.

Efforts were made to reestablish some of the old connections through individual agreements <sup>1</sup> calling for the exchange of some commodity produced in the American Zone for something turned out in the other zones. Ordinary transactions based on marks were usually not feasible because of the uncertain value of German currency. But this was like attempting to repair Brooklyn Bridge with a few strands of bailing wire. Both Britain and the United States found themselves pouring great sums of their own money into Germany in order to keep the economy going at all. Instead of collecting reparations from a defeated enemy, England found herself in 1946 paying out the equivalent of some three hundred million dollars from her own hard-pressed treasury to maintain what many would regard as hardly more than a starvation ration for the Germans. The United States was somewhat more fortunate inasmuch as her zone was more agricultural and less industrialized, but even she was subsidizing a defeated enemy to the extent of some two hundred million dollars per year.

It was in light of this situation that the United States called on any of her Allies who would to join their zones in economic union with the American Zone until such time as the Allied Control Council could implement the terms of the Potsdam Agreement and set up central German administration agencies to handle trade and industry

<sup>1</sup>In April, 1946 the American Zones imported 14,400,000 marks' worth of goods from the British Zone and exported to that zone 19,600,000. In the same month the American Zone imported 1,800,000 marks' worth from the Russian Zone and exported to it 1,600,000. Imports from the French Zone amounted to 5,600,000 marks' worth and exports to that zone 10,600,000. These figures are somewhat misleading because they show considerably larger exports than imports from the American Zone, whereas actually imports over a number of months have exceeded exports, especially as far as the British Zone is involved. At any rate they were hardly more than the proverbial drop in the bucket.

and food problems throughout the Reich. The Russians and French refused this American invitation, but the British, as pointed out above,<sup>1</sup> accepted it. In the fall of 1946 steps were taken for an economic linkup of the American and British zones. A German executive board under joint British and American supervision was created to have general oversight of the program in this field, while various agencies were organized to deal with specific problems.

It is revealing to contrast the handling of the economic reconstruction of Germany with the provisions made for reeducation and democratization. From the very early planning stages the attention given to economic problems far overshadowed that given to either reeducation or democratization. Economic matters always rated a major subdivision of the German Country Unit and under the US Group Control Council for Germany and the Office of Military Government for Germany of the United States it sometimes enjoyed an even greater recognition. At times under the shifting organization setup of the latter agencies economic affairs were placed under one of the two or three deputies to the commanding general and given not only division status but organized into several ranking divisions. This was at a time when education never attained division status and civil administration frequently found itself only a section of a division.

But more significant was the provision made for staffing the economic headquarters agency and providing economics specialist officers in the field. The early economics staffs at higher headquarters were not very large, though they always stood to the fore in comparison with other divisions. But when the chief of staff of SHAEF prior to V-E Day refused to authorize an increase in the size of the US Group CC for Germany, economics solved the problem to some extent by bringing over a number of civilians from the United States. After V-E Day the number of civilians and military personnel assigned to the various economics offices increased by leaps and bounds. Hardly a day went by that highly paid civilians or high-ranking officers were not added to the staff. By the summer of 1945 several hundred officers or civilians with officer status were working on various economic problems in the US Group CC for Germany alone. G-3 of SHAEF also had a sizable economic affairs staff, while its successor, G-5 of USFET, rapidly built up an elaborate organization

<sup>1</sup> See Chap. VI.

in this field. Not satisfied with that, G-4 of SHAEF and G-4 of USFET also entered the picture and essayed to carry on vigorous efforts in this area. Hence it may be seen that in contrast to the handful of officers assigned to education and the scarcely larger group available for civil administration most of the time, economics fared very well as far as personnel was concerned.

In the field the situation was also heavily weighted in favor of economics. The Army Group, Army, and division headquarters staffs invariably included officers who devoted all of their time to this aspect of military government. All of the larger military government detachments also received specialist officers for full-time work in this field though education considered itself fortunate if it could rate a single officer who could combine educational functions with religious affairs.

Not only did economics always receive generous recognition on the organization charts and in personnel assignments but it enjoyed various other advantages. Its director could visit the United States to discuss problems with top authorities in Washington whenever it seemed desirable. If it wanted civilians who were particularly skilled in certain technical fields, it could ordinarily obtain them, though the cost might be high. If it saw fit to bring to the Reich leading experts in German economic affairs to carry on special investigations for a few months, that also was possible. Education and civil administration, if they could enjoy these facilities at all, received them in much smaller measure and ordinarily months after they were available to economics.

With the sizable staffs always assigned to economic functions, it was to be expected that there would be considerable diversity in calibre. Some of both the military personnel and civilian personnel were far from impressive on either the score of knowledge of German economy or past achievements. A fairly large group were not even particularly interested in their work and managed to find opportunities in England, France, and Germany to devote generous time to sight-seeing and social relations. In defense of these officers it should be pointed out that during a period of several months the instructions coming from Washington regarding economic matters were so chaotic that it was exceedingly difficult to make any headway at all in drafting plans. At the other extreme there were some of the ablest officers and civilians to be found anywhere in military govern-



ment. Men of the Calvin Hoover type were obviously not numerous, but they were present and gave their able counsel to those in authority, though it was not always heeded. The proportion of persons with an adequate knowledge of German institutions was certainly less than tiny education could boast, but it probably exceeded that to be found in civil administration. Of course with a large staff, there was a considerable amount of going and coming of personnel, both at the top and among the planning officers. During the early stages this instability was especially noticeable at the top and there was a succession of directors of the Economics Division. After V-E Day there was perhaps more stability as far as the top people were concerned than in most other divisions.

It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of any military government program. In the case of economic affairs there are certain statistical items that may seem to indicate what has been achieved. Thus reports showed that non-war industrial establishments in the American Zone were producing approximately one-fifth as much in mid-1946 as the pre-war production rate. The Soviet Union in contrast claimed approximately one-third<sup>1</sup> of the pre-war production rate. In the summer of 1946 industrial production in the American Zone was reported as approximately 29 per cent of the existing capacity or about half of the authorized level. By November, 1946, this had increased to 44 per cent, but the next month it declined to 39 per cent.<sup>2</sup> These figures together with the report of the American military governor to the effect that the United States was spending approximately two hundred million dollars per year in 1946 to keep German economy in the American Zone from total collapse may not seem to reflect great credit on the work of the economic affairs subdivisions. However, it is hardly fair to judge the economic affairs program on this basis alone. The situation in the Russian Zone is substantially less complicated than that to be found in the American Zone, since the former has the advantage of great food-producing resources plus large deposits of coal. The American Zone is not only by no means self-sufficient in food but its industries

<sup>1</sup> See the *New York Times*, August 12, 1946, for the Russian claim.

<sup>2</sup> The official military government statistics place industrial production in the American Zone at 1 or 2% in the summer of 1945 and 10% at the end of 1945, with the average under 5%. From January 1, 1946 to June 30, 1946 the rate increased from 10% to 29%. From June 30, 1946 to November 30, 1946, it went up steadily to 44%. Then in December, 1946 it fell to 39%.

depend very largely on other zones for raw materials and even for markets.

It is difficult to compare the American record of achievement in the economic field with those in other areas. Economic reconstruction of Germany has both long-range and immediate aspects, but in general it is perhaps less long-range in character than either reeducation or democratization. While both reeducation and democratization depend in large measure on an unified administration of Germany, it is probable that the immediate effects of the dividing of Germany into four more or less watertight compartments are more serious in the economic field. But any meaningful evaluation of the economic achievements must take into account the steps that have been taken in such matters as decartelization, many of which cannot be measured until a considerable time has elapsed.

As in the case of reeducation, economic reconstruction has suffered from division of authority. For a considerable period during a critical time economic efforts were handicapped by a struggle between G-4 of SHAEF and USFET and the economic staff of the US Group CC for Germany. Though they had done comparatively little in the way of planning and had far from an impressive knowledge of German economy, the G-4 staffs of SHAEF and USFET were determined that the primary responsibility for dealing with German trade and industry would be theirs. Unlike certain other claimants who contented themselves with paper claims and military politics, the G-4 people were ready to expend a considerable amount of energy in some sort of program. At times they issued orders to German public officials and industrialists which conflicted directly with those already given by the US Group CC for Germany. The deputy military governor realized the seriousness of this competition, but it was the sort of problem which could not be dealt with immediately. Some measure of cooperation was achieved by sending economics officers from the US Group CC for Germany to work with the G-4 representatives in the field. When general responsibility for military government was centralized in the Office of Military Government for Germany of the United States, this conflict and rivalry came to an end, but that was not until early 1946.

As far as evidence permits any conclusions of a tentative nature, it does not seem that economic affairs have been handled with greater effectiveness than reeducation and democratization, despite the dis-

tinctly greater recognition given the former field by American military government. Schools have been reopened in far larger proportion than industrial plants. Government agencies have been reorganized and restaffed to a greater degree than German economy. Political activities have been recognized and elections held; constitutions and laws have been drafted and approved; denazification after a slow start has made substantial progress in the governmental field.

In the economic field there is still much uncertainty as to what should be done, though the Byrnes statement at Stuttgart provided some clarity and represents a more positive approach to the problem. American business interests have naturally been strongly opposed to any nationalization program such as the Soviet Union has embarked upon in its zone. In this connection it is interesting to note that the new state constitutions in the American zone do however provide for a considerable measure of state socialism. There has remained the determined opposition of the Morgenthau group to any program that would permit any considerable degree of industrialization. The fixing of a figure of 55 per cent of the 1938 production capacity represented a defeat to this group, inasmuch as it was supposedly based on the maximum German peacetime level after deduction of war output. Nevertheless, even this decision was not regarded as final and considerable agitation developed almost at once in support of increasing this figure to at least 66 per cent. By the end of 1946 it seemed probable that the United States would favor such a step, despite the wide gap that still separated actual production from the permissible maximum. As long as the Reich is divided into four national zones and those zones are administered as separate economic units, it will be exceedingly difficult if not impossible to develop a satisfactory economic program in the American Zone. Nevertheless, the increase from 10 per cent of capacity to approximately 40 per cent during the course of 1946 represents a distinct achievement. The joining of the American and British Zones into an economic union in the fall of 1946, the authorization of a limited amount of international trade in late 1946, and various other factors point to further progress in the economic field.

## *Chapter 15 American Military Government Policy*

An effective organization is of great importance in military government. The staffing of such an organization with officers and men who have character, distinct leadership, good judgment, and specialized professional knowledge and experience will determine in large measure whether the military government operations are effective. But there is a third essential which also must be provided if military government is to perform more than perfunctorily and that is a clear-cut, dependable, and reasonably integrated policy. Without a policy to guide its operations any military government organization will either flounder about, wasting much of its energy on meaningless actions or it will be more or less paralyzed, because the stimuli necessary for movement cannot be supplied.

The importance of policy in military government is generally recognized, at least as a paper requirement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee in Washington, the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, the European Advisory Commission and to a lesser extent such military agencies as the German Country Unit, the US Group, Control Council for Germany, G-5 of SHAEF, and G-5 of USFET, all had certain responsibilities in determining military government policy. Perhaps the very elaborateness of the provisions made for drawing up plans and policy defeated the basic purpose to some extent in that responsibility instead of being centralized was diffused among a number of agencies.

However, the major problem did not arise out of the multiplicity of policy-determining organizations, for under a system as extensive and involved as ours it is essential that the various departments in Washington be brought into the picture, that some machinery be set up to iron out differences among Allied governments, and that some

recognition be given the higher headquarters staffs in the field. The worst that can be said about the various agencies named above is that they were not sufficiently geared together. They expended a great amount of energy in most cases and definitely realized the great importance of policy in military government, but they did not always know what the others were doing and at times duplicated the work of one another if they did not draft plans based on conflicting policies.

Increasingly during 1945 and 1946 the newspaper correspondents who covered military government operations in Germany began to refer to the lack of policy to be observed and even to charge that the United States had no policy at all as far as military government in Germany was concerned. By the end of 1945 and early 1946 many of the correspondents had more or less reached the conclusion that military government had broken down in Germany because it proceeded blindly, ignored matters of vital importance, and seemed to have little sense of its purpose. Allowing for the lack of objectiveness on the part of certain newspaper representatives and taking into full account the probability of exaggeration, these widely circulated charges require serious consideration.

If one examines the combat phase of military government in Germany, it is clear that there was a well established policy which stressed the role of military government in assisting the fighting units. This policy is laid down in the various manuals and instructions and is based on the experience of World War I, the Spanish American War, and other military conflicts in which the United States has been involved. Hence there seems little basis for any charge that military government in Germany had no policy during this initial period. And it is only fair to point out that the critics did not score military government on this basis to any extent during the combat phase.

It is of course comparatively simple to set a policy for military government during the fighting, for its role is pretty definitely established and very little controversy arises. But as soon as the post-hostility phase begins, the situation becomes more and more complex. At this time military government begins to give heed to many local problems related to the economic, political, and social institutions of the particular country which is occupied and there is increasing opportunity to choose what will be done first, where the emphasis

will be placed, and what specific steps will be taken in handling certain problems. The situation may not be the same as the one anticipated: policies may have been fixed and plans drafted on the basis of one set of circumstances while the military government detachments in the field may encounter something quite different. Any one who has had the smallest participation in war operations will realize how difficult it is to predict the details of future events. This means that military government operational units must be given a certain amount of discretion and leeway in deciding what is to be done in meeting a given situation.

Some top brass and others have exploited this aspect of military government for more than it is worth. Possibly they want to follow the line of least resistance for the time being and therefore argue that the local military government detachments must be given a free hand in meeting their problems. Other military officials doubtless use this to bolster up their own authority and ward off what they choose to consider interference from the outside. Insisting on running their own shows they ignore higher headquarters in the theatre, the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, and the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee as far as they possibly can. On the basis that local problems require emergency action which cannot be understood in Washington, they justify their own course in determining what military government in their areas will do. There is very little doubt that a considerable part of the criticism directed at lack of policy during the immediate post-hostility period must be borne by top brass who, on the ground that local conditions required such a course, more or less ignored policy which had been drafted in Washington and by higher headquarters in the ETO.

Some degree of local discretion must be permitted military government detachments in the field, but this does not justify ambitious brass hats in running their own areas of an occupied country as they please. Such a system invariably means that one area will follow one course and others varying courses. Newspaper correspondents naturally pose the question: "Why such diversity rather than unified policy?" Moreover, it means that a policy which has received a great amount of attention from many persons of diverse backgrounds and expertness and representing both military and civilian agencies is shelved in favor of a course of action ordered by some local brass hat who may have very little background in military government and

whose interest is primarily in having his own way. Anyone who had an opportunity to visit military government detachments under the various Army commanders in Germany will know to what an extent this prevailed during the months immediately following V-E Day. Denazification is a glaring example of a case at point.

What to do about a situation where there is a carefully prepared policy but little or no inclination on the part of the generals in the field to observe it is not an easy problem to cope with. Theoretically all that is required is a supreme commander who will crack down and insist that all subordinate generals comply with the policies laid down by him as the representative of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the War Department, the State Department, and other interested government agencies. But our entire military system, while supposedly so firmly grounded in strict observance of orders from the top, is actually operated under a more or less uncoordinated arrangement that permits each Army commander in foreign theatres substantial autonomy. In extreme instances the Army Chief of Staff in Washington or the supreme commander in the theatre may of course compel compliance or at least remove a resisting brass hat from his command. However this course is not generally feasible.

It will always be difficult to control military leaders in the field because experience seems to indicate that successful tactical operations require a considerable measure of freedom on the part of the Army commanders. Using this as a basis for argument the local top brass then proceed to make for themselves a variety of feudal kingdom in which they rule supreme, even to military government matters. How to draw the line between legitimate leeway and discretion and the assumption of unwarranted authority is the big problem.

As the combat phase falls more and more into the past, top brass can argue less effectively for their unlimited control over all matters within their commands. Therefore, they interfere less seriously with policies set up to guide military government operations as time passes. Nevertheless, there is some validity in the assertions of those who maintain that as long as an Army of Occupation remains in Germany, policy will be actually determined in large measure by military brass hats who command those forces, irrespective of whether a military government or a civil administration operates.

But while substantial responsibility for so-called lack of policy in Germany during the months following V-E Day rests with the

top brass in the field, it would be unfair to saddle them with the entire load. Even if generals do have their own way, they are influenced more or less by the policy decisions originating in Washington and higher planning headquarters in Germany. In some cases they have no interest one way or another in a particular matter and may be expected to transmit directives received from above without change to the military government detachments which they control. Even if they do have their own slant they are likely to pay some attention to a policy which has been sent them, contenting themselves with modifications and rephrasing.

It has already been pointed out that an elaborate set of agencies whose purpose it is to frame policies for military government exists above the level of the brass hats in the field. To what extent have these planning staffs produced policies for military government in Germany? The first answer to that query is that they have turned out great quantities of plans of one kind and another. Anyone who thinks that the United States has not given attention to detailed planning for Germany simply doesn't know the facts. There are plans and tentative policies galore, based on various assumptions of what would be encountered in Germany. It is true that some of these plans have stressed impressive format, beautiful charts, and orderly arrangement more than content because of the fondness of certain headquarters brass hats for outward appearance and their lack of background for understanding detailed provisions. Nevertheless, the contents of many of these plans represent a great amount of study and careful consideration by well qualified specialists. Critics can find some ground for their jibes if they have access to the multiplicity of plans, but it can hardly be on the lack of proposed policies.

In examining the military government record in Germany after SHAEF was dissolved and an elaborate structure of American military government instituted, the key question is not whether the United States has policies but whether it has a *clear-cut and reasonably well integrated set of plans based on a carefully considered and firmly grounded policy decided at the highest political level*. Plans based on speculation may serve a useful purpose in the absence of anything more substantial, but they certainly leave much to be desired. It is at this point that the most serious criticism comes in and that it may be charged that the United States has failed in Germany. Detailed plans firmly grounded in a policy or policies originating from



the very highest political sources in Washington and taking into account the exceedingly complicated factors in the German situation have frequently not been furnished military government operating staffs. The first statement of American long-range policy in Germany was delayed until September, 1946, when Secretary of State Byrnes visited Stuttgart. Moreover, there has been serious doubt in many responsible minds as to how stable and dependable even the most basic plans and policy-decisions might be.

Serious planning for military government in Germany started as early as 1943 and possibly even earlier. By 1944 the German Country Unit, with approximately 150 officers and a corresponding complement of enlisted men, was hard at work on plans. G-5 of SHAEF, though more active as an operating agency than a planning group, nevertheless did something in the latter field. In the late summer of 1944 the US Group, Control Council for Germany was organized and after struggling along with an inadequate staff of 150 officers eventually reached the point about a year later where it had almost 2,000 officers engaged in planning for military government in Germany. In addition, planning was going on in Washington.

Policy decisions as to the basic attitude of the United States towards German political institutions, German trade and industry, denazification, and various other aspects of the occupation of Germany were expected almost daily from 1944 on. But these policy decisions came in small numbers and when furnished were often so vague and unintegrated that they served to add to the confusion rather than to supply clear guidance. Pressure for plans of some sort became greater as D-Day approached and the planners did the best they could under the circumstances, taking their responsibilities very seriously in most cases, frequently working at night and on a seven-day per week schedule, and familiarizing themselves with the German situation to the best of their ability. When these plans went to Washington, they either received little or no decisive attention or were branded as unsatisfactory, sometimes even by the President himself. Yet virtually no positive guidance in the form of constructive criticisms was ever received in the ETO so that more adequate plans for military government could be drafted.

Representatives from Washington visited the ETO fairly often. Assistant Secretary of War McCloy, who was in general charge of military government affairs in the War Department until several

months after V-E Day, came regularly and seemed to display much interest in what was going on. Judge Patterson as Under Secretary of War also paid visits to the various military government planning staffs in the ETO. Major General Hilldring, long head of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, and several of his assistants inspected various military government organizations regularly. On occasion these Washington representatives addressed all of the officers assigned to a planning staff; sometimes they conferred only with the commanding general and a selected group. As a rule their visits covered only a brief period, though some of the officers from the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department devoted a longer time to the US Group, Control Council for Germany alone. Almost all of these visitors, whether civilian or military, expressed concern over the failure to provide anything like complete policy decisions for the guidance of military government operations in Germany, but the situation remained critical.

To begin with, the justification for the lack of policy decisions took the form of preoccupation with winning the war. It was asserted that the job of winning the war was so pressing, that it involved such enormous efforts that it was impossible to consider policy for the post-hostility period. Planning must of course be done, but it must proceed as best it could without direction, until such a time as the President and his assistants could find time for the necessary policy decisions.

Any fair-minded person has to give considerable weight to such an explanation. The top authorities in Washington were sorely burdened and frequently carried almost intolerable responsibilities. At the time it was natural to give the preparation for the tactical operations precedence over everything else. The atmosphere of the period was so strained that it doubtless was most difficult to give more than casual consideration to the intricate and often almost insoluble problems of what came after.

In retrospect it is easy to blame those in responsible places in Washington on this score and to charge them with winning the immediate battles only to lose the war itself because of the inability to deal with Germany after occupation. Certainly perfect creatures would have had the vision to see this danger, but governments are run by human beings rather than by supermen. Then, too, it must be remembered that many of the policy decisions involved the Soviet

out our objectives and policies to a large extent in the field. This required time and involved considerable lost motion, but it had the advantage of correlating objectives with the actual situation encountered and in the long run may turn out to be the soundest course.

For many months the lack of anything like an integrated set of policies made for much confusion. It left headquarters officers up in the air and it led to great irritation and even lack of confidence on the part of the field detachments. In the absence of an official set of policies which had broad coverage it was more or less up to individuals and agencies entrusted with military government responsibilities in Germany to make their own interpretations. With one sizable group conceiving of the American policy as limited to emergency operations, the maintenance of law and order, the demobilization of the armed forces and the dismantling of the munition plants, the clearing of main roads and streets, and the withdrawal from Germany at the earliest possible time—at latest within a few years, another urging punitive measures, the destruction of German industry, the reduction of the Germans to an agricultural economy, and still another emphasizing constructive efforts of a long-range character, it is not strange that the situation seemed chaotic for a time. But despite the deadweight of those who wanted to limit military government to immediate emergency problems and the active and determined opposition of the group who sought revenge, American military government slowly but surely moved ahead after V-E Day toward the policies advanced by the third group. Long before the Stuttgart speech of Secretary of State Byrnes, the goal of democratization had become the basic one for the US Group, Control Council for Germany, its successor OMGUS, and at least a goodly number of the military government detachments in the field. Associated with the main objective of democratization there were the supplementary ones of a federal system with vital states and a reasonably strong central government, popular elections, encouragement of local initiative, reeducation, and industrial reconstruction. By the end of 1945 or the beginning of 1946 the United States actually was following a fairly decisive policy in Germany, though no official announcement had been made to declare it to the world.

The first official constructive statement of American over-all policy in Germany was made by Secretary of State Byrnes at Stuttgart in September of 1946—some sixteen months after V-E Day.

In order to reassure the French who had been alarmed by certain provisions of this statement a supplementary address was delivered by Secretary Byrnes a little later in Paris. Possibly as a reply to an earlier Russian pronouncement which purported to favor a unified Germany despite the reluctance of the Soviet Union to cooperate in any preliminary steps in that direction, the Byrnes speech at Stuttgart was addressed not only to American military government officials but to the German people. While it contained little that was new, it was nevertheless significant as an official statement of American aims. The Morgenthau proposals were cast definitely aside as were the desires of those who wanted to bring American activities in Germany to a speedy conclusion. The United States came definitely to the support of a fairly elaborate German economy and pledged itself to remain in Germany for an extended period. A unified Reich with a federal type of representative democracy was clearly espoused, with the establishment of central German administrative agencies in such fields as trade and industry, food, and transportation and communications as soon as possible. Stress was placed on giving German officials and German people increasing responsibility for their own affairs, with complete responsibility as soon as experience warranted. It was noted that the United States did not regard the eastern boundaries of the Reich as necessarily permanently fixed.

The United States may not be as fortunate in its policy position as the Soviet Union. It can hardly be denied that it required a longer period to develop American objectives than was the case with the Soviet Union which started out with a rather clear program. The fact that policy in the Soviet Union proceeds directly from a small group in the Kremlin rather than from various conflicting elements as in the United States largely explains the difference. The proximity of the Soviet Union to Germany also contributes to the definiteness of the Russian approach. The slowness in evolving an American policy in Germany may have been irksome to many in the United States as well as in military government, but it was at least to be expected. The complex racial, economic, social, and cultural structure of the United States makes it exceedingly difficult to fix a clear-cut policy in domestic matters, to say nothing of military occupation of a foreign country. Our democratic system, under which policy decisions depend upon a large number of people with widely conflicting interests and opinions, hardly leads to the type of product to be observed

in the Soviet Union. Our geographical location, our comparative self-sufficiency, our degree of individual prosperity, our fortunate position in respect to war damage, all enter into the problem of formulating our aims for Germany. Nevertheless, we have finally apparently achieved a fair measure of success in this undertaking. Time will tell how wise we have been in the matter.

## *Chapter 16* The Role of the State Department in Germany

Military government publications of the Army have comparatively little to say about the State Department. State Department representatives did not appear in the military government setup of the United States in Germany until operations were well under way and then frequently were little known to the rank and file of military government personnel because they either worked entirely apart from the purely military system or participated only in higher headquarters. Yet it would be shortsighted indeed to disregard the State Department in any study of American military government in Germany or elsewhere.

Several important aspects of State Department activity in military government in Germany may be noted here, though some of them have been dealt with elsewhere in this study. In the first place, the State Department exerted a considerable amount of direct influence at the very highest military government levels in Washington. The President naturally gave careful attention to the recommendations of this department in matters pertaining to Germany. The State Department maintained direct channels of communications with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was frequently consulted by the latter when military government policies were being discussed. When conferences were held between the Big Three or by the Foreign Ministers to give attention to various matters, including the occupation of Germany, the American State Department ordinarily played a very prominent role. The creation of a new Assistant Secretaryship of State in 1946 to deal with policies in areas occupied by the United States indicates the formal recognition accorded this field.

Mention should be made of the State, War, and Navy Coordinat-

ing Committee known as SWNCC which gave its attention to many problems arising out of military government in Germany. It can hardly be doubted that SWNCC had much to do with American policies in Germany especially after hostilities came to an end and a secretariat was created under the supervision of Major General Hildring who left the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department to become Assistant Secretary of State in charge of occupied areas problems.

Moving from Washington to the European Theatre note should be taken of the European Advisory Commission which has already been mentioned in connection with the chapter on coordination. This commission, which started out as a tripartite body and later brought in the French, recognized the primary role of the American State Department and the British, Russian, and French Foreign Offices by giving the voting seats to diplomatic officials. The Army and the Navy had representatives for advisory purposes and both the secretariat and working committees included a sizable proportion of military personnel. The Treasury Department also participated and at times succeeded in dominating the American group. But it was Ambassador Winant who served as chief representative of the United States on the EAC and he was flanked by a fairly sizable staff of foreign service officers. EAC gave its attention to many European matters, but one of its major interests was the drafting of directives to be used by the Allies in Germany. It encountered many difficulties and the formal record of its achievements is not too impressive, but its preparatory work served a useful purpose and undoubtedly exerted a considerable impact on military government policies in Germany.

Another method used by the State Department in making its influence felt was more direct. It was arranged that political advisers appointed by the State Department be assigned to the Supreme Commander in the ETO, to the Commanding General of American Forces in the European Theatre, and later to the commanders of the Third and Seventh Armies in Germany who also served as district military governors in the American Zone. These political advisers had the responsibility of making known the attitude of the State Department in various aspects of military government.

The wisdom of the political advisers selected, the willingness of the Army generals to receive advice, and the relations of the State

Department representatives with the staffs of the commanding generals, all determined how effective this work would be. The position was by no means an easy one to fill, especially in those instances where the Army commanding generals resented what they considered interference with their prerogatives. Not infrequently the military staffs which assisted the commanding generals either inadvertently or intentionally ignored the political advisers in handling some important matter which had distinct interest for the State Department. The foreign service officers who held the positions hesitated to take too aggressive a position lest they stir up the animosity of the brass hats and perhaps erred in confining themselves too largely to being good fellows.

The State Department was not represented at Shrivenham where basic preparations were made for the organization of military government in the ETO, though its advice could have served a very useful purpose at that stage. Nor did the State Department participate in the German Country Unit, despite the responsibilities which were given to it in fields that vitally concerned that department. The State Department was slow in getting organized to deal with military government problems and was not prepared to step into the picture at this stage.

By taking part during this fluid stage the State Department representatives would have been accepted more naturally as an integral and very necessary part of the military government organization. They would have presumably built up very valuable personal relations which would have in all probability enhanced their effectiveness at a later date. With their first-hand knowledge of Germany, they could have given very substantial aid in preparing the various staffs for their work, to say nothing of the assistance that could have been rendered in drafting plans. But unfortunately at a time when personal contacts were being established, operating organizations set up, and the *Handbook for Military Government in Germany* prepared, the State Department not only lacked representation but it was not even generally known that it would later become active in military government.

The initial direct impact of the State Department on American military government in Germany came in August, 1944, well after the invasion of the continent had started and after military government operations had begun on a large scale. The first organization chart



for the US Group, Control Council for Germany received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington showed a Political Division which turned out to be a State Department agency. Most of the other divisions of the US Group CC for Germany started out with larger staffs or at least recruited their staffs more rapidly than the Political Division. More than that, most of the divisions had existed in the earlier German Country Unit and consequently had perfected working organizations and made considerable progress with their planning. The State Department representatives had to become familiar with a military organization, since few of them had had previous experience in such a capacity; they had to develop a place in the operations of the US Group CC for Germany; and finally, they had to contribute their own plans for handling political matters in Germany. All of this required time and effort.

The State Department started with the general policy that the staff of the Political Division would be made up of civilian personnel exclusively. This indicated a curious naivete, considering the dependence of the foreign service officers on the Army for equipment, quarters, mess, and virtually every other personal service. However, they soon recognized the need for a small number of officer and enlisted Army personnel and later were anxious to receive a sizable number of military people.

Despite their handicaps and late start, the State Department representatives in the US Group CC for Germany did a good job in establishing themselves. Some of the more belligerent Army people never yielded their resentment at having civilians included in an Army organization, but these were distinctly the exception. Some worried at the direct channels of communications maintained by the Political Division with Washington. Being human officers sometimes found it a little difficult to accept the more generous pay scales, the more adequate transportation facilities, and the abundant supply of liquor which the State Department personnel enjoyed. But by and large, there can be little serious criticism of the manner in which the Army accepted the foreign service civilians. In general, the military people recognized the justification of having the State Department represented and sought to cooperate on friendly terms with the Political Division, even when it involved coordinating their work with that division.

The State Department people also had a generally good record in

dealing with the Army. Many of them probably felt distinctly superior to the Army personnel because of their past experience, particularly their familiarity with Germany; yet they kept this feeling pretty well in the background. Perhaps their most irritating characteristic took the form of a great consciousness of rank. Though usually proud of the fact that they were not in the Army, they nevertheless gave much attention to assimilated Army rank. Quoting an executive order which had been issued many years earlier by the President to determine precedence at diplomatic functions, a number of the State Department representatives firmly insisted that they be given an assimilated rank considerably above that called for in the Army regulations or enjoyed by civilians in the other divisions. Under this executive order which presumably was never intended to apply to military operations or service with military forces, the civilians in the Political Division claimed that seven or eight of their number ranked as generals and even the younger foreign service officers as colonels. Moreover, they demanded the billets, airplanes, commissary privileges, and general perquisites of Army officers of these ranks, though the Army instructions clearly stated that assimilated rank was never a matter of right and had been devised only as a general guide for ascertaining the privileges of civilians working with the Army. The situation finally became so involved that the theatre issued a directive to the effect that civilians should be classed merely as enlisted, junior grade officers, or senior grade officers and that the rank of general could be authorized only by Washington.

To begin with, the Political Division was placed on a par with the functional divisions of the US Group CC, but in a subsequent reorganization it was decided that it should be differentiated from the ordinary functional divisions. Hence it was made into an Office of Political Affairs and located immediately under the commanding general. At the same time provision was made for a political adviser to the United States representative on the Allied Control Council for Germany. Most of the personnel of the Political Division went over to the Office of Political Affairs, though a small staff came into being around the political adviser.

Frequent calls were made on the component parts of the US Group CC for Germany for organization charts and the Political Division (Office of Political Affairs) had to comply. However, very little real interest was ever displayed in the internal organization of

this State Department agency, even after its staff had grown to a point where it included something like one hundred persons, many of whom were professional in type. Sections supposed to specialize on political matters, the German Foreign Office, economic affairs, labor, intelligence, education and religious affairs, public relations, public information services, displaced persons, and consular functions usually appeared in various guises on the organization charts which were sent to the State Department and filed with the headquarters offices of the US Group CC for Germany. In operating the Political Division (Office of Political Affairs) some attention was paid to keeping political matters distinct from economic affairs; the intelligence and public relations sections always had some degree of identity. The consular staff in many respects operated almost independently of the Political Division—indeed during the time the latter was located in England the consular people did not even appear. In Berlin they obtained a separate building after a few weeks and later established offices in various cities in the American Zone and in Bremen. But in general the internal organization existed mainly on paper and the system of carrying on business depended very largely on personal relations. One might well have characterized the Political Division (Office of Political Affairs) in the same words used before the recent notable expansion to describe the State Department itself: "It is not an administrative organization but a group of individuals."

Mr. Robert Murphy, the "ambassador," political advisor to the American representative on the Allied Control Council, director of the Political Division, political advisor to USFET, etc., served as the State Department representative in military government as it related to Germany beginning with the fall of 1944. Prior to that time he had been much in the limelight because of his connections with the Darlan affair in North Africa. When his appointment as State Department representative in Germany was announced, it immediately stirred up a storm of protest in the newspapers and periodicals of the United States. Few appointments involving a diplomatic position have occasioned as much criticism.

On the basis of his record in the North African-Mediterranean theatre Murphy was charged with being a "fascist" and an "enemy of democracy"; he was also branded as an envoy of the Roman Catholic Church. As far as his record in the ETO goes, it is impos-

sible to take the fascist accusations very seriously, though there may be reason to doubt whether he has any firm political convictions. Murphy never attempted to disguise the fact that he was a faithful member of the Roman Catholic Church. Yet there was very little evidence that his personal religious loyalties controlled his official actions.

The weaknesses of Mr. Murphy which became increasingly serious in the ETO received little or no attention from his critics in the United States. Two of these deserve mention. In the first place, though he had once served as American consul in Munich, he displayed comparatively little understanding of the general problem of military government in Germany and did not even arouse himself to represent the State Department in any very effectual manner. It may be that his unpleasant experience in the Mediterranean led him to a compelling desire to avoid further trouble. Or it may be that he honestly conceived of the role of the State Department as largely routine and decorative. It has been alleged that he actually felt keen interest in what was going on, but had little reason to believe that the Army could achieve reasonable success and therefore did not want to be involved to any great extent personally in the vital operations.

The second serious defect displayed by Murphy in the ETO was perhaps due to his lack of experience. Prior to the North African assignment he had held a subordinate post in the Paris embassy. He had probably had little opportunity to direct a sizable staff until his appointment to the German job. At any rate, he exhibited little administrative expertness as director of the Political Division of the US Group CC. No one else had the authority to assign the foreign service personnel to specific jobs; yet Murphy sometimes permitted specialists drawing high salaries to go for months without any substantial work. At the same time other staff members received so much to do that it was impossible for them to give adequate attention to their assignments. Staff conferences which were quite feasible during the first year of operations at least would have served a very useful purpose in tying the program together and allowing the staff members and the director to exchange ideas, but though staff conferences were a regular practice in other divisions of the US Group CC for Germany and members of the Political Division suggested them to Murphy they were rarely held. Murphy found it difficult to

delegate responsibility; he wanted to keep his hand on everything despite the lack of interest which he frequently manifested and the bottleneck which resulted from such a course.

The staff sent out by the State Department to serve in the Political Division (Office of Political Affairs) deserves high praise. Obviously a professional staff of something like fifty specialists included some who were abler than others. A few had inadequate professional background for the work to be done; certain others had passed their best working days. But the majority of the foreign service and auxiliary foreign service officers were competent, acquainted with various aspects of military government problems in Germany, and hard-working. A number of the foreign service officers had seen service in the American embassy in Berlin or in American consulates in Germany prior to the war and had become quite familiar with German language, culture, and institutions. Indeed, the staff of the Political Division sometimes made the military staffs in the various other divisions of the US Group CC appear as amateurs as regards German political and economic institutions.

Aside from the lack of adequate administrative organization and leadership, the Political Division found itself somewhat handicapped by the diplomatic tradition which it never managed to cast off. Though part of a military organization and intended to contribute to the handling of military government problems in Germany, the Political Division was of course primarily an agency of the State Department. However, the State Department did not have an organization in Washington which followed military government lines. About the only patterns which the State Department knew for sending out sizable staffs to foreign countries were the diplomatic and consular ones.

A major mission is headed by an ambassador and hence the Political Division had the anomaly of an ambassador at its head. The internal organization of a mission was always used as a model in the Political Division, but necessity required some modification. The Political Division simply had to have housekeeping facilities provided and in addition wanted many other favors from the Army; consequently it had to have Army representatives to supervise the Army personnel and to persuade not very eager military agencies to furnish various services to foreign service personnel. In general, the internal organization of the Political Division followed a dual system,

with the State Department machinery paralleling a less elaborate military setup.

More serious aspects of the mission pattern involved two more or less unwritten laws which, though without legal or indeed any formal basis, nevertheless have great weight. The first relates to the dominant position of the regular foreign service officers; the second has to do with the stress on dignity and prestige.

In a mission it is perhaps natural that the responsibility rests largely if not entirely upon the shoulders of the head of the mission and the foreign service officers. During ordinary times at least any other personnel will consist of clerical people from the United States who do not have the professional training and background of the foreign service officers and various interpreters, clerks, and functionaries recruited on the spot from among the local population. But the US Group CC for Germany hardly duplicated the situation in a foreign capital. Moreover, the supply did not permit the State Department to staff the Political Division with an adequate number of regular foreign service officers. Consequently many auxiliary foreign service officers were employed by the State Department and sent to the Political Division. The professional training of the auxiliary foreign service officers probably surpassed that of the regular foreign service officers, at least as far as formal educational qualifications entered in. The professional experience of the former had of course not been directly in the diplomatic foreign service, but it usually was of such a nature that it perhaps had as direct a bearing on the work of the Political Division as that of the foreign service itself. Hence when such staff meetings as there were usually omitted the auxiliary foreign service officers, it led to hard feelings and resentment. Nor were the auxiliary people given the choice assignments or the social recognition accorded the foreign service officers.

In a foreign capital it is desirable for American representatives to hold positions of dignity. No one disputes this at all. Whether such dignity depends upon limiting associations to a comparatively small circle of government, diplomatic, and business people may be a question. Judging from recent discussion there is an increasing feeling that a foreign service which can know only the upper crust, so to speak, of a foreign country and bases its reports and advice to the United States largely on such knowledge is hardly dependable. The mission tradition which largely controlled the Political Division

made it difficult for staff members to obtain adequate material on which to base their dispatches to Washington or their operations in the field. To a very considerable extent the staff members of the Political Division found it impossible to get out and obtain as much firsthand information as was available.

Unlike the regular foreign service officers, many of the auxiliary foreign service officers had been trained in the dogma that firsthand information is essential to good reporting and effective operations, at least when such information is available. Hence when they found themselves confined to sitting at desks and compiling their reports and drafting their plans on the basis of various outdated and at best incomplete papers that came in, they naturally felt irked. Especially when they could observe military officers in the more progressive divisions of the US Group CC for Germany going out into the field as much as possible and realized that the Political Division suffered in prestige because of its unfamiliarity with what was happening in the military government detachments, they developed dissatisfaction. By nagging some did get out, but few found it possible to do field work frequently and a good many never left their desks. The paper work piled up impressively under this mission tradition, but the quality suffered rather seriously in many cases.

The activities of the Political Division (Office of Political Affairs) can be contrasted with those of other divisions of the US Group CC on two points: extensiveness and concreteness. The other divisions, at least if they were functional in character, could set up reasonably definite areas of responsibility. One handled manpower problems; another public safety matters; and still another transportation. But the Political Division as the representative of the State Department covered more or less the entire field of military government in Germany, thus paralleling the other divisions of the US Group CC for Germany. This of course made the actual performance of work more difficult than in the case of most of the divisions. With responsibility centered on a single functional field, the other divisions could view their actual assignment as something calling for specific action—in other words they could grapple with a relatively tangible and concrete job. The Political Division, on the other hand, found it impossible to foretell exactly what its job would be. So much depended upon future developments or upon unpredictable turns given to the political picture.

The Political Division (Office of Political Affairs) received certain direct responsibilities in military government. During the early period this division handled the problem of public relations for the US Group CC for Germany, though the combined efforts of the theatre G-2 and the public relations section of the theatre staff rendered its labors more or less vain. Later the commanding general of the theatre public relations section won a fight to set up his own show in the US Group CC for Germany and public relations then were taken over by an Office of Public Relations. Similarly, the Political Division was shown on the first organization charts of the US Group CC for Germany to have direct charge of German information services: the press, radio, movies, and so forth. However, the ambitious commanding general of Psychological Warfare staged a campaign which finally caused this direct responsibility to be transferred to a Public Information Services Office in the US Group CC which he headed.

The assignment for the control and liquidation of the German Foreign Office naturally fell directly upon the Political Division as far as the United States was concerned. Had the German Foreign Office been in actual operation when the surrender took place or had the United States occupied Berlin, this job would have been more important than it turned out to be. As it was, the Political Division made arrangements to take over, safeguard, and exploit the extensive archives of the Foreign Office discovered by tactical units of the American Army. It also listed the officials of the German Foreign Office who were to be arrested and held and participated in their questioning.

Perhaps the most extensive direct activity of the Political Division related to the National Socialist Party and the denazification program. At an early stage the division received the mandate to coordinate the planning for the taking over, control of, and liquidation of the National Socialist Party and its affiliated organizations as well as the Party Chancellery. Actually the party had disintegrated before the final surrender and the officials had deserted the sinking ship, hoping to save their necks. Tactical units took over such party buildings as had not been destroyed and frequently contributed themselves substantially to the destruction of any party records that remained. A similar order required the Political Division to plan for the taking over, control, and probable dissolution of the Reich Chan-



cellery, the Presidential Chancellery, and the Fuhrer's Chancellery, but here too little was actually done because of the situation existing when the Germans surrendered.

But if the dissolution of the National Socialist Party required little attention, the denazification program proved quite another matter. The job of planning for denazification involved all sorts of complications and difficulties. How far down in the scale of officials should arrests be directed? To what extent should former Nazis be summarily disqualified from holding public jobs? What degree of Nazi activity should be considered as justifying placing names on a list of those who could be removed from the public payroll at the discretion of the military government detachments but did not fall within the mandatory removal category? What about the denazification of industry and the professions? These were only a few of the far from simple questions which presented themselves. Of course, the basic policy depended upon decisions to be made in Washington and Washington was apparently reluctant to face the issue until late in the day. Even then there was such a fight between various elements ranging from the extremists who openly professed that they would like to see all Germans dead to those who laid the blame on the leaders at the top and held the rank and file of the German people victims to be pitied that no clearcut decision was forthcoming. Terms, such as "active Nazis," used in directives from Washington left great leeway for interpretation.

Two other direct jobs came to the Political Division (Office of Political Affairs): planning for the lifting of the ban on political activity and the general policy as to the holding of elections. With the German people so absorbed in the immediate problem of day-to-day existence and still dazed as a result of the Allied bombing, neither of these had to be given priority. Moreover, pressure from the United States did not complicate these problems as was the case with denazification. However, the Russians had allowed political activity from the first days of occupation and the Potsdam meeting of the Big Three led to a decision that political parties would be recognized in all the zones. The Office of Political Affairs drafted the instructions to the military government detachments relative to the conditions under which political activity would be permitted in the American Zone. As far as elections were concerned, it was decided that it would be unwarranted to permit elections of any character until ade-

quate preliminary arrangements had been made but that early elections were desirable.

In addition to the planning and policy-determination responsibilities which have been discussed, the Political Division (Office of Political Affairs) participated in certain other direct military government activities. When investigations were made of charges that certain military government detachments had failed to handle their assignments in a satisfactory manner, a representative of the Political Division usually served as one of the survey party. Thus when the *Land* Bavaria detachment found itself under fire on the ground that undue attention had been paid to a single political and religious element and too little vigor displayed in denazification, the Political Division participated in the investigation ordered.

The greater part of the work of the Political Division (Office of Political Affairs) consisted of furnishing information to the State Department and collaborating with functional divisions of the US Group CC, later the Office of Military Government for Germany, U.S. (OMGUS). Requests not infrequently came from the State Department asking for specific information. However, the bulk of the reporting was done at the initiative of the officers of the Political Division and took the form of dispatches which were intended to give the State Department a full picture of what was going on in Germany.

Not all the draft directives and plans prepared by the functional divisions of the US Group CC for Germany contained items which concerned the State Department, but a very considerable number did. To begin with, perhaps as a result of established practice before the State Department entered the picture, functional divisions drafted and sent their proposed directives and plans directly to the US Group CC headquarters for approval. But as the situation became more complicated and it became apparent that the State Department had an active interest in much of what was being done in Germany, it became the common procedure to have directives and plans coordinated with the Political Division (Office of Political Affairs) before going to the office of the chief of staff, the commanding general, or elsewhere. Sometimes conferences were held to canvass situations before plans were put down on paper and the Political Division sent representatives. Again committees were set up to prepare plans on borderline matters, such as the general plans for the reorganization

of German government, and these frequently included representatives from the Political Division.

It was frequently assumed by both State Department and military personnel in Germany that the military government would give way to a civil administration which would be under the State Department. General Eisenhower as Commanding General of U.S. forces in the European Theatre went so far as to state publicly that the Army was not well fitted to handle long-range political problems in Germany and set 1946 as a date for turning control responsibility over to a civilian administration. The Army would of course continue to furnish occupation troops to maintain security. However, after much discussion and considerable unfortunate delay, the State Department announced in 1946 that it was not prepared to assume the responsibility of a civil administration in Germany.

## *Chapter 17 The Role of the Navy*

Although the Navy regarded the Pacific as the principal sphere for its military government operations, recognition was also given to the need for a limited provision in Europe. In May, 1943 the Commander of the U.S. Naval Forces in Europe recommended that ten to twelve Naval officers trained in military government be assigned for duty in the European Theatre. Very shortly thereafter an officer with rank of commander was selected to head the Naval military government program in Europe and eight of the graduates of the first class of the Naval School of Military Government and Administration at Columbia University were assigned to duties in the ETO, arriving in July, 1943. Additional officers were sent to the ETO from time to time, until something like one hundred were available for various types of military government work.

To begin with, the Navy followed the policy of attaching its military government personnel in the ETO to the Operations Division of ComNavEu (Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe). However, in October, 1943 a separate civil affairs section was set up as part of the Intelligence Division of ComNavEu. As the military government staff increased in size to approximately seventy officers by the spring of 1944, instructions were issued authorizing a separation from the Intelligence Division and the creation of a Civil Affairs Division. In the fall of 1944 a further shift was made when a European Affairs Division was provided in ComNavEu and the earlier Civil Affairs Staff Division was joined with it to become a Military Government and Civil Affairs Section.

The military government subdivision of ComNavEu remained a relatively small organization, especially in comparison with corresponding Army agencies. It often had no more than six officers,

assigned to it as follows: a head, an assistant head, an executive officer, and three administrative officers. This small staff had responsibility for maintaining liaison relations with the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force, the British Colonial and War Offices, and the governments in exile located in London as well as the preparation of historical materials. It also participated in the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in London through its head and provided Naval personnel for the joint Army-Navy Secretariat of this committee.

The majority of the Naval military government officers sent to the ETO were attached to the Civil Affairs Division or Section of ComNavEu for administrative purposes, but they actually performed duties in connection with various operating units or planning agencies. Some of them performed military government functions in ports which the Navy held; others served as liaison officers; while another group assisted in the planning efforts which were carried on by both the Army and the Navy.

After D-Day the Navy had the responsibility for administering certain ports which had been captured, mainly in France. As Germany was occupied, it might have been expected that the Navy would receive substantial additions in the way of military government duties. Had the initial agreement which provided that the United States would occupy Northwestern Germany been carried out, the Navy would doubtless have had a good deal to do. But the decision to give that section of Germany to the British and the remaining part of North Germany to the Soviet Union left only an inland area for American occupation. Obviously the Navy military government program did not find a large place in Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, and Greater Hesse.

It is true that Bremen and its environs were organized into a Bremen Enclave to serve as an American port, but otherwise the great German seaports were held by our Allies. For a time it appeared that the Bremen Enclave would be administered primarily as a Naval military government project, but negotiations between the Navy and Army eventually resulted in an arrangement under which the Navy undertook limited military government functions and the Army was given the general job of military government. The net result was that the Navy military government program in Germany turned out to be less extensive than had been anticipated by many

and more than that confined itself quite largely to the combat and immediate post-hostility periods.

If the Navy participation in direct military government operations proved less ambitious in the ETO than had been expected—and it may be added that the Navy itself apparently took the initiative in asking the Army to handle most of the military government work in the Bremen Enclave<sup>1</sup>—it is also true that the Navy escaped many of the headaches which came to the Army in the occupation of Germany. Instead of having to involve itself in the complicated tasks of denazification, decentralization of political machinery, elections, political activities, education, and the problem of democratizing Germany, the Navy found it necessary to deal only with more or less immediate problems. The Navy military government officers concerned themselves with the maintenance of law and order on the part of civilians in the port areas, issuing proclamations, rules, and orders as to their conduct. Inasmuch as the Navy used water rather than roads to move its equipment and personnel and ordinarily carried on its combat operations at sea, its problem of keeping the civilians out of the way was less complicated than that of the Army. Civilian boats, especially fishing boats, of course had to be kept in port or at least restricted to specified waters, but otherwise there was little disposition on the part of the local civilians to clutter up the scene as so often happened in the case of roads.

Nevertheless, if the mission of the Navy differed from that of the Army in keeping the local civilians from interfering with military operations, it involved other military government functions of substantially the same character. The Navy required a local labor supply just as the Army did. True, the nature of the work might be different in that the Navy program called for harbor repairs and clearance. However, much of the work to be performed by the local civilian labor was not of the skilled types and in both Army and Navy took the form of general manual labor. As in the case of the Army, the Navy had to take over numerous buildings for billets, offices, warehouses, and other purposes. Like their counterparts, the Navy military government officers were expected to locate emergency supplies, to give some attention to local food supplies especially for the civilians working for the military, and to arrange payment for wages and

<sup>1</sup> In early 1947, the Bremen Enclave was organized as a *Land*, thus becoming the fourth state under American jurisdiction.

supplies. In certain cases the Navy military government officers depended upon the Army to handle some of this work. For example, if the Army had established machinery for registering the Germans and calling them out for military labor, the Navy frequently arranged with the Army to provide the civilian labor required by the Navy instead of proceeding to create duplicating agencies.

In addition to the functions noted above, Naval military government officers gave their attention to vice-control measures, to the revival of the local fishing industry at the appropriate time, to displaced persons, to the public health and sanitation of the areas under Naval jurisdiction, and to the control of the local public information services, including the press, the radio, and places of amusement. The local civilian economy came in for such emergency consideration as seemed possible, while black market operations were prohibited. Military courts had to be set up to handle violations of the rules promulgated or if the Army had already established such tribunals, the Navy military government officers participated in their operations. Inasmuch as the Navy carried on its military government activities in the ports of the liberated countries more than in occupied Germany, the problem of dealing with local officials naturally assumed large proportions. While there was usually not the necessity of organizing government from the ground up as had to be done in Germany by the Army, the sensitiveness of the liberated people required not a little consideration if anything like satisfactory working conditions were to be expected.

The liaison efforts of the Naval military government organization in the ETO did not require many full-time officer assignments, but nevertheless may be regarded as significant. Perhaps the most important liaison job involved G-5 of the Supreme Headquarters. The representatives of Naval military government at this point worked out arrangements as to the loan of Naval military government specialist officers to various Army agencies. Cordial relations between the Naval liaison and the Army officers assigned to G-5 SHAEF made it possible to develop a large measure of cooperation between Army military government detachments and Naval military government officers assigned to the staffs of the commanders of U.S. ports and bases. SHAEF directives were sent through these Naval liaison officers to ComNavEu to be dispatched to the operational commands of the Navy for promulgation and implementation. In addi-

tion, this relationship made it possible for the Navy to know what was being planned and carried out by the Army military government officials. Another important liaison connection was made with the British Colonial and War Offices. This enabled certain agreements to be reached as to military government operations in Eastern Asia and the Pacific. A Naval military government liaison with the governments in exile located in London, while somewhat informal in character, led to the furnishing of information and the exchange of visiting lecturers.

The operational aspect of Naval military government in the ETO while not extensive deserves distinct credit, for it accomplished a very necessary purpose. However, it is probably fair to state that the most important contribution of the Navy to over-all military government in the ETO was at the planning level. The Navy had officers in virtually all of the military government planning agencies which functioned in the European Theatre. It was ably though not generously represented in numbers in the German Country Unit, the French Mission, the US Group, Control Council for Germany (OMGUS), G-5 of SHAEF, G-5 of USFET, the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in London, and the U.S. Planning Committee of the European Advisory Commission. In these agencies its officers served on research and coordination boards and divisions, as members of working committees, as secretariat officials, and as staff members of functional divisions dealing with political affairs, trade and industry, civil administration, finance, public welfare, education and religious affairs, communications, legal matters, and monuments and fine arts. With few exceptions, these Naval officers gave an unusually good account of themselves. Several of them started out with the German Country Unit and continued right on through for some two years with the U.S. Group, Control Council for Germany and the Office of Military Government for Germany of the United States doing substantially the same job. Inasmuch as a number of them had studied in German universities before the war, spoke German without difficulty, and knew a great deal about the German political, economic, and social systems, it is not surprising that, being also familiar with American military government policies and development, they proved highly valuable.

The Naval military government officers assigned to the European Theatre were probably more uniform in type than their brethren



in the Army. For one thing the Navy did not have the problem confronting the Army in the ETO of transferring large numbers of tactical officers without specialist military government background into military government. Out of 91 Naval officers who received military government assignments in the ETO during the first year and a half 64 had had military government training in the United States. Fifty-four were graduates of the Naval School of Military Government and Administration at Columbia; nine had been trained at the Army School of Military Government at Charlottesville; and one was a graduate of both of the above schools. Forty-five officers received military government training in the United Kingdom, including 26 who had also been trained in the United States. Twenty-five Naval officers participated in the Army military government training program at Shrivenham. Other Naval officers received military government instruction in Scotland at a center set up by the Navy in a castle.

In addition to the military government specialists which the Navy assigned to European duties, mention should be made of the Naval Division of the US Group Control Council for Germany and its successor the Office of Military Government for Germany of the United States. The Navy assigned a varying number of officers from time to time to its division in the above agencies. At one time it had a vice admiral at the head of the division, a number of captains in charge of subdivisions, and a sizable staff of other officers and enlisted personnel to assist in the planning and operations. The Naval Division was charged with the responsibility for planning and supervising the liquidation of the German navy in collaboration of course with the corresponding representatives of the Allies. It may be seen that the mission was somewhat apart from the general military government job and that it was logical that the Naval Division should be more or less autonomous in its relation to the US Group CC for Germany (OMGUS). As the occupation progressed, it appeared that the work to be done was less than had been anticipated and the Navy after arranging with the British Royal Navy and the American Army to undertake certain responsibilities reduced its staff in Germany sharply.

Perhaps the most significant fact arising out of the military government experience in the ETO involving both the Army and Navy is the degree of cooperation achieved. There was apparently very little,

of the service rivalry and jealousy so frequently manifest elsewhere. Instead of building up a competing military government organization of elaborate character which might have been quite in order, the Navy kept its military government staff to a minimum and preferred to have the Army take over most of the military government of the Bremen Enclave as well as provide various services elsewhere. The relations between the Navy and Army officers who worked side by side in the German Country Unit, the US Group Control Council for Germany, and other planning agencies were most satisfactory. Both groups liked and respected each other and tried hard to do an effective job. There was virtually no consciousness that one served with the Navy and another the Army.

## Chapter 18 Public Relations and Intelligence

### *Public Relations*

Almost from its inception in World War II military government received generous attention from the press, the radio and other public information services. Especially when the fighting subsided either for the moment or permanently, the newsmen apparently considered the activities of the military government detachments very good copy and the editors at home not only gave generous space to these reports but in some cases sent out special correspondents to prepare series of articles dealing with the achievements and failures of military government in Italy and Germany. In general, this interest not only served a useful purpose but more than that indicated a public consciousness which seemed to promise well for the future. The American public became aware of many of the problems confronting the detachments in the field and in certain instances indicated rather clearly reactions which were helpful in determining policies at home as well as pointing to changes in the field. Many of the newspaper and magazine stories were available through photostatic reproductions and clipping services to higher headquarters in the ETO and were read with interest and not infrequently profit.

Although it was apparently the intention at one time to have a full-fledged public relations section of military government in Germany, this plan was never carried out, probably because of the strong opposition of the public relations officers of the Army at SHAEF, USFET, Army Group, and Army levels. The result was that such public relations officers as there were both at the detachment and headquarters levels in military government were limited to routine

matters at least until far along in the operations. The actual control was exercised by the theatre public relations staff. Apparently ill-informed of military government purposes and all too often unconscious of any particular responsibility to do a highly important job in educating the American people as regards the necessity of a military government program in Germany, these Army public relations officers followed a more or less dilatory policy of negative character. Again and again their decisions hinged on a superficial basis of military security, when military security really did not enter in at all.

In so far as military government officers assigned to Germany were permitted to give out information directly to the newsmen on other than purely routine and usually insignificant matters, there was a distinct tendency to follow either a policy of self-advertisement or a course of extreme caution. A good many commanding officers who desired publicity at home in connection with future political aspirations frequently issued statements in which one could be sure that their names always appeared in a prominent position. A colonel in command of the military government detachment for *Land* Bavaria may be cited as a good example. The statements which he issued were frequently inaccurate in character and even sometimes almost incredibly naive—the widely circulated report in which he predicted that full responsibility for government as far as the *Land* level would be returned to the Germans as early as the fall of 1945 may be cited—but they never failed to give full prominence to the name of the colonel. The ultra-cautious type of officer feared the press as he feared perhaps nothing else and saw in every correspondent an emissary of the devil out to do all the damage possible. Because of their power newsmen must be dealt with in an urbane manner, but every effort must be made to keep from them data of important nature. Any statements made by these officers were so carefully pruned of any information that could possibly be the source of subsequent embarrassment that they almost invariably proved deadwood.

It can hardly be denied that the Army failed to appreciate the full importance of publicizing military government organization and operations in Germany. Instead of perceiving the extreme desirability of giving the American public as full and accurate a picture of military government as could be done so that support would be established for its long-range program, the official policy was frequently

one of tolerating correspondents as necessary evils to be guarded against as carefully as possible.

In defense of this attitude on the part of the Army, it is only fair to look at the other side of the picture. It does not justify the Army policy, but it undoubtedly strengthened the hand of those military representatives who saw everything in a negative way. Newspapers and press associations were faced during World War II with a shortage of newsmen of even average competence; the supply of those with any very substantial background relating to European affairs or military government was especially limited. Some newspapers probably would not have employed correspondents with such background had they been available, since they had their own irons in the fire which did not call for responsible reporting. The combination of lack of trained reporters and "smear" tactics naturally played into the hands of the military officials who lacked a constructive attitude and for the most part determined the Army public relations policy as regards military government in Germany. Reporters who saw in the military government program merely a source of easy copy, preferring to gather a few superficial items rather than to do a careful job, along with those who had little or no interest in ascertaining the difficulties inherent in the complicated job confronting military government in Germany, must bear a considerable measure of onus for the situation.

The result was that, while some very illuminating dispatches<sup>1</sup> were sent to the United States by certain correspondents, the general record was far from satisfying to those who hoped that an adequate reporting job could be done as an essential part of military government. One could make allowance for the inaccuracies of the dispatches of top-flight correspondents of the *New York Times*, the *Chicago Daily News*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, and other papers which have long prided themselves on their foreign news, because the official sources of news were inadequate. But it was not as easy to justify a correspondent such as the *Time* representative who sweepingly blasted all military government officers on the basis of their use of interpreters, their fondness for German women, their drinking and so forth.

<sup>1</sup> The Sulzberger articles appearing in the *New York Times* may be cited as an example.

*Intelligence*

In a somewhat related field—that involving the internal assembling of information as to the field activities of military government—the record also leaves something to be desired. It should be obvious that any organization, even if far less extensive and complicated in operations than military government in Germany, needs to have an adequate knowledge of what is going on within itself. Of course provision was made for field reports from the officers in charge of each military government detachment—it may be added that the number of reports soon became such as to constitute a very heavy if not intolerable burden—but this information tended to be departmentalized in character and factual rather than analytical.

Moreover, military psychology was such that most local military government officers in Germany were reluctant to report their difficulties and failures in anything like an adequate fashion because the tactical officers who received the reports to begin with resented any suggestion that all matters in their respective areas were not being successfully handled. A military government officer who did make a realistic report usually received a stiff memorandum from his immediate superior asking why, if such conditions existed, the military government detachment had not remedied them. If he persisted in such reporting, he was likely to be relieved of duty. So the reports from the field tended to show that the situation was far better than it was and the details which went up tended to be of a routine type which could cause little or no comeback.

As the reports went from military government detachments to division, to Army, to Army Group, and finally to G-5, SHAEF or USFET, it was the custom, particularly in the early phases, to edit them at each successive stage. The result was that they lost more and more of their sharpness, and, as they were finally incorporated in the periodical military government report issued by G-5 of higher headquarters, they provided a far from adequate basis for making decisions.

After V-E Day more and more of the detachments on the *Land* and district levels and in the case of metropolitan areas the *Stadtkreis* level issued their own mimeographed reports and these not only made it possible to provide many additional details but fresher in-

formation. But they still provided comparatively little analysis and in general had to be considered as only partially comprehensive, especially on the pessimistic side.

Some provision was made as time went on for reporters in the various military government detachments and fairly elaborate machinery was set up on top to collect the material and make it available to the appropriate offices. A monthly over-all report on military government by the commanding general of American forces in the ETO who also served as military governor in the American Zone of Germany began publication reasonably soon after the military government situation settled down. But the task of reporting on the intricate and far-flung problems and activities of the larger German political units called for a high degree of skill and in most cases considerable background. It is one thing to obtain answers to specific questions contained on a report form; it is quite a different matter to look into a highly confused and complicated German *Land*, *Regierungsbezirk*, *Stadtkreis*, or *Landkreis* and to decide what requires reporting and what the basic facts are. Experts in government research, journalism or public reporting would not have found this assignment an easy one. But these were not available except in rare instances and there was no assurance even in such cases that they would be used for this reporting.

Some detachments, especially in the smaller political units, made little or no effort to assign anyone to do this reporting job. In the other detachments someone was designated, but it was frequently on a part-time basis, with other work so heavy that little time and energy remained for reporting. In any case, the person receiving the assignment infrequently had any particular background nor was he regarded as anything like the equal of the officer in charge of the more definite and locally impressive public safety, finance, legal, or food and agriculture jobs.

The lack of adequate information might have been remedied to some extent by sending representatives from higher echelons to investigate and report. And in a few instances, especially in the economic, food and agriculture, finance, and public safety fields, this was done to some extent. But the personnel available at higher levels, if they were at all expert, usually had a job to do there. The fact that the lower echelons resented outside observations in many cases, considering it to be a source of trouble or a reflection on the local

detachment, made even this very limited spot observation out of the question in some places.

With higher headquarters not in possession of the complete picture, much of the planning was done and the consequent directives issued on a theoretical basis. When the directives finally filtered down to the local detachments, they were frequently received with general suspicion because it was apparent that they did not take the actualities into account in certain instances. Hence a vicious circle operated as a result of lack of adequate reporting, with mistakes made at higher levels and lack of confidence all too often prevailing in the field.

### *Promulgation of Policies*

Though not strictly in the same category, a third difficulty added to the complications. Basic policies for military government were supposedly determined at the very highest political level, often by the top leaders themselves at their meetings at Quebec, Yalta, and Potsdam. These decisions had to be translated into JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) papers as far as American military government was concerned. As a rule it required several weeks or even months to get the decisions made by the heads of states embodied in JCS papers and delivered to higher headquarters in the ETO. Then SHAEF, USFET, or the US Group CC for Germany had to study the Joint Chiefs of Staff papers with great care and frame directives based on their provisions. This usually meant that several different divisions of these higher headquarters had to perform the initial drafting; the drafts had to be coordinated with other interested divisions; the headquarters chief of staff and secretariat had to get their hands in—all before the headquarters commanding general could approve and transmit the proposed directive to the commanding general in the ETO or his deputy.

After further delay, with the possibility of the proposed directive being returned for redrafting, the directive issuing from the commanding general in the ETO went to the headquarters of the Army Groups, at least until they were discontinued. With a distinct sense of their own importance, Army Group headquarters were not disposed to transmit the directive as received to the Army headquarters. Hence additional time was spent in redrafting the directive to be issued under the authority of the commanding general of the Army



Group to the Armies. Not to be shoved aside, the headquarters of the Armies frequently felt that they in turn had to make a showing by making a redraft of the directive from the Army Group headquarters. Again more time was lost.

Though policy directives were not redrafted after leaving the Army headquarters, they still had not reached the military government detachments which were operating in the field and which obviously had to carry out the policy. Going out from Army headquarters they might go through corps headquarters, though in some cases they went directly to the division headquarters. Here after further delay, they usually were dispatched to the military government detachments. With communication facilities not too adequate during the tactical and early post-hostility phases as far as the smaller military government detachments were concerned, several days might be required to get the directive from the division to the detachments. It was rare for the military government detachments to receive the policy decisions reached by the Big Three in less than three months.

The result was naturally that the military government detachments often felt very vague about policy matters and during a considerable period developed the point of view that they made their own decisions on the spot as to what should be done in regard to most problems. It was not strange that great divergencies developed from one area to another under such a system. Many military government officers may have preferred to be left alone to decide as they pleased all sorts of highly complicated problems, but an effective over-all organization could hardly be expected under such circumstances. The amazing thing is that the results were as good as they were.

## Chapter 19 Relations with the German People

The relations of American occupying forces with the German people present a paradox. It is probable that no other Ally has given as much formal attention to this matter as the United States. Yet the American forces have encountered more embarrassment in this connection than the British, Russians or French. Moreover, there is some evidence that the general record of the United States in this respect is less satisfactory than those of our Allies.

Several months before D-Day the Anglo-American German Country Unit of SHAEF began to discuss the problem of Allied relations with the German people. A draft directive was prepared which was carefully considered by numerous staff members and after wide circulation underwent various revisions. It was recognized by these planners that general intermingling on the part of the Allied military personnel with the German people was not desirable since it would lead to pernicious results both among the soldiers of the Allies and the inhabitants of the Reich. On the other hand, few if any of the planners were of the opinion that an absolute ban on fraternization could be enforced as a practical measure. Inasmuch as they regarded a categorical prohibition that would be subject to wide violation as a questionable policy, they tackled the problem on the basis of a strict attitude of disapproval in the case of indiscriminate association and stress on the importance of an indoctrination program to point out to Allied military personnel the objections to widespread association with the Germans.

The instructions relating to fraternization which the German Country Unit prepared were included in the *Handbook for Military Government in Germany* and when the issuance of that book was long held up by the attacks of the Morgenthau

group it had the effect of nullifying much of what had been done. Not only had there been no official promulgation of the policy when American troops began to invade Germany, but the important job of indoctrination had not been undertaken.

The newspaper and radio accounts of the first American break-over into Germany naturally received both widespread and eager attention in the United States. These reports varied somewhat in their content, but they gave prominent attention to the generally cordial reception given by the Germans to the Allied invaders and some of them stated that the American soldiers reciprocated by presenting candy bars to German children. How much basis there may have been for such statements relating to the attitude of the American forces toward the German population it is difficult to determine. Doubtless there may have been individual instances where Americans did give chewing gum or candy, though the Army investigation seemed to throw doubt on the reliability of general assertions. However that may be, large numbers of people in the United States accepted these reports as both accurate and characteristic of American troop conduct and they screamed their indignation to Washington. That American soldiers should give bits of candy to people who had murdered American airmen, almost annihilated the German Jews, and caused a world-wide war by their wicked aggressions seemed to many people in the United States to be the worst infamy. So much had been said in high quarters and by the press to the effect that all Germans were guilty of these offenses and that there was no such creature as a good German that it was not surprising that there should have been this popular reaction.

At any rate the pressure became so intense that Washington, which had long been oblivious to major matters of American military government policy in Germany, was galvanized into almost immediate action. And this action took the form of a categorical and absolute ban on the fraternization of American personnel in Germany with the German people. It went so far that military government officers entertained some doubt to begin with whether it was legal for them to have contact with Germans for the purpose of obtaining information required for official duties. Certainly it prohibited military government officers from shaking hands with any Germans, even those designated to work with American military government. There could be no eating together of Americans and Germans, irrespective

of whether the latter had been leaders in the anti-Nazi underground movement or disciples of Hitler.

If this ban was adhered to by officers, it was certainly not generally accepted by American GIs. By this time most of the latter had become highly critical of orders which seemed to them primarily intended to encroach on their personal liberties. Little or nothing had been done to explain to the GIs why fraternization with the Germans was not desirable. The fact that the ban had come directly on the heels of the newspaper reports involving the early conduct of American forces in Germany and apparently had been inspired by public opinion in the United States did not make it more palatable to the GIs. They had heard a great deal about the wages being paid in the munitions plants and the black markets organized by those in the United States who desired to avoid rationing and they were in no mind to have their very limited perquisites reduced by a dog-in-the-manger attitude of those at home.

The American GI was of course primarily interested in the German *Fraulein*. After his dreary life in fox holes and his participation in front-line warfare it is probable that any civilian women would have seemed attractive. The blondness of the German girls in contrast to the tendency of the French toward brunette coloring, the adequate wardrobe of the German women in comparison with those of England and France, and the generous and warm attitude of many *Fraulein* did not detract from their desirability in the eyes of the American GI. The fact that the silk stockings and finery had been looted from women in the rest of Europe or that the willing reaction on the part of the *Fraulein* might be an indication of a basic inferiority in character were rarely taken into account. But the ability of German girls to present a fresh and neat appearance in their pastel-colored frocks amid all of the destruction and chaos and lack of housing was frequently commented on.

Despite all of the military police who roamed the countryside in jeeps to enforce the non-fraternization ban, it became increasingly apparent that the American Army would have to give itself to court martialing on an enormous scale and construct gigantic stockades to house the offenders; or wink at what was going on, thus jeopardizing any degree of discipline and order; or modify the non-fraternization ban. Public opinion in the United States continued to demand such a ban and it seemed suicidal for any commanding general in the

European Theatre to ignore its dictates. Yet the other courses presented such serious problems that a responsible commander was most reluctant to accept them. A less able officer than General Eisenhower would perhaps have yielded to the temptation of following the easy way out for the time-being, even though it meant acute weakness in the long run. General Eisenhower, though not addicted to sudden actions without reference to Washington, decided that the situation could only be handled by modifying the ban. Hence it was directed that American personnel might fraternize with German children. This was shortly increased to permit fraternization with Germans of all ages in public places. After a time the ban was more or less dropped entirely and fraternization with Germans in their homes was authorized.

Starting out with an absolute ban on associating with the Germans, the American policy within a few months virtually dropped all pretense of prohibiting social relations between its soldiers and the rank and file of German population. Not only did the official attitude undergo a more or less complete change, but it is probably accurate to say that American GIs and to a less extent officers actually associated with Germans to a distinctly greater degree than did their British, Russian, or French counterparts. The British went along with the Americans in issuing a general non-fraternization ban, but they apparently never attempted to enforce it to the extent of the latter. The Russians and French, being realists of the first order and not bothered by such things as public opinion at home, never encumbered themselves with such a ban; yet their policy actually rather severely limited relations on the part of the rank and file of their military personnel with the German people.

Though the Russians and the French apparently maintained distinctly more general aloofness from the German population than the Americans, they followed quite a different course in the case of influential Germans. In the early days of occupation the American military government received the proffer of aid from various German groups and from important individual Germans. Following the non-fraternization policy it turned these offers down and insisted on relying upon its own resources. Even after the non-fraternization ban had been ended, it still remained the American policy to remain officially aloof from the Germans. GIs could consort with German *Fräulein* without breaking any regulation, but the military govern-

ment officers of the United States were instructed to keep their social relations with German officials to the minimum. Entertaining the German officials upon whom Americans depended to run the German governmental system and to deal with the multifarious problems of occupation at dinner or other social functions was frowned upon, though occasional beer parties seemed to be permissible. In contrast, the Russians and French from the beginning considered it desirable to cultivate certain key Germans. The Germans with whom they dealt were frequently entertained at dinner, given fine houses to live in, and shown distinct marks of favor. American military government officers gave much attention to the past records of Germans whom they associated with, while the Russians and French apparently were not greatly concerned as to whether Germans had remained entirely free from Nazi relations or not: their evaluation was based to a large extent upon what use individual Germans would be to them in the future.

It is rather difficult to understand the American policy of refusing to deal with Germans who promised substantial assistance in carrying out the mission of the United States in Germany. During the early days it was said that we had no way of knowing what Germans were sincerely our friends and therefore that the only safe course to follow was one treating all Germans as dangerous. That is not to say that the American practice was a particularly harsh one, for the instructions from the military governor always stressed dealing fairly with the Germans. And in examining the record it is probably fair to state that none of the Allies dealt more considerately with the Germans as a whole than the United States. The British certainly had a more professional attitude, gained from their long experience with colonial peoples, but they displayed less sentimental concern for German suffering. The Russians and French followed a distinctly harder course as far as the Germans in general were concerned. They lived off the country in contrast to the American and British policy of feeding their forces from imported stocks. They did not hesitate to liquidate Germans whom they regarded as inimical. But as has been pointed out before, they saw fit to extend a high degree of cordiality and favor to those Germans whom they regarded as important to their future interests.

It may be that the American failure to cultivate a selected group of Germans goes back to the lack of assurance on the part of

American top brass.<sup>1</sup> The American military government detachments naturally made considerable use of Germans as interpreters, secretaries, and domestic servants and in addition had daily contact with the German officials of the governments which they controlled. Many of the detachment officers depended rather heavily on Germans—in certain instances too heavily. A good many doubtless maintained German mistresses, though the reports in the press seem exaggerated in this respect. But the top brass did not have anything like as close contacts with the Germans, especially with German public officials. Some of the top brass at least were imbued with the idea that Americans could never be expected to understand German psychology and that the best policy therefore was to remain more or less aloof from all Germans.

There is some reason to believe that American military government lost substantially as a result of its failure to make use of the services of selected Germans. Some of these latter were probably genuinely interested in the democratization of their country and would have labored assiduously in this direction. Others had less worthy motives, but perhaps could have been used to advantage for certain purposes. By refusing the aid of these Germans, sometimes even to the point of rudeness, Americans built up an indifference and even in some instances an enmity which in the long run may make our program more difficult of realization. Though some of those who wanted to help may have been tinged with Communism, which was so feared in American circles, it is possible that they could have been definitely converted to the American brand of democracy. Brushing them aside probably had the effect in many cases of driving them from a position of communist leanings directly into the arms of the Communists.

The American attitude toward refugee Germans has been generally sympathetic as long as the latter remained in the United States or outside of Germany. However, American military government has looked with suspicion on the return of these refugees to Germany. Even before D-Day there were proposals to make use of certain of these German refugees for planning purposes. One project involved the preparation of textbooks for use in German schools by

<sup>1</sup> Certain American officials, such as the late Colonel Dawson, Lt. Clark, USNR, and Dr. Pollock, did maintain quite cordial relations with key Germans, but they were exceptions to the rule.

refugees in the United States. But virtually all of these were turned down for one reason or another. Objection was made that the German refugees were not reliable and could not always be depended upon to support American interests. In the case of the refugees who offered to prepare textbooks and certain other instances it was argued that they had lost touch with psychology in Germany and would be so resented by the German people that they could serve no useful purpose. After V-E Day some German refugees were brought back to the Reich to assist in the labor program. Certain others were occasionally made use of for other purposes, but there was no widespread authorization of their return. It is probable that this policy in general has substantial foundation to support it, though it may have been carried to an extreme. There are individual German refugees in the United States and elsewhere whose experience has been such that they should be able to make a considerable contribution to American efforts in Germany; inasmuch as they have passed tests indicating their anti-Nazi records it would seem that they might be safely employed.

The attitude of the German people has been of constant concern to American military government. During the early days of the occupation at least two organizations, using Gallup Poll techniques, were active in sounding out German public opinion. Some of their reports were interesting, but there was widespread questioning among American military government personnel as to how reliable their findings were. The professional backgrounds of some of those responsible for the polls left something to be desired; the questions which they propounded to the Germans were not always regarded as valid. There was always a doubt in many minds whether a conquered people could be expected to sustain public opinion polls of the variety known in the United States, especially when that people had been regimented and corrupted by the Gestapo and the Nazis over a period of years.

Prior to the entry of Allied forces into Germany it was generally anticipated that the Germans would present so many dangers to the occupying forces that the most careful steps would be required to maintain anything like adequate security. The Nazis were reported to have dug themselves in various redoubts; an extensive underground movement was predicted; werewolves aimed at decimating Allied forces were supposedly lurking in every nook and corner. Even the rank and file of the German people were not regarded as safe. It



was believed by many that Allied military personnel would not be able to venture out of carefully guarded barbed-wire enclosures except in sizable groups and then heavily armed. When military government personnel left France to proceed into Germany, they were frequently given a sad farewell by the French and led to understand that their chances of returning alive were hardly more than 50-50.

Even the most optimistic American military government officials were not prepared for the attitude actually encountered among the Germans. The Nazi plans to establish themselves in redoubts had apparently proved abortive; the werewolves either gave up their roles or were a figment of imagination. The enthusiastic reception given Allied forces by the Germans was sometimes such that it led to acute embarrassment. Instead of taking every precaution to guard against death, higher headquarters had to issue a directive instructing American forces to inform the Germans that they had not come as liberators but as conquerors. But despite the official notification to the Germans of this role, the prevailing attitude toward the Americans was at least superficially friendly. Again and again Germans in high places and low maintained that, irrespective of what the occupying forces might say, the latter were regarded as liberators.

Of course the reaction among the Germans varied widely even during the first days of occupation and as time passed it became even more diverse. Though some Americans felt that they knew what the Germans really felt at any given time, most of the more thoughtful officers were never certain in this matter. They could see the outward signs, but they did not believe that these manifestations were always to be taken at face value. If American military government could have been sure what the Germans believed and how they reacted, much time would have been saved, many mistakes would never have been made, and American accomplishments would doubtless have been more extensive in scope.

Though there were very few instances where there was any suspicion of Germans seriously threatening the safety of Americans during the first year of occupation, the general attitude of the people became somewhat less friendly as the occupation settled down and the people became increasingly aware of the dreary prospects ahead. Even during the first weeks there was a striking difference between the attitudes in various sections, though the unexpected over-all cordiality served to blind the occupying forces somewhat. In the

West, where fighting had been especially heavy and destruction both from bombing and land fighting had frequently caused almost complete devastation, the people were in general less well disposed than in Bavaria. Residents of rural areas where there had been less damage were more cordial than inhabitants of cities which had been laid waste. Those who had lost their relatives and their property were naturally more disposed to be reserved than those who had been more fortunate in these respects. Small children were probably the most friendly and frequently waved vigorously at any passing American. The German youth of the male sex, though less hostile than had been predicted, frequently displayed a sullenness that was noticeable. It was not uncommon to encounter older people who could with difficulty control a snarl.

To begin with, most of the German population were so dazed as a result of the bombing and artillery fire, the destruction of their property, the loss of their relatives, and the shattering of their politico-economic structures that they were hardly conscious of anything else beyond the basic necessities of food and shelter. Many were hysterical and shocked American occupying forces by their grewsome laughter and apparently merry state of mind amid the havoc which surrounded them. In certain cases the relief of having the bombing stopped and of being alive after months of persistent uncertainty was so great that nothing else seemed to matter. As the weeks passed and the military government authorities informed the populace that they could expect no fuel during the coming winter except what they could themselves provide, there was an increasing physical activity to be observed, especially among the middle-aged and aged. Already they had done something to clear away or repair the worst of the wreckage immediately around them; now they devised all sorts of strange tools and often with children's play wagons journeyed to nearby woods, parks, and collapsed buildings in which wooden timbers were to be found to secure for themselves bits of fuel.

The military government personnel was almost always startled by the inability of the rank and file of the Germans to face reality. They not only lacked the initiative to tackle their major problems in many instances, expecting military government or providence to provide, but they simply could not realize that their much-vaunted Reich had collapsed, that the proud Wehrmacht had been defeated,

and that their country had suffered such destruction as had perhaps never before been known. Even in those cases where hysteria and daze were not apparent, Germans repeatedly referred to the future as if the situation would be about what they had known it to be in the past. They of course knew that a central government did not exist and that the Reich had been divided into four zones to be occupied by the Allies; yet they were unable to perceive the implications of all of this. In many respects it seemed that they were as those emerging from a nightmare, but instead of confusing the nightmare with reality, they tended to identify reality with their dreams. As months passed, there of course came more and more recognition of what difficulties the future had in store and it was then that the initial rosiness of occupation disappeared to give way in many instances to a deep depression.

Perhaps the most indelible impression created in the minds of American military government officers by the German populace resulted from the widespread lack of dignity and pride. Here were a people who had flaunted their racial superiority and their Messianic role before the world, who had boasted that their mighty Wehrmacht could demolish all obstacles, who had been so conscious of their own culture that they had denounced Americans as barbarians. Even in the midst of defeat and chaos it might have been expected that they would retain a basic human dignity and pride. But relatively few of them did. The subservience and servility of well educated and economically successful people frequently became such that Allied personnel could hardly escape a feeling of disgust and even repulsion. Many of them cringed and fawned in their routine dealings with the occupying forces. And as for the members of the Wehrmacht who were not in prisoner-of-war camps, it would have been difficult to imagine a more bedraggled and tatterdemalion sight than many of them presented. It was as if the most weathered and battered scarecrows from the fields had been given the barest spark of life and started on a miserable parade through the byways and market places of Germany. Of course there were exceptions. Some of the former Nazi bigwigs were stupid enough to emerge from their holes and display a caricatured cockiness. Prussian countesses descended on the local military government headquarters and arrogantly demanded that their castles be cleared of American military installations. Certain enterprising tradesmen, seeing the opportunities for black mar-

ket dealings, galvanized themselves into an energetic action worthy of promoters anywhere.

The German clergy probably displayed more solid character than any other class. It is true that some of them had trucked to the Nazis, but a sizable proportion had exhibited considerable courage in refusing to capitulate to the most vicious demands of the Hitlerites. Thus they had developed a hardiness of character which withstood even the difficulties of national defeat and Allied occupation. Many of them sought to assist American military government authorities by offering advice and recommending candidates for public offices. Their counsel was not always reliable and in a good many instances led to more or less embarrassment on the part of American military government. But it is probable that the German clergy meant well and acted in good faith in so far as their background permitted. The high prelates at times may have displayed a condescending attitude toward Allied personnel in Germany; various clerics sought special favors for their friends and relatives; but at any rate the German clergy as a whole were not the cringing suppliants so commonplace. Whether they recognized that Germany had committed grievous wrongs against other nations and consequently bore a heavy load of guilt was a controversial question. Certainly they did not sit back apathetically as did so many of their fellow countrymen. German churches, in so far as they were still standing, scheduled religious services as never before. In contrast to the sparse attendance during the Nazi era, most of the churches were crowded, even to worshippers standing in the aisles and sitting on the floor. And the clergy spoke with a vigor if not an authority which was impressive.

Though it is dangerous to generalize as far as German public opinion is concerned, there was reason to believe that the German reaction to the Americans was more favorable during the first weeks of occupation than to any of the other Allies. The British seem to have held a second place and the Russians and French a lower status. The fact that many Germans from the East moved to the American Zone whereas very few left the American Zone to settle themselves in either the Russian or French Zones supports such a conclusion. The United States had long been regarded by the Germans of the pre-Hitler days as par excellence the land of opportunity and even the Nazis recognized the superficial prosperity of the Americans though they denounced this as an indication of weakness

and decadence. With so many Germans having relatives in the United States, it was more or less natural that the initial reaction should have been more favorable toward the American occupation than toward any of the others. Nevertheless, even from the beginning there was a fearful respect for the Russians which could not be ignored and which may have been more fundamental than the more positive attitude toward the Americans. The Germans are impressed by military might as perhaps no other people. They had been told that the Russians would collapse like toy soldiers' before their mighty Wehrmacht; instead the Russians killed approximately three million of their soldiers and civilians, wounded many more, and drained the German army of its lifeblood at a time when the western Allies were still making preparations.

The German people had been impressed by the great quantity of American military armament, by the terrible striking power of American heavy bombers, and by the superior personal equipment and mess of American soldiers. They hoped that the Americans through some legerdemain would restore their devastated cities and bring prosperity to Germany. When the American forces were rapidly demobilized and withdrawn from Germany and American GIs in their anxiety to get home staged demonstrations visible to the German people, when American military morale seemed for a time to be at a very low level and American public opinion at home gave little support to the American military government in Germany, much of this early impact disappeared. Word spread about that the Americans would soon withdraw entirely from Germany and that the Russians would take over. Add this to the disillusionment which came to the Germans when they saw that the American military government did not consider itself a magician with ability to produce rabbits out of the hat and it is not surprising that American stock went down in Germany.

During all of these early months the Russians were proclaiming their superiority over other Allies to the German population. Their radio in Berlin told the Germans throughout Germany every day that the Russian Zone provided a more generous food ration, that the Russians admired German culture and immediately sought to encourage the theatre, music, and other forms of art while the Americans refused to permit theatres to reopen, that the Russians treated Germans whom they approved with great courtesy and consideration

while the Americans refused to so much as shake hands with any German and regarded all Germans as evil, that the Russians had the factories and plants in their zone going at full blast ahead with employment for all while the Americans wanted to destroy German industry. Of course much of this Russian propaganda was not founded on facts<sup>1</sup> and the remainder distorted the situation. But the Germans in the American Zone could see only the complications in that zone and in comparison the Russians on the basis of their claims seemed to offer a distinct advantage.

The early migration from the Russian Zone to the American Zone gave way to a slight movement in the other direction. What was more serious, the attitude on the part of those millions of Germans remaining in the American Zone underwent a change. How much genuine sentiment was built up in favor of the Russians, it was impossible to ascertain. American military government authorities took courage from the election results which showed the Communists in the third place in the various elections held during 1946 in the American Zone. But no one could maintain that the early advantage of the Americans remained untouched; under the circumstances perhaps that was too much to expect.

From the very beginning there was evidence that the Germans would resort to their old game of playing one Ally against another—a device which had been so successful during the occupation of the Rhineland after World War I. Despite the fact that few passenger trains were running, gasoline almost unobtainable for civilians, and transportation in general about as lacking as could be imagined, Germans of various sorts began to visit American military government headquarters at Höchst and Frankfurt to complain of the way the French and Russians were administering their zones. The nearest sections of the Russian and French Zones were quite distant from Höchst and Frankfurt and some of the Germans came from deep within these other zones. How they made the journeys remained a mystery, but they presented themselves almost daily. The tenor of their stories during the early period was that the Russians and

<sup>1</sup> The American-licensed *Neue-Zeitung* in Berlin maintained that despite Russian claims the food ration in the American Zone exceeded that in the Russian Zone. It claimed that the Russians authorized a normal consumer to buy 1,263 calories per day in August, 1946 while the corresponding American ration was 1,330 calories. "Workers" were entitled to 1,639 calories in the Russian Zone and 1,795 in the American Zone. See the *New York Times*, August 19, 1946.

French were stripping their zones of virtually all movable objects, even to hospital equipment, university facilities, and related items. They pled with the Americans as civilized and humane people to avert the calamities which threatened to reduce Germany to a land which had been completely sacked. Some of these Germans related sensational tales involving the conduct of the Russian and French occupational troops toward the populace, with raping highlighted. Doubtless most of these early visits to American military government higher headquarters were spontaneous on the part of the Germans and had little or no suggestion of a concerted attempt to play the Allies against each other. Nevertheless, they pointed to a later organized movement that might entail serious consequences.

## *Chapter 20*    The Berlin District

After prolonged discussion among the Allies it was decided that Berlin would be used as the headquarters of the Allied Control Council for Germany. There were those who advocated a more centrally located place, a site less historically associated with the Nazis and German supernationalism, a city less damaged by bombing than Berlin was thought to be, a position more on the borderline of the American, British, and Russian Zones. Some favored going to a rural spot and constructing an entirely new city; others mentioned Magdeburg and Leipsig. But no other site could be agreed upon and it was finally decided that Berlin would be made use of at least for the time being.

Berlin is situated well within the Russian Zone and it was necessary to set it apart from its surrounding territory and place it under Allied administration. But just what kind of an arrangement should be made was a question which occasioned a great deal of discussion in American and British military government circles and presumably among the Russians also.

With the setting up of the US Group Control Council for Germany and the British Element of the Control Commission for Germany in the summer of 1944, provision was made in both cases for subdivisions to plan the occupation of the Berlin District. The British displayed greater energy in making their organization a going concern and provided a fairly sizable staff to carry on the work of the Berlin District section in contrast to the more or less token provision made by the United States. Moreover, once having decided to establish such an agency as part of the British Element of the Control Commission for Germany, they went ahead on that basis. In the case of the United States there was an unfortunate division of opinion. After delay in staffing the Berlin Area subdivi-



sion of the US Group Control Council for Germany, a working organization was finally achieved. But certain elements in the European Theatre did not look favorably on this arrangement. An American Berlin Area military government force was subsequently set up in France with an assignment to move forward at the appropriate time to occupy Berlin. The British made a similar provision, but they integrated this unit with the subdivision of their British Element in London. There was supposed to be a tenuous connection between the two American agencies, but relations were actually characterized by rivalry and a competition for the most advantageous position. The American Berlin Area force on the continent won out in this contest and built up a large staff, leaving the section of the US Group Control Council for Germany to exist for some months as a mere shell and eventually forcing its abandonment.

After a stay of several months at Fontainebleau, south of Paris, the American and British Berlin Area units moved up toward Germany. But instead of pushing onward, they were held up for weeks until the Russians got around to agreeing to their entry into Berlin. With the time passing after the Russians succeeded in quelling the street fighting in Berlin, it seemed to some observers that the British and American groups would not be authorized by the Soviet Union to proceed to their destination and it was predicted that these organizations might not be used or at least that they would have to be shifted to another location. But the Russians eventually agreed to their going forward and in the early summer of 1945 they actually entered Berlin.

The early planning for the administration of the Berlin District was severely handicapped by the lack of a Russian counterpart to the American and British Berlin Area units. It was not generally known at the time that the Russians would be the first to occupy Berlin of course, but even so it was apparent that their desires would play an important role in the program to be followed. The relations between the British and American forces were such that each could know what the other was doing, but there was no way of ascertaining the Russian attitude, despite various attempts which were made.

The big question as far as the American and British Berlin Area units were concerned was whether there should be a joint control of Berlin or whether there should be a division into three sectors, with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union each attempt-

ing to administer a sector (the French had not yet been admitted to the undertaking). The strictly military point of view generally favored the latter course of action, with distinct national responsibility over a given area. The staff members with experience in public administration, especially with municipal background, did not see how a great city could be divided up into sectors and operated by parts. They pointed out that water systems in cities are not constructed so as to be run on the basis of national sectors. Nor are sanitary systems and public utilities adapted to such an arrangement. Certain functions, such as waste removal, education, public safety, and public finance, might conceivably be handled on a sector basis, but most of the public administrators looked with distinct doubt on such a provision. The early planning was based on the joint control of Berlin, though it was admitted that there would probably have to be areas set aside for the use of the occupying troops of the three Allies.

As the time neared when the occupation would be put into effect, it became increasingly clear that the relations among the three Allies were not such as to permit a thorough-going joint control of Berlin, irrespective of the desirability of treating Berlin as a unit. Fortunately the governmental structure of Berlin was of such a character as to fit into a compromise arrangement with national sectors supplemented by an Allied administration for the control of certain over-all functions. Under the Germans Berlin had been organized in a fashion more like New York and London than the typical American municipality. It had a central government to deal with various problems of a city-wide character, but it also had a fairly large number of areal subdivisions (*Besirke*), each with a *Bürgermeister* and several administrative departments.<sup>1</sup> As in New York City and London, these governments within a government had jurisdiction over streets and other local matters. It was finally agreed among the three Allies that an Allied *Kommandatura* would be set up to deal with over-all problems in the Berlin District and that the city would be divided into three sectors, which would be occupied and controlled by the forces of the respective nations.

Under this arrangement the Soviet Union retained the eastern part of Berlin which included *Unter den Linden*, most of the national government buildings, many of the industrial sections, and the largest

<sup>1</sup> There are twenty of these *Besirke* in Berlin.

number of inhabitants. The northwest area was assigned to the British and the southwest to the United States. But before a great deal had been accomplished, the French persuaded the United States and Britain that they should be permitted to participate in the occupation of Berlin. The Soviet Union reluctantly agreed to this arrangement, though it was not willing to have its sector reduced in size in order to carve out a sector for the French. The United States and Britain then proceeded to adjust their sectors in such a manner as to provide a comparatively small sector in the northern part of the city for French occupation. After four sectors had been set up, the Russians continued to have the eastern area and the largest territory and population;<sup>1</sup> the British occupied the west;<sup>2</sup> the United States the southwest;<sup>3</sup> and the French a portion of the north.<sup>4</sup>

Despite the reports that Berlin had been completely destroyed by Allied bombing and then further devastated by Russian artillery fire, it still remained sufficiently intact to provide a home for approximately three million Germans. *Unter den Linden* was hardly to be recognized by those who had strolled down its tree-lined course before the war; the *Tiergarten* with its fox holes and blasted trees resembled a bitterly contested battle field rather than a world-renowned park. Many of the public buildings were so badly damaged that it seemed doubtful whether they could be repaired. The streets were choked with debris and the *U-bahn* (subway) had been pierced at various points by bombs and large sections in the downtown area flooded. The water and sanitary systems had been badly damaged and the public utilities partially destroyed. Nevertheless, in comparison with the old part of Nuremberg, Wurzburg, Mannheim, and certain other cities in Germany, Berlin was reasonably well off, despite the early reports.


American military government anticipated that it would be necessary to bring in huts and prefabricated structures both for its offices and billets on the basis of aerial photographs and various intelligence reports, but it found that existing structures in Berlin would provide adequate housing. The Tempelhof air field in the American Sector was badly damaged, but the Zehlendorf area, perhaps the best residential part of Berlin, had a good many buildings that were only

<sup>1</sup> The Russians have 8 *Besirke* in their sector.

<sup>2</sup> The British have 4 *Besirke* in their sector.

<sup>3</sup> The United States has 6 *Besirke* in her sector.

<sup>4</sup> The French have 2 *Besirke* in their sector.



Prepared by the State Department

## THE BERLIN DISTRICT

superficially hurt. The rambling *Luftwaffe* buildings in the latter area provided the best offices the US Group CC for Germany had ever had. Though so commodious that they covered several acres of ground, they were intact except for broken window panes and cracked plaster. Many of the fine residences in the vicinity were also in good shape and provided probably the most sumptuous living quarters that American generals had ever known either at home or abroad. The offices of the American headquarters of the Berlin District were less elaborate than those noted above and somewhat more damaged, located as they were in a large industrial building, but they were commodious and modern.

The responsibility for controlling the American Sector was lodged in the commanding general of the American tactical forces in Berlin. The G-5 section of his headquarters, staffed by a colonel and various specialist officers in the fields of trade and industry, food, public utilities, public health, education, governmental structure, and so forth, exercised the active responsibility of controlling German governmental agencies in the sector. Military government detachments, also with a commanding officer and various specialist officers, were to begin with placed in direct charge of the various German borough governments within the American Sector. Thus far the pattern was not unlike that to be found in the general military government setup in the American Zone.

The most significant aspect of military government in Berlin is that involving the over-all control. An Allied *Kommandatura* (*Kommendatura*) was set up, with headquarters in a modern building in the American Sector. It is composed of the four Allied commanders in the Berlin District, their deputies, their chief military government officers, and a secretariat staffed by officers assigned by the four Allied armies. This agency fixes general policies for the administration of Berlin, seeks to settle any differences among the Allies arising out of the Berlin District, and supervises the German officials who have city-wide jurisdiction. The four Allied commanders rotate on a monthly basis as presidents of the *Kommandatura*. Various committees composed of representatives of the four Allies deal with certain matters not suitable for general action.

The weekly meetings of the *Kommandatura* are held in the morning and last anywhere from approximately an hour to more than two hours. They convene in a rather impressively furnished

room in the headquarters building. The Allied commanders, their deputies, their military government chiefs, their interpreters, and the respective representatives on the secretariat have seats around a long polished table. Representatives from the Foreign Offices and State Department, officers present to discuss current business, observers, and others occupy chairs arranged around the sides of the room. An agenda prepared by the secretariat and circulated beforehand among the various Allied staffs serves to control the order of business. Considering the fact that proceedings are carried on in three languages: Russian, French, and English, one would expect very long-drawn out sessions of a tedious character. Actually the interpreters have been so skillful and the stress on informality such that business moves along fully as rapidly as in many public bodies in the United States. The vigorous brilliance of the Russians' presentation and discussion, the natural eloquence of the French, the well chosen and carefully modulated words of the British, and the less suave but straight to the point utterances of the Americans combine into proceedings that frequently made a very favorable impression on observers. The Russians may take more than their share of the time, but they usually speak so well that it is not ordinarily objectionable. The French, occupying as they do a minor section and desiring equal status with the other Allies, perhaps tend to display the unpleasant characteristics of an inferiority complex, but one can forgive them most of this because of their difficult experiences at the hands of the Germans.

The Russians had selected the first public officials of Berlin before the other Allies were invited to enter the city. In the national sectors the British, Americans, and French continued those Germans chosen by the Russians as far as they deemed it desirable, but they did not hesitate to make replacements if it suited their convenience. However, in the case of the Germans who held the city-wide positions and who were responsible to the *Kommandatura* rather than to the various national military governments in the sectors no major change was made until elections held in the fall of 1946.<sup>1</sup> Having been named in the first place by the Russians, it was more or less natural for these German officials to look primarily to the Russians, even after the other Allies arrived to share responsibility for the administration of

<sup>1</sup> In the election held in 1946 the Communists were decisively defeated in Berlin.

the Berlin District. When an American, British, or French general served as president of the *Kommandatura* and therefore supposedly instructed the German chief executive of Berlin as to the decisions of the *Kommandatura*, it was alleged that the Russians actually dominated that official. There was evidence that the German chief executive and the principal administrative officers in Berlin were in intimate contact with the Russians while their relations with the other Allies were more formal and casual.

The Russians undoubtedly feel that they have a special interest in the Berlin District. They conquered it to begin with, though many American officers believed that it could have been taken by American forces at an earlier date if freedom of action had been permitted. Russian graves occupy commanding sites throughout the city, for, instead of gathering their fallen soldiers for burial in a single place, the Russians simply had graves dug in front yards, gardens, along sides of streets, in the center of streets, or wherever their comrades fell. These graves were later marked with red poles bearing the name and other data relating to the fallen Russians. The Berlin District is of course situated in the Russian Zone and separated from any other zone by many miles of Russian-occupied territory. The Soviet Union controls the German territory which had supplied Berlin with its fresh vegetables, its milk, and much of its other food; now that the British, French, and Americans held sectors in Berlin the Russians were not desirous of providing food except for their own sector. Supplies brought in by the other Allies have to be carried by railroads running through the Russian Zone and the Soviet Union desired to remove some of the tracks to the east. The Russians had proceeded to open the theatres and schools before the other Allies arrived. Later they attempted to combine the Social Democratic party with the Communist Party on their own initiative.

Considering the complications, it is remarkable that the administration of the Berlin District has proceeded as smoothly as the record shows. There were numerous differences of opinion as to what should be done. Some knotty problems have remained on the agenda of the *Kommandatura* indefinitely. Progress in restoring adequate sanitary facilities and a safe water supply was perhaps slower than it would have been under strictly American jurisdiction. Nevertheless, more had been done by the Russians in clearing streets of debris before the arrival of the other Allies than at a corresponding time in certain

cities in the American Zone. All in all, the experience in the Berlin District seems to indicate that the four Allies can work together with some degree of success to deal with complicated problems, at least if the political level is not too high.



## *Chapter 21 Conclusion*

The United States has a great stake in Germany whether we like it or not. Because of ultranationalistic regimes pushing Germany on to international aggression we have fought two world wars in a quarter of a century. We have sacrificed tens of thousands of lives and dedicated many months of the best years of millions of our citizens to the purpose of coping with the German military menace. More than that, the United States has expended fabulous sums in financing these wars and built up enormous public indebtedness which will in all probability constitute a heavy burden on its people for generations to come. For a period of more than three years the energy of the entire nation was concentrated on the defeat of Germany and Japan. Since V-E Day much additional time and strength has been given to the problem of reconverting to a peacetime status. In light of all of this it would seem that even the last American would appreciate the stern necessity of dealing with the future of Germany in as adequate a manner as can possibly be devised. The most elemental common sense points in the direction of taking every precaution that our investment in lives and capital has not been in vain.

Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that large numbers of Americans have very little realization of the vital relationship of what happens in Germany to our own future as well as to the peace of the world. A few may be heard who say that they don't see how the United States permitted herself to be drawn into war with Germany, that Hitler and his unholy crew should have been supported as bulwarks against the Russian menace. A much larger number are so tired of war service, war regimentation, war shortages, and war excitement that they seek to forget the German problem and every-

thing else unpleasant in their search for personal relief and satisfaction. The more mercenary citizens are sometimes so anxious to devote themselves wholeheartedly to capitalizing on the immediate market in the United States that they can find no time to give to anything outside of their little rut, to say nothing of Germany. Then there are those sentimental persons who hearing of the awful devastation and the grim suffering in Germany allow themselves to forget the Nazi barbarism and the brutality of large numbers of Germans and think only of the present. There are the GIs who smarting under their recollections of harsh treatment while in uniform resent any mention of problems remaining from the war. Certain officers and men who served in the armed forces of the United States in out of the way places where there was little or no action and it was difficult to keep up with what was going on in the world have emerged from uniform with a Rip Van Winkle complex which causes them to be oblivious to Germany. One brand of politicians in Washington anxious to get back to the good old days of domestic issues welcome an opportunity to shove the German problem aside.

The net result is that there is wide indifference rather than alert interest in what goes on in Germany. Washington at times seems to be willing to give its attention to anything under the sun rather than to consideration of a program for Germany. Congress appropriates niggardly sums to support reconstruction efforts in the Reich. Most of the newspapers in the United States have long since ceased giving more than the most cursory attention to what goes on in American military government in Germany. The military government specialist officers return home from Germany, but little or no organized program has been approved to replace them. Responsibility for the civil administration of Germany instead of being concentrated in a single agency in Washington is divided. Lip service is given in high places to the first-rate importance of Germany, but little progress is made in providing the necessary machinery to carry out American commitments in Germany.

Some of this inattention is doubtless due to the inevitable reaction that sets in after an enemy has been defeated. The nation has goaded itself onward to the point of great weariness if not exhaustion, and it must pause for a time to rest. In any war effort as vast as the one in which the United States has recently been involved there is bound to be confusion in moving from active warfare to the

postwar period. In fairness to Congress and the President it must be pointed out that there are large numbers of domestic problems demanding attention. The State Department, long a very small agency and sadly undermanned, was suddenly transformed into a large department with a sizable staff. It is difficult for it to develop an administrative system which permits effective action; it has had to take on numerous officials with relatively little experience or impressive expertness. The American way of doing things is responsible in some measure for the division of authority as far as German affairs go and for the delay in providing for a long-range program.

One cannot refrain from regret that the United States has not made more progress in dealing with Germany since V-E Day, but it is still possible to take action. Elections in 1946 would seem to indicate that the American electorate has not withdrawn to a position of supporting members of Congress who ignore international affairs. As domestic reconversion becomes complete, we may shuffle off the earlier preoccupation with home problems and find time to devote to the foreign field. Washington after long delay may reach the point where it perfects an organization to carry out the American policy of reeducating the Germans and democratizing the German Reich to such an extent that future German aggression will be prevented.

If this is to be achieved, there must be developed an awareness and interest on the part of the American people. For under the system which operates in the United States it is essential that there be public backing for any far-reaching program of an effective character. The newspapers and other organs of public opinion must assume their share of responsibility by reporting on the American operations in Germany and more than that by assigning newsmen with instructions to prepare comprehensive reports on what goes on rather than cable the scandals and mistakes only.

Contrary to common impression, the United States has already made substantial preparations which if implemented should be very useful in carrying out American responsibilities in Germany. The establishment of a Civil Affairs Division in the War Department during the early stages of the war and the authorization of a specialist military government organization for Germany at a time when manpower shortages were acute were more significant than is generally recognized. Few people are aware of the great amount of time and thought given by such agencies as the German Country Unit of

SHAEF, the US Group Control Council for Germany, and the G-5 staffs of SHAEF and USFET in planning for the American occupation of Germany. Many mistakes have been made, some inevitable, some perhaps unnecessary, in American occupation operations in Germany, but at the same time a great amount of faithful and reasonably effective effort has been put forth. None of the Allies has done more in the way of planning and preliminary preparations than the United States; indeed with the possible exception of Great Britain none can equal the United States in this respect. Thus there is a good if not a perfect foundation upon which to build.

Perhaps the most essential step which needs to be taken in this field is the general recognition in the United States that we must commit ourselves to a program in Germany covering a period of at least ten years. As long as there is uncertainty as to whether we will remain in Germany beyond the immediate future, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to build up an organization which can be expected to prosecute American aims with real vigor. It is of course impossible at this time to fix an exact date at which American occupation will terminate, that is, unless we withdraw shortly, write off our enormous investment, and leave the German problem to go unheeded. Military government personnel in Germany is not agreed as to how long an effective occupation must extend. The Russians apparently think of fifty years or possibly an indefinite stay; the British and French frequently argue for at least twenty-five years. Americans ordinarily regard these periods as too lengthy, maintaining that unless reeducation and democratization can be carried well forward in a shorter time than that it seems improbable that they can be achieved at all. However, very few Americans after serving in military government units in Germany believe that an occupation of less than ten to fifteen years can be expected to accomplish much. A period of four or five years would leave the program so incomplete and without support that it would be as well to withdraw at once. On the other hand, there is a widespread feeling among Americans in Germany that it is possible to prolong the occupation beyond the point where it would serve a useful purpose. An occupation of a quarter of a century or longer might not only tend toward too great subsequent dependence on the part of the Germans on Allied control, but it would perhaps stir up sufficient animosity on the part of the population to have the effect of defeating the democratization efforts.

A second essential is the establishment at the earliest possible time of a civil administration to direct American reconstruction efforts in Germany. That is not to say that the Army will not have a role to play, for as long as there is an American occupation of Germany it will be essential to have the Army assume responsibility for security. But as General Eisenhower pointed out before he gave over the post of American military governor in Germany and commanding general of American forces in the European Theatre and Lt. General Clay has more recently stated, military forces are not intended to administer long-range reconstruction programs. During the combat period and during the months immediately following the fighting, military government is probably the only effective method of dealing with civilian problems in occupied territory. But it is not well fitted to carry on beyond the early stages. Army organization, background and techniques were never designed to handle long-range occupation problems except for security. Experienced civil administrators assisted by an adequate number of civilian specialists in the various fields are then required to take over the job of reconstruction. That is not to say that some of those who have served in military government should not be used at a later stage. Many of the specialist officers in military government are primarily civilians and have come from wide experience in various civilian fields related to occupation. They have put on the uniform because they could best serve their country as part of the armed forces during hostilities. With the war over, there is no reason why those who have served effectively in uniform cannot, if they wish, transfer to civilian positions in the occupation.

Instead of following the counsel of General Eisenhower, Washington allowed the situation in Germany to drift. The State Department had been earmarked to take over the job of a civil administration in Germany, but Secretary Byrnes after months of delay informed the War Department that his agency was not prepared to assume that responsibility. With no other provision made, the Army was compelled to continue military government in Germany, though the time had passed when the strictly military phase should have been kept in effect. Taking into account the difficulties encountered by the State Department in getting itself organized to handle administrative problems and the heavy responsibilities which it has to bear in connection with peace conferences and the United Nations, it

is probably just as well that it did not assume the task of organizing a civil administration for Germany. What is needed is a separate agency which, while working in close collaboration with the State Department and the Army, will have direct responsibility for administering the American occupation in Germany. The exact form of such an agency is a matter which would permit some leeway. It would seem that an Office of Occupied Areas might well be attached to the Executive Office of the President. But the main thing is to authorize a transition from military government in Germany to a civil administration and to place such an American administration directly under a single civil agency in Washington.

It should be obvious that an American civil administration for Germany would require reasonably adequate appropriations from Congress and the authorization to recruit a well trained staff on a permanent civil service basis. The amounts of money involved are infinitesimal in comparison with what has already been spent to defeat Germany and only the most short-sighted and niggardly citizen can advocate penny-pinching in this important field. No American civil administration can hope to carry on an effective program unless it has a staff which combines administrative ability with professional expertness and a substantial knowledge of German politico-socio-economic problems. The job to be done is by no means a routine task which can be performed by any industrious and honest set of officials. It calls for maturity, broad experience of a successful character in the United States, imagination, tact, courage, vigor, mastery of the details of at least one professional field, and familiarity with German language, psychology, and institutions. More than that, a sort of missionary zeal is desirable, for the complications are such that faith in the possibility of accomplishing more than ordinary things is almost essential. Of course the supply of people of this type is not large; indeed it is probably inadequate to staff an American civil administration in Germany. But those who are available will hesitate to sever their connections with jobs in the United States unless they can expect reasonable security. This can be provided only by placing them in the category of permanent civil service employees of the government. In so far as the available supply is not sufficient to meet the needs, a training program should be set up to provide qualified persons and the success of this would depend in no small measure upon civil service status for the positions.

The final point to be raised is that relating to the unification of Germany. No one can deny that the carrying out of the programs of education and democratization in Germany and indeed the broader problem of restoring stability in Europe depend in large measure on the cooperation of the four Allied nations. If Russia and France continue to refuse to join the United States and Britain in dealing with Germany as a whole, then the future becomes distinctly blacker. There are those who allege that Russia intends to absorb eastern Germany at least and has her eye on Germany as a whole, in the capacity of a Russian satellite. France is so gripped by future apprehensions and so preoccupied with her past suffering at the hands of the Germans that she finds it difficult to react in an objective fashion. While no thoughtful person can ignore the possibility of Russian ulterior motives, that does not mean that the United States should desist from prosecuting the program in her own zone as far as possible and that she should not endeavor in so far as possible to collaborate with the Russians in dealing with over-all German problems. If the Soviet Union does not eventually see fit to join in a program of unification, the record of the United States will at least have been clear and there is some chance that the program in the western part of Germany may accomplish substantial results.

# Index

## A

- "A" detachments, 58-59
- ASTP, 38-39
- Aachen, military government experience at, 134-135
- Adjutant General, OMGUS, 47
- Administrative courts, 170
- Agriculture. *See* Food
- Air Division, US Group CC (OMGUS), 151-152
- Allied Control Council for Germany, 4, 45, 46, 67 f., 70 ff., 189 ff.
- American Sector, Berlin, 254-255, 256
- Anhalt, State of, 177
- Archives, activity of military government relating to, 128
- Areal instruction, 10-12
- Armed Forces Division, OMGUS, 47
- Armies, role in military government, 50
- Army Ground Division, US Group CC, 151-152
- Army Groups, role in military government, 48-49, 52
- Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), 38-39
- Assignment boards, 15-16
- Assimilated rank, problem of, 213
- Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, 41, 74, 77, 209
- Assistant Secretary of War, 41
- Atlantic Charter, 167-168
- Autonomous German states, military government attitude toward, 173-174
- Autonomy, problem in military organization, 75-76
- Auxiliary Foreign Service Officers in military government, 216 f.

## B

- "B" detachments, 58 f.
- Banks, 108, 125
- Basic German Handbook*, 18

- Bavaria, State of, 52, 54, 63, 95, 100, 177, 190, 245
- Belgian Mission of SHAEF, 19
- Berlin, District Military Government, 4, 251-259; *Beowke* (boroughs), 253; American, British, French, Russian sectors, 254-255, 256
- "Black" lists, 92
- Boston University, CATS at, 7-8
- Bremen Enclave, 224-225
- British Element, Control Commission for Germany, 71-72, 121, 169
- British role in military government in Germany, 4, 38, 64, 77, 144, 182, 185, 204, 240, 257
- British Sector, Berlin, 254-255
- British Zone, 123, 190 f., 196, 240, 247
- Brunswick, State of, 177
- "Bungling," press charge of, 198
- Bushey Park, London, 43
- Byrnes, James F., statement at Stuttgart, 196, 202, 206 f.; address in Paris, 207

## C

- "C" detachments, 58, 59-60
- CATS, 7-8, 9
- COSSAC, 68
- Central Reich administrative agencies, 174-175
- Chicago Daily News*, 232
- Chief of Staff, SHAEF, 44, 74, 98, 192; OMGUS, 47
- Christian Democratic Union, 180, 182
- Christian Science Monitor*, 232
- Christian Socialist Union, 182
- Civil Administration Division, US Group CC (OMGUS), 169-170, 171 f., 179, 183
- Civil administrative agency as control device, 264
- Civil Affairs Division of War Department, 6, 17, 20, 41, 58, 74 f., 197, 199, 203, 260, 262



- Civil Affairs Training Schools, 7-8, 9  
 Civil War, American, military government in, 1-2  
 Civilians, German, control by military government, 80 f.; US, use by military government, 192  
 Clark, Lieut. Dale, USNR, 242 n.  
 Clay, Lieut. Gen. Lucius D., 26-28, 55, 144  
 Clergy, German, military government relations with, 92, 133-134  
 Combat phase of military government, 79-87  
 Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 68  
 Combined Intelligence Department (CID), 18  
 Command channel in military government, 48-49, 52-53  
 Commanding General of American Forces in European Theatre, 42, 52, 200, 210  
 Communication facilities, military government activities relating to, 114-115, 128  
 Communist Party, 180, 183, 257, 258  
 ComNavEu, Military Government and Civil Affairs Section of, 223-224  
 Conferences of Foreign Ministers, 67, 70  
 Conflict between headquarters, problem in military government, 45-46  
 Constitutions for *Länder*, 177, 185  
 Control Officer, OMGUS, 47  
 Coordinating Committee of Allied Control Council, 70-71  
 Corps, role in military government, 50  
 Council of States (*Länderrat*), 56, 64, 74-75, 99-100  
 Counterintelligence, 91 f., 141  
 Courts, military government activities relating to German, 108-109, 125; administrative, 170  
 Cultural field, military government activities relating to, 124, 159 ff.  
 Curfew violators, problem of, 109  
 Curriculum for training military government personnel, 7-11, 13, 15  
     categories in, 143-144; tribunals (Geiman), 143-144  
 Deputy Military Governor, 47  
 Detachments (teams), military government, 58-61  
 Direct administration by military government, 93-94  
 Directives, 235-236  
 Director of Administrative Services, OMGUS, 47  
 Directorates, of Allied Control Council, 71; of Council of States, 74  
 Displaced persons, 80, 105-108, 121-122  
 Divisions, Army, role in military government, 50-51  
 Doenitz government, 90  
 Duration of occupation, 263  
 Dutch Mission of SHAEF, 19
- E
- "E" detachments, 58-59  
 Eastbourne, British Civil Affairs Training School in, 16  
 Eastern Military District, 52  
 Economic Adviser, OMGUS, 47  
 Economic affairs, 72-73, 74, 90, 112-113, 132, 186  
 Economic Division, OMGUS, 47; US Group CC, 192-194, 195  
 Economic planning, 187-196  
 Education and Religious Affairs Division, German Country Unit, 148-151  
 Education Branch, US Group CC (OMGUS), 151-159  
 Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D., 3, 24-25, 122, 240, 264  
 Election codes, 179  
 Elections, 103, 170, 179-180, 181 f., 185, 220-221  
 Emergency repairs, responsibility for, 104-105  
 Emergency supplies, responsibility for, 81, 84  
 Enlisted personnel, 37-40  
 European Advisory Commission, (EAC), 68, 197, 210, 227  
 European Civil Affairs Division (ECAD), 38, 42, 51-52  
 Evaluation of military government record, during combat period, 86-87; during intermediate period, 115-116; during final period, 129  
 Expellees. *See* Refugees  
 Extermination, proposal of, 166
- "D" detachments, 58, 60  
 Danish Mission of SHAEF, 19  
 Dawson, Col. W. W., 242 n.  
 Democratization, military government program of, 165-186  
 Denazification, 74, 76, 79, 102, 130-146, 220; Review Board, OMGUS, 47;

## F

- "F" detachments, 58-59  
 Federalism, military government attitude toward, 174, 176-177  
 Field organization in military government, 57-65  
 Finance Adviser, OMGUS, 47  
 Finance Division, OMGUS, 47  
 Financial institutions, 108, 125, 126  
 First Army, 58  
 Food, and agriculture, 74, 82, 90, 109-111, 112, 123-124, 132; ration, 111 f.  
 Foreign Economic Administration (FEA), 190  
 Foreign Service Officers in military government, 216  
 Fort Custer Provost Marshal General's School for training military government officers, 7 ff.  
*Fragebogen*, 141, 143  
 Frankfort Enclave, 97-98  
 Fraternalization, problem of, 237-242  
 French Mission of SHAEF, 19  
 French role in military government in Germany, 4, 64, 67 f., 72, 99, 144, 182, 185, 240, 241, 257  
 French Sector, Berlin, 254-255  
 French Zone, 120, 141 n., 249 f.  
 Fuhrer's Chancellery, 220

## G

- "G" detachments, 59-60  
 G-2, SHAEF and USFET, 219  
 G-4, SHAEF and USFET, 193, 195  
 G-5, Army Groups, 48-49, 52; Armies, 50  
 G-5, USFET, 18, 28, 35-36, 37, 39, 45, 52 f., 74 f., 152 ff., 183, 192, 197, 227, 233, 235, 263; SHAEF, 28, 35-36, 37, 39, 46-48, 49 f., 52 f., 58, 74, 95, 133, 152 ff., 192, 197, 202, 226 f., 233, 235, 263  
 General officers, assignment to military government, 23-31  
 German civil service, reorganization by military government, 102, 170, 184  
 German Country Unit of SHAEF, 17-18, 19-20, 42-43, 45, 130 f., 139 f., 149, 237, 262-263; Government and Administration Section, 168  
 German Foreign Office, 219  
 German people, attitude toward military government, 243-250  
 Greater Hesse, new State of, 99  
 "Grey" lists, 92

## H

- "H" detachments, 58, 60  
*Handbook for Military Government in Germany*, 19-20, 43, 130 ff.  
 Harvard University, CATS at, 7 ff.  
 Headquarters for military government field detachments, 85-86  
 Hesse, State of, 97-99, 101, 175  
 Hessen-Nassau, Province of, 97 ff.  
 Hildring, Maj. Gen. John H., 203, 210  
 Hoover, Calvin, 194  
 Housing, 125  
*Hunt Report*, 117-118

## I

- "I" detachments, 58, 60  
 Industrial production, 194-195  
 Industry, level fixed by Potsdam Agreement, 188  
 Information control, military government activities relating to, 115, 160 f.  
 Information Control Office, OMGUS, 47  
 Intelligence, in military government, 233-235  
 Intelligence Office, OMGUS, 47  
 Interdivisional Committee on Reconstruction of German Government, US Group CC, 171-172  
 Intermediate phase of military government, 104-116  
 Internal Affairs and Communications Division, OMGUS, 47  
 Italy, military government in, 3-4

## J

- JCS papers*, 43, 76, 135, 137, 168, 178, 187, 235  
 Japan, military government in, compared with military government in Germany, 3-5, 89-90  
 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 41, 43, 74, 135 ff., 168, 197, 199, 209, 212  
 Joint Economic Administration, US and British Zones, 72-73, 192, 196

## K

- Kommandatura* (Berlin), 253, 256 ff.  
 Kurhessen, Province of, 97-99

## L

- Labor Adviser, OMGUS, 47  
 Labor supply, 81, 84

Labor unions, 126, 205  
*Land* Bavaria Military Government Detachment, 221, 231  
*Lander*, as units for military government control, 55, 63-65; constitutions for, 177, 185  
*Landerrat*. See Council of States  
 Language instruction given military government personnel, 10  
 "Law for the Liberation of National Socialism or Militarism," 143  
 Legal Adviser, *OMGUS*, 47  
 Legal Division, US Group CC (*OMGUS*), 47, 141  
 Liaison and Security teams, 63, 65  
 Lippe, State of, 177  
 Lippmann, Walter, 147 f., 162  
 Local Government and Civil Service Section, US Group CC, 169  
 Local self-government, 177-178, 179  
 Long-range objectives in military government, 117-121

## M

McCloy, John J., Assistant Secretary of War, 202  
 McNarney, Gen. Joseph, 122  
 Manchester pool, 39  
 Manpower, Division, *OMGUS*, 47; registration, 126  
 Manuals, military government, 17-20  
 Medical education, 157  
 Mexican War, military government in, 1  
 Military jealousy, 48  
 Minister Presidents, 74, 95  
 Mission of military government, 79-106  
 Mobilized Police Force of US, 127-128  
 Morale, in military government, 116  
 Morgenthau, former Secretary of Treasury Henry, influence on military government, 20, 131 f., 166 ff., 187, 189, 204, 207, 237 f.  
 Movies, 162-163, 164  
 Murphy, Robert, 214-216

## N

National Socialist Party, liquidation of, 219-220  
 Naval Adviser, *OMGUS*, 47  
 Naval Division, US Group CC, 151-152, 228  
 Naval School of Military Government and Administration, 223, 228

Navy, role in military government in Germany, 223-229  
 Nazism, scope in Germany, 135, 136  
*New York Times*, 232  
 Newsmen, US, in Germany, 232  
 Newspapers, issued by Information Control in Germany, 161, 162, 164  
 Ninth Army, 58  
 North Africa, military government activities in, 3-4, 6  
 North Africa and Mediterranean Theatre, military government activities in, 3-4  
 Northwestern University, CATS at, 7-8  
 Norwegian Mission of SHAEF, 19

## O

*OMGUS*, 46-47, 53 ff., 74, 141, 154, 170, 183, 192, 195, 197, 206, 221, 227, 235  
 OSS, 17-18, 91 f., 131, 133, 139  
 Objectives of military government in Germany, 117-121  
 Office of Military Government for Germany (US). See *OMGUS*  
 Office of Strategic Services. See OSS  
 Officers assigned to military governments, qualifications of, 31-37  
 Oldenburg, State of, 177  
 Organization of military government, 41-78

## P

Party Chancellery, 219  
 Patch, Lieut. Gen. A. M., 25-26  
 Patterson, Robert P., Undersecretary of War, 203  
 Patton, Gen. George, Jr., 25-26, 138  
 Personal influence of American military personnel, 184-185  
 Personnel, in military government, 35-36  
 Personnel Officer, *OMGUS*, 47  
 Plans, military government, 201 ff.  
 Policy, American, in Germany, 197-208  
 Political activity, 179-183, 220  
 Political Adviser, *OMGUS*, 47  
 Political advisers, 210-211  
 Political consciousness, in military government, 120-121  
 Political Division (Office of Political Affairs), US Group CC (*OMGUS*), 18, 74, 121, 139, 159, 168, 171 f., 183, 212 f., 214-222, 227

Political parties, 180 ff., 205, 258  
 Pollock, Dr. J. K., 242 n.  
 Posthostility period, 52 ff.  
 Potsdam Agreement, 99, 187 f., 191, 205  
 Potsdam Conference, 43, 67, 108, 174, 184, 187 f., 205, 235  
 Presidential Chancellery, 220  
 Prisoners of war (German), 110-111, 127  
 Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons Division, OMGUS, 47  
 Provost Marshal General, Office of, Military Government Section, 6  
 Provost Marshal General's School for Training Civil Affairs Officers at Fort Custer, Michigan, 7 ff.  
 Prussia, attitude of military government toward, 174, 176-177  
 Psychological Warfare, 115, 159 ff.  
 Psycho-neurotics, assignment to military government, 39  
 Public health, 113  
 Public Information Services, 47, 115, 160 f.  
 Public opinion polls, use of, in Germany, 162  
 Public relations, in military government, 230-232  
 Public Relations Office, OMGUS, 47; US Group CC, 219  
 Public safety, 81, 127-128  
 Public Safety Division (Branch), US Group CC, 139  
 Public welfare, 113  
 Public works, 124-125

## Q

Qualifications of military government personnel, 22-23  
 Quebec Conference, 43, 66 f., 168, 204, 235

## R

Radio programs in Germany, 161-162, 164  
 Railroads, 124  
 Rank consciousness, in military government, 29-30  
 Rationing system, 111, 123  
 Reeducation, 147-164  
 Refugees, from Eastern Europe, 122-123; German, 242-243  
*Regierungspräsidenten*, 95 f.  
 Reich Chancellery, 220

Reich ministries, dispersal of, 88-89  
 Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, 159  
 Reich Ministry of Science, Education, and Popular Culture, 149  
 Religious affairs, 114  
*Report of Military Governor, US Zone*, 234  
 Rhineland, 190  
 Ruhr, 190  
 Russian role in military government in Germany, 4, 72, 144, 155 f., 182, 185, 190-191, 204, 207, 240 f., 247-248, 249, 257  
 Russian Sector, Berlin, 254-255  
 Russian Zone, 73, 123, 185, 191, 194, 240 f., 247, 249, 257 f.

## S

SHAEP, 19 f., 42, 46-49, 52, 74, 95, 230  
 SHAEP period in military government, 46-52, 57-60, 61  
 SWNCC, 41, 74, 77, 197, 199, 209-210  
 Schaumburg-Lippe, State of, 177  
 School of Military Government at Charlottesville, 6 f., 9, 11  
 Schools, contamination by Nazis, 149-151; military government activities relating to, 113-114  
 Secretary General, OMGUS, 47  
 Selection of military government officers, 33-34  
 Senior colonels, problem of, 28-30  
 Seventh Army, 26, 48 n., 52, 58, 74, 210  
 Shrivenham, England, Civil Affairs Training Center, 12-16  
 Sicily, military government in, 3-4  
 Sixth Army Group, 48  
 Social Democrats, 182 f.  
 Social insurance, 126-127  
 Spanish American War, military government in, 1-2  
 Spatial planning, 170  
 Special Branches, 141  
 Specialist officers in military government, 33-35  
 Specialist pool, 51  
 Specialization in World War II as related to military government, 2  
 Staff organization in military government, 41-56  
 Stanford University, CATS at, 7  
 State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee. See SWNCC

State Department, in military government, 41-42, 77, 171, 200, 209-222  
 Sulzberger, C. L., 232 n.  
 Supreme Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Force *See* SHAEF  
 Surplus officers, in military government, 30-31

## T

Tactical officers, in military government, 35  
 Tax system, 108  
 Teacher training institutes, 157  
 Teams (detachments), military government, 58-61  
 Technical channel of communications, in military government, 52-53, 55  
 Textbooks in German schools, 150-151, 154-155  
 Third Army, 26, 52, 58, 74, 210  
*Time*, 232  
 Trade and industry. *See* Economic affairs  
 Traffic control, 82-83  
 Training of military government officers, 6, 7-11, 13, 15  
 Transport Division, OMGUS, 47  
 Transportation facilities, 112-113  
 Tribunals, military government, 108-109, 125  
 Twelfth Army Group, 48

## U

UNRRA, 122  
 US Group CC, 18, 26, 30, 35-36, 37, 39, 43-46, 71-72, 74, 95, 141, 152, 154, 160 f., 168, 169 ff., 183, 192, 195, 197, 202, 206, 212, 214, 218, 221, 227, 235, 263

US Group, Control Council for Germany. *See* US Group CC  
 US Information Centers, 185 n.  
 Underground movement, 105  
 Unemployment, 126  
 Unified Reich, attitude of military government toward, 173-174  
 University of Michigan, CATS at, 7-8; German studies at, 18  
 University of Pittsburgh, CATS at, 7-8

## V

Versailles, France, as military government higher headquarters, 44  
 "Vetting," 141, 143

## W

War Department, in military government, 41-42, 76-77  
 Weimar Republic, 167  
 Western Military District, 52  
 Western Reserve University, CATS at, 7-8  
 "White" lists, 92  
 Winant, Ambassador John G., 210  
 World War I, military government in, 1-2  
 Wurttemberg-Baden, new State, 98-99, 101, 175

## Y

Yale University, CATS at, 7-8  
 Yalta Conference, 43, 67, 168, 204, 235  
 Youth program, military government activities relating to, 163

